

# AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN POETICS

*Edited by*

**Professor V RAGHAVAN**

*Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit,  
University of Madras*

AND

**Professor NAGENDRA**

*Professor and Head of the Department of Hindi,  
University of Delhi*



**MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED**

**BOMBAY**

**CALCUTTA**

**MADRAS**

**LONDON**

**1970**

**MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED**

**Bombay Calcutta Madras**

**Companies and representatives throughout the world**

*Copyright © by V. Raghavan and Nagendra, 1970*

## PREFACE

This volume has been designed to meet the needs of the foreign as well as the Indian reader who has no access to the original texts in Sanskrit or in modern Indian Languages and to help him in his search for the basic principles of Indian Poetics. It comprises articles by recognised scholars in the field, and presents a survey as also a critical appraisal of the main aspects of Indian Poetics. To facilitate smooth reading, we have generally excluded erudite references, longer quotations and recondite details and added English equivalents, brief explanatory notes or translations wherever necessary.

As we traverse deeper into the realm of the science of poetry, we find enough reasons to believe that like their systems of philosophy, the poetical theories of India and the West are complementary to each other, and a reliable common code of literary standards can be evolved through a rational and coordinated study of the two. We can modestly hope that our book may serve as a corner stone of such an edifice which is yet to be built.

Our acknowledgements are due to the learned contributors or to their heirs and publishers for according permission to use their valuable material. We are also grateful to M/s Macmillan & Co, Ltd, for their cooperation in executing our plan.

May, 1969

Raghavan & Nagendra

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Preface</i>	iii
<i>Kane, P. V.</i>	
1. The Origin and Growth of Poetics in Sanskrit ..	1
<i>Hiriyanna, M.</i>	
2 The Main Aspects of Indian Aesthetics ..	9
<i>Kuppusu ami Sastri, S.</i>	
3 The Highways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit ..	20
(i) Law and Liberty .. .. .	20
(ii) The Central Principle of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit	27
<i>Dasgupta, S. N.</i>	
4 The Theory of Rasa .. .. .	36
<i>De, S. K.</i>	
5. Vāmana's Theory of Riti .. .. .	42
6. Kuntaka's Theory of Poetry: Vakrokti .. .. .	50
<i>Sreekantaiya, T. N.</i>	
7. Imagination in Indian Poetics .. .. .	61
<i>Gnoli, R.</i>	
8. The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta ..	75
<i>Raghavan, V.</i>	
9. Sāhitya .. .. .	82
10. Use and Abuse of Alampkāra .. .. .	94
11. Aucitya in Sanskrit Poetics .. .. .	102
<i>Nagendra</i>	
12 The Nature of Aesthetic Experience .. .. .	117
13 Tragic Pleasure or The Enjoyment of the Pathetic Sentiment .. .. .	128
<i>The Contributors</i> .. .. .	138
Bibliography .. .. .	141



# 1 THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF POETICS IN SANSKRIT\*

*Professor P V Kane*

## EARLY POETIC EFFORTS

It is extremely difficult to give an accurate definition of poetry and try to distinguish it from other forms of literature. But true poetry (leaving aside the question whether a work clothed in prose is poetry or not) is distinguished at least by three things, viz, by a certain peculiar diction, by its subject matter and by the spirit in which it approaches the handling of its themes. Judged from this stand point, the most ancient monument of the Indo Aryan languages, viz, the *Rgveda*, contains, though it is mainly a religious book of fervent prayers, a great deal of true poetry. (Many of the hymns, particularly those addressed to Uṣas, exhibit fine specimens of poetry. The Rgvedic poets not only indulge in such figures of speech as Upamā,<sup>1</sup> Atiśayokti<sup>2</sup> and Rupaka<sup>3</sup> (as in *Rgveda* III 27 15, IX 64 1), but they appear to have had some ideas about a theory of Poetics, as the following brief statement will show. They are fond of the repetition of the same letters or words which create an appearance of what is called Anuprasa<sup>4</sup> in later times. An interesting verse is *Rgveda* X 71 2, 'When men of wisdom create by their intellect verse (lit. speech) after winnowing (words) as barley grains are sifted by means of a winnowing basket, then men of equal knowledge understand (recognize) the meaning (contained in the verse), in their verses (speech) blessed glory is enshrined (resides)'. This makes it clear that a distinction is here made between ordinary speech and poetic speech, that poets have to pick and choose their words and that poetry leads on to bliss and glory. *Rgveda* X 125 is a sublime hymn to Vāk (put in the mouth of Vāk herself) wherein the power of speech is most effectively and picturesquely described. The word 'Kāvya' (poem) occurs several times in the *Rgveda*, the word Gāthā (a verse that is sung) also often occurs in the *Rgveda*, this shows that poems with sweet words were highly valued in those very ancient times and, though no theory of Poetics could be stated to have been evolved, the germs of it were

---

\*From *The History of Sanskrit Poetics*—Part Two

<sup>1</sup>Simile

<sup>2</sup>Hyperbole,

<sup>3</sup>Metaphor

<sup>4</sup>Alliteration,



Prekṣā<sup>1</sup>, Ākhyana<sup>2</sup> and Sobhanagaraka or *Sobhanaka*,<sup>3</sup> are mentioned. The preceding brief discussion shows that from at least 500 B C to 100 B C a great deal of poetical material of a secular character had been accumulated in classical Sanskrit. This must have naturally led to speculations about the functions and objects of poetry, the classification of different kinds of poetry and literary works like Ākhyayikas,<sup>4</sup> the enunciation of rules about the standard form of certain classes of composition, in short, to attempts, more or less crude, to establish a theory of Poetics and literary criticism. From this time onwards the two processes viz composition of secular poetry and the elaboration of rules must have proceeded hand in hand.

### EARLY BEGINNINGS OF POETICS

Epigraphic records of the 2nd century A D and onwards show that before that period a theory of Poetics had been evolved. In Seven Brāhmi Inscriptions from Mathurā<sup>5</sup>, Lüders says that in one of them occurs a verse in the *Bhujangaviṣṭambhita* metre and that therefore it must be conceded that Kāvya (poetry) was fully developed before the first century B C. The Inscription of Rudradaman at Junāgaḍ (dated 150 A D) sheds much light on the stage Poetics had reached by that time. The preserved portion contains only two verbs, it is written in prose with long compounds, it is full of alliteration and other tricks with words. This shows that in or before the second century A D, Kāvya had been divided into Gadya<sup>6</sup> and Padya<sup>7</sup>, that some of the Guṇas<sup>8</sup> that figure in later works had been already named, and that both Gadya and Padya were required to be Alamkāra—that is, endowed with figures of speech. The composer of this inscription was evidently trying to come up to the standard of a good poet laid down in the works on Poetics of his day and therefore the inscription represents at least a mediocre attempt at what a Kāvya was in those days required to be. The Nasik Inscription of Siri Pulumāyi which is somewhat earlier than that of Rudradaman, though in Prakrit, exhibits the same traits. In the first two centuries of the Christian era both Sanskrit and Prakrit inscriptions were engraved and fol-

<sup>1</sup>Theatrical show

<sup>2</sup>Narrative

<sup>3</sup>pantomimist

<sup>4</sup>Narratives

<sup>5</sup>*Epigraphia Indica* Vol 24, p 193 ff

<sup>6</sup>Prose

<sup>7</sup>Verse

<sup>8</sup>Qualities



owed the same pattern of literary style. The Ayodhya Sunga Inscription of Dhana (deva or bhuti), who was the sixth from Senapati Puṣyamitra is in Sanskrit and the inscription of Rudradaman has been cited above already. The inscription of Kharavela is in Prakrit, shows all the traits of the inscription of Rudradaman and mentions Gandharva veda<sup>1</sup>, Nāṭa<sup>2</sup>, Gīta<sup>3</sup>, Vādita<sup>4</sup> and Utsavasamaja<sup>5</sup>. They are full of alliteration the language is forcible and sonorous and there are long compounds which were the essence of prose according to the later works like the *Āvyaḍarśa* (I 80) which dictum was probably based on older prose works now lost that were imitated by the writers of the early inscriptions in Sanskrit and Prakrit. An inscription of the 4th century A D contains a panegyric of the great Emperor Samudragupta by Hariṣeṇa<sup>6</sup>. The prose of this panegyric rivals the style of Bāṇa. It tells us that the title Kaviraja (king of poets) has been applied to Samudragupta on account of the composition of many Kavyas that were the source of inspiration to learned men. These inscriptions therefore show that long before the 4th century A D Poetics had made a good deal of progress. There are other indications of great antiquity that point in the same direction. The *Nighaṇṭu* (III 13) collects twelve phrases from the *Rgveda* and calls them Upama<sup>7</sup>. The *Nirukta* while commenting on this part of the *Nighaṇṭu* cites a scientific definition of Upama by Gargya a predecessor of Yaska, and remarks that in the *Rgveda* a superior object is sometimes compared with an inferior one though the general rule is that Upamana<sup>8</sup> is superior to or more well known than the Upameya<sup>9</sup>. Yaska foreshadows the later distinction between Purṇa (full) and Lupta (elliptic) Simile. A complete Upama is stated here to have four constituent elements Upamana Upameya (or Upamita) the common property (Samanya) and the word expressive of the relation (such as Iva Tulya). Long before Paṇini these technical words relating to Simile had become fixed in the language. Paṇini refers to the *Nāṭasūtras* (Guide book for Actors) composed by Śilalin and Kṛśasva<sup>10</sup>. It is not unlikely that they gave instruction as to what the business of

---

<sup>1</sup>Mus c and dance

<sup>2</sup>Actor

<sup>3</sup>Song

<sup>4</sup>Instrumental mus c

<sup>5</sup>Festivals and festive gatherings

<sup>6</sup>Vide Fleet's *Gupta Inscriptions* No 1 p 8

<sup>7</sup>Simile

<sup>8</sup>That with which the comparison is made

<sup>9</sup>That which is compared

<sup>10</sup>*Aṣṭadhyayi* IV 3 110-111



extant that were composed about the time of (or a little later than) Bāṇa such as those of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha.

### THE NAME OF THE ŚĀSTRA<sup>1</sup>

The earlier works of Poetics are generally designated *Kāvya-lamkāra*, e.g. the works of Bhāmaha, Vāmana and Rudraṭa. These works were so-called probably because *Alamkāras* played the most prominent part in the treatment of Poetics in them. Vāmana in his *Kāvya-lamkāra-sūtra* tells us that the word *Alamkāra* is used in two senses, viz. (i) a thing of beauty, and (ii) a figure of speech. According to him it follows that a work on Poetics is called *Kāvya-lamkāra* because it points out and explains the things of beauty in *Kāvya*, which make us prize the latter. This is more or less scholastic. Even in those early works that are not designated as *Alamkāra*, figures of speech loom very large as in the *Kāvya-darśa* of Daṇḍin, three fourths of which is taken up by the explanation and elucidation of figures of speech of *Śabda*<sup>2</sup> and *Artha*<sup>3</sup>. The *Kāvya-darśa* says—‘Yathāsāmarthyamasmbhiḥ kriyate kāvyalakṣaṇam’, i.e., I am attempting ‘*Kāvya-lakṣaṇa*’ to the best of my ability. The *Dhvanyāloka* speaks of writers on Poetics as *Kāvyalakṣaṇavidhāyinaḥ*, i.e., the writers on ‘*Kāvya-lakṣaṇa*.’ Though in I 1 Bhāmaha calls his work *Kāvya-lamkāra*, at the end (VI. 64) he refers to it as *Kāvya-lakṣma*. The *Dhvanyāloka* also (in I 3) speaks of *Kāvyalakṣma-vidhāyinaḥ*, i.e. the authors of *Kāvya-lakṣma*, as having explained *Upamā* and other figures of expressed sense. Another name for Poetics is *Sāhitya*. This word seems to have been used in early works in three different but allied senses, though in modern times it is generally employed for Poetics. In the verse ‘*Sāhitya-sangīta-kalā-vihīnaḥ*’ the word *Sāhitya* appears to have been used in the sense of *Kāvya*. In the verse ‘*Sāhitya-pāṭhanidhimanthanottham kāvyāmṛtam rakṣata he kavīndrāḥ*’, it will be noticed that *Sāhitya* means ‘literature in general’ and *Kāvya* is said to arise like nectar from the ocean of *Sāhitya* (i.e., *Kāvya* is the quintessence of *Sāhitya*). Prati-hārendurāja, eulogising his teacher Mukula and his proficiency in the *Mīmāṃsā* and other *Śāstras*, speaks of him as ‘*Sāhitya-śrīmurareḥ*’; here obviously the word *Sāhitya* stands for *Sāhitya-śāstra* (as in the

<sup>1</sup>See also Raghavan, *Some Concepts of Alamkāra Śāstra*, Ch. B. The Evolution of the Names of Sanskrit Poetics and below pp. 22ff., his section on *Sāhitya*.

<sup>2</sup>Word

<sup>3</sup>Meaning.



case of *Mīmāṃsā*, *Vyākaraṇa* and *Tarka* that precede this expression) *Rajaśekhara*<sup>1</sup> says 'Panchamī Sāhitya vidyete Yayavarīyaḥ' i.e. the fifth is the *Sāhitya vidyā*. These passages establish that some time before 900 A.D. (when *Rajaśekhara* flourished) the word 'Sāhitya' came to be used in the sense of 'the science of Poetics'. How much earlier it was employed in that sense, it is difficult to say. The word 'Sāhitya' seems to be derived from 'Sahita'—meaning 'together'. When Poetry came to be defined as 'Śabdārthau Sahitau Kāvyaṃ' (i.e. the word and meaning together constitute poetry), the science of poetic criticism that propounded this definition was naturally called *Sāhitya*. *Rajaśekhara*<sup>2</sup> gives this etymology 'Śabdarthayoḥ yathavatsaha bhāvena vidyā'—the science of perfect union between word and meaning. *Bhāmaha* says 'Śabdārthau Sahitau Kāvyaṃ' and *Vakroktijīvita* does the same. In order to constitute real *Kāvya*, the *Sahitya* (union) of *Śabda* and *Artha* is required to possess peculiar charm. Therefore, the use of the word *Sāhitya* arose probably after the 7th or 8th century A.D.

### THE TOPICS OF THE *ĀLANKĀRA ŚĀSTRA*

The next question is to consider the problem with which the science of Poetics grapples. The first problem of Poetics is to declare what poetry can do for us and for the poet also (i.e. to enumerate the *prayojanas* (ends) of *Kāvya*). Then the *Śāstra* has to consider the essential qualities that constitute the equipment of a poet (i.e. *Kāvya-hetu* has to be considered). A definition of *Kāvya* is attempted. In defining a *Kāvya*, reference is generally made to *Śabda* and *Artha* and one has also to say what constitutes the soul or the essence of *Kāvya* (which makes *Kāvya* what it is). It is here (about the soul of poetry) that the greatest divergence of view prevails. As *Śabda* and *Artha* are necessary for *Kāvya*, the various powers of word and its relation to *Artha* have to be discussed. This leads to the topic of the three *Vṛttis*<sup>3</sup>—*Abhidhā*, *Lakṣaṇa* and *Vyañjanā* and their sub-divisions and the three kinds of *Artha*—*Vācya*, *Lakṣya* and *Vyañgya*. The critic has to give the several divisions of *Kāvya* from different stand points, viz. into *Gadya*<sup>4</sup>, *Padya*<sup>5</sup>, *Miśra*<sup>6</sup> (according to the external form), into the best, mediocre and inferior *Kāvya* according to the

<sup>1</sup>*Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, p. 4

<sup>2</sup>*Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, p. 5

<sup>3</sup>Powers of words—denotation, indication and suggestion

<sup>4</sup>Prose

<sup>5</sup>Verses

<sup>6</sup>Mixed



## 2 THE MAIN ASPECTS OF INDIAN AESTHETICS\*

*Professor M Hiriyanna*

It is usual for every prominent philosopher in the West to regard the question of beauty as a part of the problem he is attempting to solve. Hence aesthetics has come to be recognised there as a regular part of philosophy. The intrinsic relation implied in this between aesthetics and philosophy is not denied in India, but the former of these studies is carried on by a distinct class of thinkers—*Ālaṃkarikas*, as they are called, or literary critics—who are not, generally speaking, professional philosophers. This separation of aesthetic problems, in the matter of investigation, from those of general philosophy may at first sight appear not only strange but also defective, a little reflection, however, will show that it is not really so. Before explaining this point, however, it is necessary to state that when we say that Indian philosophers have not troubled themselves with questions of beauty, what is meant is only that they do not deal with beauty in art and not also beauty in nature. The latter is certainly included, but, while it is explicit in some systems, it is only implicit in others. The exact view which they hold in this respect will become clear as we proceed. As regards their neglect of beauty in art, the reason is that its pursuit cannot, according to them, directly minister to the attainment of the final goal of life, which is the prime concern of Indian philosophers. Perhaps some among them thought that its pursuit might even tend to lead man away from that goal, in which case their attitude towards art would be like that of Plato towards the same.

So far from being a defect, the separation of aesthetics in this sense from general philosophy has many positive advantages. It has thereby been able to get rid of the constraint which particular types of metaphysical thought may impose upon it. When a philosopher holds a particular view of reality, he is bound to square his theory of art, if he formulates one, with it, and the consequence is that we have as many theories of art in the West as there are theories of reality. This cannot be helped in the case of beauty in nature, but there is no reason for acquiescing in such diversity of views in a theory of art. That is the view of Indian aestheticians. Thus the postulation by Indian aestheticians of what is called *Vvāṅgy artha* (suggested sense),



which is not only not recognised by any school of philosophy but is definitely opposed, shows the freedom with which aesthetic investigation has been carried on in India<sup>1</sup>. They have succeeded in this in evolving a theory of meaning which, as we shall try to point out, certainly sheds new light on the nature of art. Where it is not necessary to devise such a new theory, Indian aestheticians select one or other of the views held by the philosophic schools according to the needs of the case. Such eclecticism results in a more detached view (from the aesthetic standpoint) than would be the case if a particular philosophic point of view were adopted in its entirety. This does not, however, mean that there is a dull uniformity in the Indian theory of art. There is as much diversity in it as in any Western treatment of the subject, but the important point is that the diversity is based upon purely artistic considerations and is, therefore, more genuine.

There is another reason to support the Indian practice. Reality, as represented in art, as is generally admitted, is a unity in diversity, so that there is no room for any divergence of opinion in regard to it, so far as art is concerned. The aim of art is not to discover the nature of reality but to secure for us the highest experience of life. It does not pronounce any final opinion on the tenability or otherwise of the view of reality it thus uses. In other words, aesthetics unlike ethics for instance, is alogical. While it is closely connected with psychology it regards logic, or more properly epistemology, as irrelevant to its purpose. Art is a short cut to the ultimate value of life, by-passing logic. Even supposing it is not admitted that reality, as represented in art, is necessarily a unity in diversity, the view of reality that may be accepted in its stead does not matter, for it is to serve but as the medium through which the value is realised, art being concerned less with facts than with values.

### NATURE AND ART

We have distinguished nature from art. The question will naturally arise here whether there is any need for seeking beauty in art, if it is found in nature. As G. E. Moore has stated in his *Principia Ethica*, when other things are the same, beauty which is found in actual objects is decidedly better than that in imaginary ones. It is therefore necessary to point out why art is necessary, though in certain respects the beauty which it presents may be inferior to that in nature. As regards the latter, two views are possible.

<sup>1</sup>See Jayaratha's commentary on Ruyyaka's *Alamkarasartanā* p. 10, Nirnayastagar Press Edition.

(i) We may hold, with the idealists, that nature as a whole is beautiful, but that when it is looked at in parts, it may or may not be so. That is, though nature may, in reality, be beautiful, there may appear ugliness in it when we take a partial view of it as, ordinarily speaking, we are bound to do. This means that, though in the case of those few who can take a synoptic view of nature, art may be superfluous, it is not so in the case of the many. As an old Vedantic stanza has it, it is only 'when man has overcome selfishness and realised the highest truth, he will be in rapt ecstasy wherever he may turn,' for he sees the glory of Being everywhere. Till then, therefore, he can have an experience of complete beauty only in art. Further, even as regards the parts that appear beautiful in nature, there is no certainty that they will continue to be so for long. For there may come to be a change in our attitude towards them, when their appeal will become non-aesthetic. Or the situations in nature may themselves so change in course of time that they will cease to appear beautiful. Hence it is that we require the creations of art which are not subject to these defects—a change in the presentations of nature or in our attitude towards them. This is the need for art according to the idealistic view of nature.

(ii) The second view of nature is that though it may be beautiful, that feature is inevitably associated with ugliness and that the latter element cannot be eliminated from it without, at the same time, eliminating the former also. According to this pessimistic view, art becomes even more necessary. In fact, it is the sole means, in this view, of satisfying the quest for unmixed joy which somehow actuates all men or, to state the same otherwise, the need for escaping from the struggles and perplexities of everyday life.

Whatever the worth of these two metaphysical theories in themselves may be, the point that is important for us now is that there is a need for art in either case. To state this need in terms applicable to both the views, it is the presence, on the one hand, of evil in life and, on the other, of an ideal within us that has led to the invention of art. Here we may observe, in passing, we have another instance of Indian aesthetics transcending the differences that characterise the metaphysical schools. Art is a device for the provisional attainment of the final ideal of life, whether or not we look forward to a state which eventually renders it superfluous<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>There is an ultimate ideal according to the second view also, but it is a state transcending joy as well as suffering. Positivistically speaking, this means that man may cultivate detachment to such an extent that he will ignore nature altogether. But there is nothing resembling aesthetic pleasure then, unless we understand the



## ART EXPERIENCE

The aim of art is implicit in what we have said so far. It is to secure for man a unique form of experience which, according to one view, can never be attained in actual life and, according to the other, can be attained only when self-perfection is achieved. But either way, it is an ultimate value in the sense that it is sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything else<sup>1</sup>. The characteristics of this art experience are two:

(1) The first is unselfishness. It is true that all or nearly all men, in virtue of their social nature, show more or less of unselfishness in their behaviour; but it may be the result of habit or of prudential, and therefore eventually of selfish, considerations. Such outward unselfishness is not what is meant here. Even when it is spontaneous and therefore quite genuine, it is not complete. The selflessness signified by art experience, on the other hand, is not only spontaneous but also complete. Man grows so unselfish then that he becomes virtually unconscious of his private self. This is the meaning of saying that art experience consists in the disinterested contemplation of beauty. The intrusion of any personal aim is sure to vitiate it, and make the pursuit of art unsuccessful.

(2) The second characteristic, which is probably a consequence of the first, is that it yields a kind of joy which is pure and untainted by even the least pain. This is a further indication of the transcendental character of art experience; and it shows that the aesthetic attitude stands higher than that of common or everyday life which is invariably characterised by more or less of mental tension.

On account of these excellences, art experience is regarded as identifiable with the ultimate goal of life as it is conceived by the idealists. When we take the ideal of life, as it is conceived by others, art experience affords the same escape from worldly concerns as that ideal, when attained, does; but it also does more for, while the latter does not represent a state of supreme joy, the former does. According to both, it is one of the only two such values recognised by Indians—*Ātmānanda*<sup>2</sup> and *Rasānubhava*<sup>3</sup>.

## THE CONTENT OF ART

But what is the means whereby the artist is able to secure for us such experience? All art is a blend of form and content; and it is

<sup>1</sup>Self realization in Advaita is value-realisation, for the Self is the ultimate value.

<sup>2</sup>Spiritual bliss.

<sup>3</sup>Aesthetic enjoyment.

through certain excellences characterising either that he succeeds in inducing in us the artistic attitude. In the case of poetry, for example, the content is constituted by the figurative ideas and sentiments it expresses, and the form, by the musical language through which they find expression. Of these, the form varies much from one art to another, and it is also technical. We shall not refer to it here at any length, and shall confine our attention mainly to the content. We shall only observe, in passing, that the legitimate function of form is to subserve the content, and if it assumes greater importance, the work in which it does so marks a lapse from the best type of art.

The content of art may be defined generally as the meaning which it expresses. The excellences that may characterise it are many, and they have been classified in various ways. But these details, while they are undoubtedly helpful in indicating to us their character in a concrete manner, can never be exhaustively enumerated. As one Indian literary critic observes<sup>1</sup>, they can only be indicated generally. This general character of the content of art is that it must be drawn from actual life, but that it should also be judiciously idealised. The purpose of the idealisation is two fold. In the first place, it is that, having its source in the artist's imagination, it may appeal to the same faculty in the spectator and not to his intellect merely. In the second place, it is that the particular things of common experience may thereby be transformed into general ones, and thus readily induce a detached attitude in the spectator which, as we have pointed out, is a salient feature of all art experience. But it is necessary to add that the things represented in art will not become false or fictitious through such idealisation. For a spectator to mistake them for real objects, as we do in illusions, will be to lapse from the truly aesthetic attitude, because he will then cease to remain detached. But at the same time, they cannot be viewed as unreal or false because then they will cease to interest him. Thus the things depicted in art assume a unique character which the spectator can describe as neither real nor unreal. In brief, we do not take a logical view of them. We neither believe nor disbelieve in their reality. We merely entertain them<sup>2</sup>.

This is the general view of the content of art which is prevalent everywhere; Indian aestheticians also held the same opinion for a long time, but a profound change in this respect, the germs of which seem to have been there all along, was introduced about the 9th century A.D. The change was to look upon what had so far been

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Vāgbhaṭa in his *Alaṅkāra* p. 77, N. S. Press edn.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. 'Poetic Truth'.



regarded as the content of art viz , the meaning also as only the outer vesture of art and to take emotion as its true content<sup>1</sup> When the meaning in general was regarded as the content, it might be emotion or might not be, but now it is laid down that it should be only emotion. We have stated that the appeal of art should be to the imagination, and imagination always implies the presence of emotion in some degree or other. But it is not this emotion that we should think of now. It is the emotional character of the situation depicted by the artist that constitutes the true content of art, and the type of experience to which it gives rise in the spectator is called *Rasa*. A consequence of this change in the idea of the content of art was to deny that the expressed meaning can have any excellences of its own and to assert that, like the form, it also has them only in relation to the emotion which it is intended to subserve. The excellences of meaning may be the very best, according to earlier standards, but yet they may produce the exact opposite of artistic feeling in the spectator, if they are out of harmony with the emotion depicted. This rightly introduces a relativistic view into art criticism and neither form nor meaning was thenceforward regarded as beautiful in itself. The standards by which they were judged remained more or less the same, but they ceased to be taken as absolute.

We may point out before concluding this topic that the earlier view of art as consisting in the excellences characterising its form and meaning was not abandoned. That view also was retained, but works answering to that description came to be assigned an inferior status. It is designated '*Citra*', a term which, in all probability, signifies that its merit lies more in skill which appeals to our intellect rather than in affecting our life or soul.

### THE METHOD OF ART

Now emotions cannot be directly communicated. We can, of course, talk of, say, love or fear, but these words, when used by themselves merely convey the idea of the corresponding feeling and do not communicate it to the listener. Such communication of it is possible only through a proper portrayal of select aspects of its causes and consequences. That is, the artist is obliged if he is to succeed in what is his foremost aim to adopt an indirect method in dealing with his material. This method is called *Dhvani* (suggestion), and secondarily, the work of art also, which is characterised by it, is designated by the

---

<sup>1</sup>Poetry was brought nearer music thereby.

same term. It had always been recognised as important for the artist, but only as one of those at his disposal for conveying the appropriate sentiment to the spectator. We may instance, as illustrating this point, *Alaṃkāras* like *Paryāyokti*<sup>1</sup> and *Samāsokti*<sup>2</sup>, which are mentioned in the earliest *Alaṃkāra* works. The discovery that was made later was that it was the sole method of the best type of art. This, we may add, was the direct consequence of recognising *Rasa* to be the aim *par excellence* of the artist. The method of art is thus as unique as its aim.

The method of *Dhvani* has naturally been extended to other spheres of art where direct communication is possible, viz., *Alaṃkaras*, and has led to a preference being shown to them when they are indirectly suggested, instead of being directly expressed. Owing, however, to the intimate connection between imagination on which *Alaṃkaras* are chiefly based and emotion on which *Rasa* is, the difference between them is not always quite definite. The one may easily pass into another. Hence the decision in any particular case depends upon the view one takes of it, and it accordingly becomes personal, illustrating the well known saying that tastes differ. Another extension of this theory of *Dhvani* is to those poetic representations, which can be regarded neither as *Rasa* nor as *Alaṃkara* and are therefore indefinitely designated as *Vastu*<sup>3</sup>. The innovation thus introduced by the *Dhvani* canon here, like that in the case of *Alaṃkāras*, we may observe, is more in re-arranging conclusions that had already been reached than in making any new additions. The above statements enable us to divide the subject of first rate art in a triple way. It may be emotion when the resulting experience is called *Rasa dhvani*, it may be any other imaginative situation, in which case it will be *Alaṃkara dhvani*, or it may be a matter-of-fact representation, in which case it will be *Vastu dhvani*.

The discovery that the *Dhvani* method is the secret of true art furnishes another instance of what we described above as the alogical character of art. The conclusions suggested by this method vary according to the persons concerned and the contexts to which they belong, although the premises given are the same. At best, the mental process involved resembles analogical reasoning. Some of the erroneous views current before the method of *Dhvani* was formulated, or after, are due to mistaking the method of art to be logical. Thus Mahima Bhaṭṭa tried to make out that the process involved in the so called *Dhvani* was nothing but inferential, and others like Mukula

<sup>1</sup> & <sup>2</sup> Figures of speech

<sup>3</sup> Any part of the idea or subject matter



Bhaṭṭa represented the secondary senses of words as derived through the *Pramāṇa*<sup>1</sup> known as *Arthapatti*<sup>2</sup>. Both forgot that the *Dhvani* lacks the element of necessity, which is essential to what is strictly a logical process.

### ART AND MORALITY

We have referred to two views of reality in explaining the need for art. Whichever of them we may adopt, the implication is the presence of evil in life. According to one of these views, evil is finally removable, according to the other also it is so, only its removal involves the removal of good as well along with it. Overlooking this distinction which is really irrelevant for art, we may ask what the bearing of art is on the problem of evil which it thus implicitly postulates<sup>3</sup>.

It may appear that art cannot be unconnected with morality, since the experience which it yields is, as we have pointed out, essentially disinterested, and disinterestedness is the very root of all morality. It is, therefore, necessary to examine what precisely the significance of this attitude is. To begin with, the ethical attitude is more than one of mere detachment. It is essentially active, but activity is from the very nature of the case, wholly excluded from art experience. Or to state the same otherwise the ethical attitude is orientated towards some purpose while the artistic is quite the reverse, its sole purpose being the transcendence of all purpose. It is an attitude of contemplation rather than of achievement. Even as regards the unselfishness, which it shares with the ethical attitude, there is a vital distinction. There are two points to be noted in connection with it. In the first place, the aesthetic attitude is induced by an external stimulus. When once it has arisen, it may be quite genuine, but we cannot overlook the fact that it is due to an external influence. Morality which springs from fear of punishment or hope of reward is really no morality at all. The unselfishness characterising the ethical attitude, on the other hand, springs from inside and is quite spontaneous. It is only when it is the result of an inner urge that it will be of an enduring influence on life. But this latter feature is lacking in the case of the art attitude, which we chiefly owe to the power that all true works of art possess. That such an exalted attitude can be produced without any arduous trouble on the part of the spectator, is indeed an excellence of it, but it is

---

<sup>1</sup>A mode of proof/evidence

<sup>2</sup>Presumption: one of the sources of knowledge or modes of proof accepted by some philosophers

<sup>3</sup>It is the problem of evil that gives rise to art as well as to philosophy

unfortunately fugitive. Sooner or later, it comes to an end for it cannot last longer than the outside stimulus which has evoked it. Even such short lived experience may, through refining emotions, leave some good influence behind, but the point to be noted is that there is no guarantee that it will. In the second place, the disinterestedness of the aesthetic attitude marks a reaction to an imaginary situation and not to a real one. It results from the contemplation not of actual but fictitious situations created by the artist. Fiction facilitates detachment. The consequence of this again is unfavourable to true morality, whose proper sphere is actual life. Thus even though perfect selflessness may be a prominent mark of art experience, its influence on the moral side of man may be very little. When that experience ceases he may lapse into the former state of tension and perplexity, which has its source in a selfish outlook on life.

According to some, this is no defect at all, for art, they maintain, has nothing to do with morality and is ethically neutral. But if that is so, it ceases to be a human value, and its recognition of evil as a fact of life becomes virtually meaningless<sup>1</sup>. There has been much controversy in this respect among art critics, but if we take a comprehensive view of man's nature and his aims, it seems that art cannot be altogether divorced from morality<sup>2</sup>. Art is, no doubt, for its own sake. But, in the result, it should be more by being a criticism of life's values. This explains, for instance, the double standard of our judging a character appearing in a work of art. To take the case of Iago, as an example, we not only speak of him as a perfect creation of Shakespeare but also condemn him as wicked in the extreme. The practice of the best artists is our support here. And the close alliance, again, of art with religion in all countries and in all times appears to be for saving art from possible degeneration by its separation from morality<sup>3</sup>. Art, correctly conceived, cannot be merely a selfish escape from life, it must also influence life permanently or, at least, tend to do so. But the view that art is not connected with morality is not altogether baseless. The truth underlying it is that art has nothing directly to do with morality. It should influence character indirectly, and what is discountenanced is only direct instruction in that regard,

---

<sup>1</sup>It would also then cease to appeal to the whole being of man which, as an ultimate value, it is expected to do.

<sup>2</sup>It would then amount to a selfish escape from the tedium of life—a view as blameworthy as pure asceticism is in ethics. Both are at bottom egoistic, being preoccupied with oneself and not caring in the least for society.

<sup>3</sup>The association of art with religion in all probability is primarily to make the latter attractive but it has undoubtedly helped to prevent the former from deteriorating.



for it will militate against the primary purpose of art which is to raise man above all strife and secure a form of unique joyful experience<sup>1</sup>

When even the primary aim of art is to be attained indirectly, it is natural to ask What is this indirect connection between art and morality? It cannot be due to the method of art for fables and parables teach morality indirectly but are not art It must be through the characters which it introduces or what comes to the same thing through the general significance of the plot that art can exercise moral influence on the spectators<sup>2</sup> The implied outlook of these characters on life and the world should be moral 'That is a true poem' says an old Indian authority which treats of the doings of the good and the great The best examples of this are to be found in the great epics of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* whose indirect influence on Indian men and women has all along been greater than that of any other single factor In a work of art where no such characters are found say a lyric poem it is the artist's outlook on what he portrays that counts The conclusion to be drawn from this is that art should not have a moral aim but must necessarily have a moral view if it should fulfil its true purpose<sup>3</sup> This is not to make art didactic for morality does not form either its content or its purpose according to this view

In addition to this general moral view there may be some aspect of the moral ideal dominating the conduct of the hero or of other characters and be thus intimately woven into the structure of the plot<sup>4</sup> It will then become an organic part of the content of art A very good example of it is found in Bhavabhūti's drama *Uttara rāma carita* Here as in any other great work of art there is a general moral view pervading the whole piece It includes not a single character which leads to any lapse from the high level that is expected in a play of which Rama is the hero But over and above this there is Rāma's sense of public duty (as interpreted by him of course) and his determination that it should have priority over all private obligations which forms the very pivot on which the whole of the story here

<sup>1</sup> In this sense the following statement of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is correct

Kāvyo rāso yā tū sarvo na bodhā na niyoga bhik (Quoted in *Dikṣyaśāloka* loc. cit. p. 1) N. S. Prasad in 1938)

<sup>2</sup> It is not what the characters say that counts but what they are and what they do.

<sup>3</sup> No art it will present characters like Iago as examples to be followed But the negative attitude towards them is not enough He should do his best to leave the impression on us that they are warnings.

<sup>4</sup> This is the meaning of *śloka* in the *Arthashastra* saying that any of the *Puruṣārthas* (principal objects of human life) may be the content of art. When either *Artha* (money) or *Kāma* (sensual enjoyment) forms the content a general moral view is expected to prevail when *Dharma* (religion) becomes the content there is the additional emphasis on morality.

dramatised turns<sup>1</sup>. Unlike the general moral view, this is in the foreground of the picture. But it must be added that it, in no way, encroaches upon the artistic function of the play which is to awaken in us the emotion of love—not as the source of all life's joy, but as leading to pathos which so often and so inexplicably comes in its wake. This emphasis on the importance of public duty may be the main lesson of the story. But the story is not the end in dramatic art; it is only a means to the communication to the spectators of the Rasa in question.

That is, the creations of art must leave a moral influence on the spectator without his knowing that he is being so influenced. Though theoretically, the theme of art may be anything which has a basis in life, this additional requirement makes it necessary to restrict the scope of the artist's choice to the higher aspects of life. Otherwise, art not only ceases to exert any moral influence; it may turn out in the end to be a means of corrupting character and degrading ideals.

---

<sup>1</sup>There is no hesitation whatever before the dictate of reason that a ruler must put his private inclinations aside and there is a narrow salience in the Indian view of life as a consequence.



### 3. THE HIGHWAYS OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT\*

*Professor S. Kuppusuami Sastri*

#### LAW AND LIBERTY

I am tempted to read out a well-known passage from one of the greatest of the modern poets, whose imaginative vision is all-comprehensive and thoroughly Indian—I mean Rabindranath Tagore. ‘When we come to literature we find that though it conforms to rules of grammar, it is yet a thing of joy, it is freedom itself. The beauty of a poem is bound by strict laws, yet it transcends them. The laws are its wings, they do not keep it weighed down, they carry it to freedom. Its form is in law, but its spirit is in beauty. Law is a first step towards freedom and beauty is the complete liberation which stands and shines on the pedestal of law.’<sup>1</sup> The passage referred to is prose-poetry and, in a telling and beautiful way, it points out the synthesis between literary law and literary freedom.

How is this synthesis between law and liberty achieved? It is achieved through a particular doctrine of literary criticism; the achievement of this synthesis has been rendered possible by the recognition and acceptance of the principle of Vyañjanā—suggestion, though true it is that the acceptance of this principle has led to a number of wooden classifications in Sanskrit literature. What is this Vyañjanā? In technical language, it may be described as an extraordinary significative power which all works of art possess. In its narrow sense, what do we understand by it? Yesterday I referred to the dictum laid down by Benedetto Croce, the replacement of the concept ‘all art is expression’ by the concept ‘all expression is art’. We have now to remind ourselves of it. In one sense, even from the point of view of the ordinary speaker, even an ordinary sentence has some artistic element in it, and it is the result of the inherent artistic capacity that every intelligent being possesses. This idea is developed by a modern scientific writer, Jespersen, in a thrilling manner in a recent work of his, *The Philosophy of Grammar*. In all speech, he says there are three distinct things—expression, suppression and impression. It is important to note that impression is often produced by suppression also and suggestion, he

\*From *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*

<sup>1</sup>Sadkora, *Realisation in Love*, pp. 99-100, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

says, is impression through suppression. Boredom we have when there is only expression, but it is only a question of degree. You cannot come across any human being of average intelligence, being such a hopeless bore as to express everything. One cannot do it. One has always to suppress something and the greatness of great writers and great speakers is said to lie in the larger or greater degree of suppression. This idea could easily be illustrated by a commonplace example. We go to the railway station and standing at the counter say 'Please, a second class ticket to Annamalai-nagar'. Even here there is a large amount of suppression. This helps us to realise the full meaning of the definition given by Jespersen that suggestion is impression through suppression.

Vyañjanā is suggestion, that is, suggestion in poetry, and it often means more than that. Poetry comes from a principle of suggestion. Even in ordinary sentences the element of suppression cannot be avoided. This truth was long ago recognised in India by the Naiyāyikas, who in their anxiety to be absolutely precise by expressing everything have become real bores and everywhere they inflict their hopeless boredom. They are precise, they want to measure thought quantitatively and so use the various and varied formulas<sup>1</sup> such as *Avaccheda*<sup>2</sup>, *Avacchinna*<sup>3</sup>, etc., and in every sentence of theirs these formulas are used to the best of their ability, so that they might express everything they want, and leave no scope for carrying any impression through suppression. Even they, however, cannot escape from the inevitable nature of language. In spite of their formulas, there is yet a residual element in a sentence which refuses to be expressed—the residual element of artistic sense inherently available in every being. Now let us illustrate this position. Taking an ordinary sentence, let us enquire whether it expresses anything which is not expressed by its constituent elements. That is to say, does the sentence express anything over and above the meaning of the words which compose the sentence? The answer is inevitably 'yes'. The relation between the various words is unexpressed and the question naturally arises, how is this idea conveyed? *Samsarga*<sup>4</sup> they say is *Vākyaārtha*<sup>5</sup>. How is this *Samsarga* conveyed? It is mysterious and has not yet been satisfactorily explained. In sentences we have a juxtaposition of words and

<sup>1</sup>These formed the subject of a course of lectures of Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri—*Thought measuring Devices in Indian Dialects*—delivered under the auspices of the Madras University in 1929.

<sup>2</sup>Delimitation.

<sup>3</sup>Delimited.

<sup>4</sup>Relation—association.

<sup>5</sup>Meaning of the sentence.



Kavirityuktam'<sup>1</sup>. Prophets and poets are made of the same stuff and their vision is identical. Shelley remarks that painters and poets would not fail to apprehend this vision. How is this effected in poetic expression? It is, as I have already stated, by the principle of Vyañ-janā. The secret is suggestion. Sound and sense cannot be harmonised except through suppression. Mechanically speaking, that is purely from the linguistic point of view, it would mean that the two could not be harmonised. The relation between Śabda and Artha has been and is a riddle and the difference becomes accentuated when this great principle is forgotten. Articulation is the result of certain adjustments of the speech mechanism, and sense is quite different from this. Thus, organically, the two cannot be harmonised. It is the artistic instinct of suppression that serves as the connecting link, bridges over the gulf between the two entirely distinct things, Śabda and Artha. Thus in this field also, we find that this principle is very important.


This now leads us to a consideration of certain other principles representing certain other highways of literary criticism. We are aware of the fact that literary art or an expression of literary art involves two important aspects—form and content. Every artist has to pay special attention to literary form and literary content. Now what is literary form, and what is literary content? This again leads us to the old synthesis of Śabda and Artha. What is literary form? Indian critics have analysed literary form and they have laid down that this consists of Śabda and Artha, or Śabda and certain types of Artha. Ordinary words grouped in an artistic way with some ideas, that is, Vācyārtha—primary sense—constitute form. This alone, of course, will not do. It must be bright, free from defects, etc. The other elements associated with form are technically referred to as Guṇas, Alaṃkāras, Ritis, etc. The term Alaṃkāra stands for decorative devices. Guṇa is a term untranslatable. It is not merely quality or merit, but something more; a new Rūḍhi (usage) must be established before these words could be accepted. Riti cannot again be identified with style merely. This is a very vague term. Does it refer to ways of grouping words or thought? It is not very clear. In a general way Riti may be equated with style, for both are vague. I have devised a pedantic phrase which is probably the nearest approximation to the ideas expressed by the term Guṇa, ways of collocation; collocation of ideas or sense and of words approaches Guṇa. It must be remembered that

---

<sup>1</sup>One who is not a seer cannot be a poet.

it is not merely collocation of words and ideas referred to here but the artistic collocation of artistic Śabda, Artha, absence of defects, presence of brightness, Riti, Guṇa and Alampkara, these constitute literary form

Now what about content? The sense which is beautiful, the sense that is charming constitutes content. A careful examination of our great works of art and our views and modes of appreciation would reveal this important fact—on one side the various aspects of form synthesise, and on the other the various aspects of content synthesise. And this has been rendered possible by the doctrine of Dhvani which sums up the synthesis of all conceivable modes of literary appreciation



The above graph will form a key to the whole position. Dhvani, Rasa and Unnaya<sup>1</sup>, these three stand for three important schools of thought in Sanskrit literary criticism. Dhvani is Vyañjana, Rasa is a highway of criticism not only for Indian literature but also for the study of European literature, a sure and certain method. Emphasising Rasa, one school accepts Dhvani or suggestion while another school accepts Rasa emphasising Unnaya. Dhvani the latter say, is a sort of inference, a quick anticipatory way of inference. These three run after Aucitya. Guṇas, Alampkaras and Ritis, these are emphasised in special ways. Are Ritis and Guṇas different? They are recognised as different in Alampkara śāstra. Anjū val<sup>2</sup> means Vakrokti. This also runs after Aucitya.

<sup>1</sup>Inference

<sup>2</sup>Indirect expression



The graph also represents their historical inter-relation. The bigger circle which encloses the bigger triangle stands for Aucitya which may be termed as 'adaptation' to be understood in its philosophical sense. Adaptation is understood in this sense as standing for the perfect harmony which parts bear to each other and to the whole. Dhvani, Rasa and Unnaya or Anumāna<sup>1</sup> obviously refer to the literary content, i.e., artistic thought, whereas Guṇas, Alaṅkāras and Rītis refer to the literary form.

Now what is Vakrokti? Some have translated it as eccentric expression. This is a monstrosity. In a simple way, it may be understood as deviation in expression from the commonplace. This deviation may be due to various causes, but when the deviation is effective, it is termed Vakrokti. On the side of expression, the inner circle refers to Vakrokti and Guṇas. Alaṅkāras and Rītis are comprised within it. Aucitya represents the great synthesis of Rasa, Dhvani and Anumāna and what is more, both form and content. Rasa, Dhvani and Anumāna, because they deal with the sphere of content, are bigger, more important, more comprehensive than the sphere of form.

If speech fulfils its purpose, there ought to be some amount of suppression. Hence naturally thought is wider than speech. Philosophically also this is true. If one must be thinking, he must think in language. If this be so, and so far as we know it is so, can it be said that thought and speech are co-extensive? We have seen what the answer should be. And Indian metaphysicists hold that thought is always wider, more comprehensive than speech. If this is so in ordinary parlance, it is expressly and definitely so in the field of literary art. As a fiction, they are taken as co-extensive in one field, that is the field of law, both ancient and modern. The Mīmāṃsakas assume that thought and form are co-extensive. But it remains only an assumption; in actual practice this view is always given up. The assumption is that Vidhi is straight-forward—'Na Vidhau paraḥ śabdārthaḥ': this is an attitude that is totally inimical to literary criticism. In this field, we accept that thought is always wider than form<sup>2</sup>; if not, the world would have been deprived of the pleasure of art; in the field of art, they are never co-extensive. This great synthesis of form and content is the greatest of our achievements in the realm of art and that we have been able to achieve through the doctrine of Vyañjanā.

<sup>1</sup>Inference.

<sup>2</sup>This is signified in the graph by the triangle of Rasa-dhvani-unnaya representing content, enclosing within itself Vakrokti, Rīti, Guṇa and Alaṅkāra, representing form.

obtrude upon notice in an immodest way, but which are presented through a veil and in a properly concealed fashion, like the physical charms of a modest beauty then, the suggested element when it is presented, when it is disclosed after some degree of concealment, proves to be attractive. This is also true to some extent. But it is only a poetic way of presenting the other explanation. There is scope for quest and conquest here. But the fact is, as far as I have been able to gather, that Vyanjanā makes it possible for art, for every suggestive art, to re-live its life in itself through a purely artistic process and to find its fulfilment and consummation in a definitely artistic purpose. That is the secret of the force of the whole charm of Vyañjana.

This requires amplification and an amplification of this statement may involve a review of the whole literature on Sanskrit Poetics from the point of view of Vyañjanā. We may take a long and comprehensive view of the whole literature from this standpoint. Let us take this statement in parts and proceed to consider it. Vyañjana is a wholly suggested, a wholly artistic, process. Can we not say that it is an intellectual process? Yes in the language of the logic-ridden phraseology of the Ālaṃkarikas. Or can we not say in the technical sense of the logicians that it has a power attracted towards it? All these technicalities could be introduced in the course of a discussion of the nature of Vyañjanā and of a discussion of its place in art criticism. We have to remember in this connection one important fact. Such a view would enable you to see how to study in detail the learned criticisms in the Ālaṃkara śāstra and also how to study in detail all the discussions of relevant topics of this principle, namely Vyañjanā in art criticism. Many of you may be familiar with the learned arguments that are adduced to show that Vyanjanā or suggestion is not the ordinary *prima facie* significatory power which words possess. It is not the primary power by virtue of which words or expressions or phrases or sentences convey their *prima facie* meaning. Well, in a majority of instances, we are using so many words in a secondary sense. And can we not bring Vyañjanā or suggestion under the category of some secondary significatory power? Secondary significatory power is a sort of fiction which we have introduced in the philosophy of interpretation for purposes of convenience, the result of the superimposition of a certain subjective aspect made intentionally and consciously by the subject upon the expression that is used. You find a certain statement made and some phrases are loosely used, some expressions do not admit of strict interpretation, and consistently with the context, consistently with what you know about the intention of the



speaker, and consistently also with the general aim that is kept in view, you interpret and you seek to interpret correctly and to interpret him generously and favourably. Hearers are always supposed to be generous, except probably those who are to consider or interpret law. Other hearers are always supposed to be generous. A certain amount of generosity in interpretation is necessary in all inter communication of thought. Life will not be worth living, if every hearer should insist upon exact precision and exact accuracy in every statement that you make in ordinary conversation. In writing even, it is possible only with due limitations. Now under such circumstances in order to find out the intention of the speaker, we take some of the phrases loosely used by him in a certain sense which those phrases do not primarily possess. Some hackneyed examples are cited in this connection. Take for instance a hamlet on the Ganges—we interpret it as a hut on the banks of the Ganges. Well, in such cases consistently with the context you reinterpret such phrases in a different way and the interpretation which you put upon them is attributed to some secondary significatory power which the phrase is supposed to possess. Well, can Vyañjana or suggestion be brought under that? No, the reason is this: you deliberately resort to a certain process of interpretation, because you feel some difficulty in understanding the phrase in its literal sense. The phrase used cannot be construed strictly and your conscious experience of some hitch or difficulty is at the root of the secondary interpretation that is adopted. That is what I mean when I say that it is a sort of fiction which you create for purposes of interpretation. That is not suggestion. Behind that, however, there is another element. Well, fancy for a moment that the speaker who uses such a phrase uses it in that way with a purpose and in a deliberate manner, not as a result of some lapse. As it is, he deliberately uses the phrase then in a secondary sense. You are not justified in assuming that the speaker is a fool or thinking loose, that he has not got sufficient control over language to make himself intelligible in a direct and straightforward manner. You assume that he is a master of language. Under these circumstances there must be some object, some purpose the speaker must have in view in adopting this secondary mode of expression. He must have something in view, some purpose or Prayojana in view. What is it he wishes to suggest? He wishes to go a step further on the path of suppression. He wishes to conceal from the point of view for a little while a certain idea and at the same time he wishes that the idea should be understood in an agreeable way. As it is, the speaker wishes to suggest that the

hut is pure, it is holy because it is situated on the bank of the river Ganga and it is very close to it. As it is, he wishes to emphasise the idea of the proximity to the river and so many other things that may be associated with its close proximity. That element is left to be gathered from the context and that element is left to be suggested; that element is not conveyed for the moment by the expression itself. This is *Vyañjanā*. This gives rise to a furious controversy in the philosophy of *Ālaṃkāra śāstra* between the *Ālaṃkārikas* and the logicians. Well, why should not this element be brought under inference? It may be the case of an agreeable type of inference. Call it inference or call it suggestion, you cannot say that it is a regular type of syllogistic inference, you may treat it as a sort of immediate inference. A degree of mediacy is an essential feature of inferential process. Mediacy is the characteristic feature of inference and here in suggestion one feels that the degree of mediacy that is necessarily characteristic of inference is wanting, and we feel that there is a certain degree of immediacy which does not entitle us to bring it under inference. As a result, this process is taken to be a process associated with artistic expression itself but not with an ordinary process; it is taken to be an extreme process and it is described by *Ālaṃkārikas* as *Lokottara*<sup>1</sup>. In the course of the technical discussion of the nature of this *Vṛtti*<sup>2</sup>, one is apt to forget the essential characteristic of the process called *Vyañjanā*. One is likely to be carried away by the glorifying description of the character of *Vyañjanā*. It is an extraordinary process. Abhinavagupta exalts this process as something extraordinary<sup>3</sup>. Why is it *Lokottara*? The simple idea behind the phrase *Lokottara* is this—it is essentially an artistic process, it is not a *Laukika*<sup>4</sup> process, it is not a process of the ordinary life, it is not the inartistic process with which we are familiar in this work-a-day world in our everyday task—it is an essentially artistic process. That is why it is described by the *Ālaṃkārikas* as a *Lokottara-vṛtti* and it is an artistic process for various reasons.

To appreciate adequately why *Vyañjanā* should be regarded as an essentially artistic process, you have to look at it from various points of view, and I propose to help you in looking at it from certain points of view. It is an essentially artistic process as it involves suppression, not of the everyday type but of the agreeable type. It is an essen-

<sup>1</sup>Extraordinary.

<sup>2</sup>Significatory capacity of a word.

<sup>3</sup>See *Lacana*, Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute edn. pp. 105-132.

<sup>4</sup>Worldly—such as we see in the world.



ually artistic process because it gives us an impression, not the ordinary commonplace impression which sentences give, not the impression of the craftsmanlike or mechanical type but a delicate impression described as artistic thrill. It is an essentially artistic process because it enables you to feel that you have done with certain matters with which students of *Alaṃkāra śāstra* are already familiar. It enables you to feel that you have done with the compartmental slicing of Sanskrit literature into literary genera such as epic, lyric, the metrical, the non-metrical and so on. It enables you thus to feel that you have done with this sort of compartmental slicing up of literature and it enables you to take the right view of poetic art and view it as an organic and complete expression and put the right question which you should put to yourself in matters connected with literary production. Well, what is the right question which you should put to yourself? The question to be put is not what is the type under which it should be brought, not whether it conforms to certain time-honoured traditional classifications recognised by the classical school of critics, not whether it conforms to rules deduced from such classification, not whether it conforms to the dead weight of the technique—that is not the right question to put, but the right question to put is what this artistic specimen expresses and how far it expresses it well and artistically? That is the right type of question to put. This point of view was emphasised adequately for the first time by certain Kashmirian critics under the leadership of Ānandavardhana, a great exponent of the *Dhvani* school<sup>1</sup>. Prior to Ānandavardhana critics were carried away by the excesses of classification in Sanskrit literary criticism. Ānandavardhana flourished in the latter part of the 9th century. If anybody before Ānandavardhana investigated and envisaged the fruitfulness of this principle, namely the principle of suggestion, and vividly realised the importance of this principle being raised to the rank of the central principle of literary criticism, it was Vālmīki himself, the father of Sanskrit poetry, and Kālidāsa who followed Vālmīki in so many respects. Among the professional writers on literary criticism in Sanskrit, there is sufficient evidence to show that none clearly realised the importance of this principle before Ānandavardhana. This artists realised, the art critics were unconsciously biased in favour of this principle and they unconsciously

<sup>1</sup>Among the contributors to this volume Kuppaswami Sastri, Hirayana Raghavan and Srikanthaya belong to the school of thought that the *Dhvanyaloka*, comprising verses and prose gloss, is of unitary authorship and that Ānandavardhana is author of both parts.

recognised the importance of this principle but they never intentionally did anything to popularise this principle, to elucidate it and to explain and illustrate it, and we owe this great contribution to the genius of Ānandavardhana, that great artist and art critic

It was he who inaugurated a certain way of classifying specimens of poetic art on the basis of this principle, in fact, it was he that was responsible for the re classification of poetic expression under three heads. The three heads in *Alaṃkāra* literature are not very suggestive except to those who are familiar with the implications behind the names. The names are *Uttama*<sup>1</sup>, *Madhyama*<sup>2</sup> and *Adhama*<sup>3</sup>. That specimen of poetry should be regarded as the best specimen, *uttama*, which allows the suggested element to reign supreme, it never lets itself to be subordinated to anything else—that should be regarded as the *Kāvya* of the best type. What about *Madhyama kāvya*? That specimen in which the suggested element is not raised to the supreme rank, is not allowed to reign supreme, and is either co-ordinated with some other element or subordinated to it but is at the same time allowed to preserve its minimum degree of agreeableness and beauty and attractiveness—that is regarded as the *Madhyama*. And then there are certain specimens of art which may be described as the result of amusing diversion in which poetic geniuses indulge either at the stage of practice or even after reaching the stage of perfection as a sort of amusement. They are readily described as lifeless *citra*<sup>4</sup> in poetry and such specimens give prominence only to certain attractive features of literary form, and under such attractive features the beautiful suggested element is allowed to lie buried. Well, that is regarded as *Adhama*.

Ānandavardhana himself suggests that this re classification is only a tentative device which he has suggested as a challenge to the traditional classification of literature into various genera, to the traditional method of compartmental slicings and cuttings. He indicates how the unity of poetry could be preserved by fixing your attention upon the central principle of *Vyāñjana*. You make it the leading principle of art criticism, adopt it as the source of literary charm and you can use it as a magic wand.

Some commentators and some traditional writers who came after Ānandavardhana were labouring under the misapprehension that he

---

<sup>1</sup>Best first rate

<sup>2</sup>Second rate

<sup>3</sup>Inferior

<sup>4</sup>The inferior form of poetic composition based on figures and word jockeyry



intended that this scheme should be adopted as an inflexible or rigid scheme of classification. Sometimes great masters provide the world with certain devices, and these devices are misused. Great artists provide the world with certain devices and with certain materials, and their followers come to attach greater importance to the material than to the purpose itself. In that way, later writers, in the spirit of cavilling critics, proceeded to find fault with Ānandavardhana for giving an elastic or unnecessarily flexible scheme of classification which involves a lot of overlapping. It is not for purposes of a strict classification that Ānandavardhana provided the world of readers with this scheme. He never intended it to be a logical scheme. His scheme of classification is not intended to satisfy the demands of strict logic. It is more a challenge to the traditional process of slicing and cutting, and he himself makes it clear towards the end of his work. He indicates how this scheme could be re arranged and could be re exhibited in a slightly different fashion.

Take for instance what is known as the excellent specimen and compare it with what, in a technical sense, may be brought under Madhyama kavya or a specimen of the middling type. Compare these two, you will find that you are likely to feel that Ānandavardhana has done a grave injustice to these two types. In this connection I should like to draw your attention to two specimens.

Suvarṇapuspaṁ pṛthivīm cinvanti puruṣāstrayaḥ  
Suraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca janāti sevītum

This was brought under the first class. The suggestion is allowed to reign supreme here. Three classes of people are able to gather gold, as one would be able to gather flowers, wherever they go. They are in prosperity everywhere, that is the suggested idea. Who are these three classes of people? (1) The brave person, (2) the scholar, and (3) one who knows how to serve one's master. These three classes of people, wherever they go, thrive well. Now the simple idea that is suggested is that they meet with prosperity everywhere. That is not expressed in a straightforward way. That is certainly a suggested idea. That is allowed to reign supreme and for that reason it is Uttama kavya and so comes under the first rank. Now place it on one side and compare it for instance with another beautiful specimen which is likely to be brought under the technical Madhyama type.

Anurāgavatī sandhyā divasastatpurassaraḥ  
Aho daivagatūḥ kīḍṛk tathāpi na samāgamaḥ

The evening twilight is endowed with Rāga, is endowed with red colour Her lover, the day, goes before her and quite close to her and love is reciprocated What a fatality it is that they never come together! They are so anxious to marry each other, they are so anxious to be completely united with each other, but their desire is never allowed to fulfil itself and is never realised The obvious meaning here is the relation between the *Sandhyā* and *Divasa* and behind it there is a suggested idea The suggested idea is the relation of two lovers who reciprocate each other's love but who are never allowed to be united with each other Such relation is described by the prince of Indian poets, by Kālidāsa, as reaching the supreme moment of the most spiritual aspect of love<sup>1</sup> It is that aspect of coming together and separation, of complete reciprocation without fulfilment or consummation, it is this that represents the supreme spiritual moment of love And students of Rasa know that *Śṛṅgāra* or love is essentially spiritual as conceived by Indians and in Indian culture

The Indian conception of love is never to possess and is always to efface oneself and to forget oneself That is why it is raised to the rank of a vehicle which can freely reach to God Now in this aspect of love one could find something very attractive Those who are sufficiently responsive to Rasa cannot miss the central idea in the suggested part of this verse But still what is the position of that suggested idea? It is assigned a somewhat subordinate rank It appeals certainly far better and with greater force than the idea on the surface That is true But what is the rank that is assigned to it? The intention of the poet is to describe *Sandhyā* and *Divasa*, from the context you have to assume that In describing *Sandhyā* and *Divasa*, he has produced a work of art A work of art, the moment it leaves the artist's hands, is the property of art critics We are not at all bound to interpret art in the same manner in which the artist himself intended it to be interpreted That is the way of every good work of art, but still when we pay some attention to the context and so long as we are alive to the details of the circumstances under which this particular specimen of art was produced, we are hopelessly in the grip of historical criticism, and so long as we are within the grip of historical criticism, we have to realise that the position that is assigned to the suggested element is a subordinate position. Though we know from the circumstances of the case that the artist intends to present the idea beautifully, he seeks to present it by linking it up with some situation.

<sup>1</sup> *Uṣṇasāgṛama III 15 Anānukāṣṭhitaḥ* etc



## 4 THE THEORY OF RASA\*

*Professor S N Dasgupta*

We must start the theory of Rasa or aesthetic emotion with Bharata's maxim *Vibhavanubhava vyabhicari samyogad rasa nispatih* i.e. the Rasa is accomplished as a result of the conjunction of Vibhava Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to explain a few of the technical terms that are continually associated with any discussion of Rasa — (1) Vibhava is the objective condition producing an emotion. Vibhava may be of two kinds (i) Alambana and (ii) Uddipana. Alambana vibhava means a person or persons with reference to whom the emotion is manifested. Uddipana vibhava means the circumstances that have excited the emotion. A man may feel attracted to a woman if the circumstances are cooperating with it. It is easier for a man to be attracted towards a woman of young age if they are thrown alone and there is a beautiful scenery before them the moon peeping through the clouds the fragrant breeze blowing and the like. Any one of such circumstances may be regarded as Uddipana vibhava whereas both the man and the woman are Alambana vibhavas to each other. (2) Anubhava means bodily expression by which the emotion is expressed. Thus the arch glances of a lady her inviting smile, may be regarded as Anubhava. (3) Vyabhicari means a series of diverse emotions that feed the dominant emotion. A woman in love anxiously waiting at the rendezvous to meet her lover may feel disappointed that he is not coming may be anxious that something might have happened to him may be jealous that he might have been courted by another woman may feel delight in remembering the coaxing words that he had whispered into her ears and so on. Like pictures in a cinematograph emotions of diverse sorts may be passing in quick succession and may all at the same time be continuing the constitution of the same emotion.)

The real discussion of Rasa was started by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on Bharata's maxim on Rasa. The real point of discussion and diversity of opinion was on the two words Samyoga (conjunction) and Rasa nispatih (manifestation of Rasa or completion of Rasa). Before

\*From *A History of Sanskrit Literature Classical Period Vol. I University of Calcutta* 1947 pp 592-604

bhāva The Vibhāvas, etc., cannot also be regarded as a communicative agent, for a communicative agent presupposes the existence of the thing to be communicated, but the Rasa does not exist before It can be lived through only when it is suggested by the Vibhavas and the Rasa has no other existence than being lived through and enjoyed For, it should be remembered that the dominant emotions existing in the subconscious strata of the person are not themselves Rasas They acquire that designation only when they are aesthetically presentable and enjoyable Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa cannot also explain the method as to how the Rasa produced in the player can infect the audience

Saṃkuka introduced the similitude of painting to explain the enlightenment of aesthetic emotion He said that just as of a painted horse it can be said that it is not a horse and that it is a horse, so of an aesthetic experience we can say that it is both real and unreal | Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka said that Rasa is neither produced nor suggested, nor created by anything He held that a proper aesthetic creation has the peculiar function of generating in us a new spiritual creation and we have in us a special function by which we can enjoy it These two functions are called by him Bhāvakatva and Bhojakatva The enlightenment of Rasa is not the subject of ordinary psychology but of aesthetic psychology For the presentation of the spiritual situation throbbing with exhilaration we are bound to admit two different functions, Bhavakatva and Bhojakatva, without which the aesthetic experience cannot be explained

Abhinavagupta combated the view with all the force that he can command Abhinavagupta is unwilling to admit these two extraordinary functions He holds that in the case of a truly poetic composition, after having grasped the full significance of the words and their meanings, there is a mental intuition as a result of which the actual temporal and spatial character of the situation is withdrawn from the mental field and the emotion suggested therein loses its individual character and also becomes dissociated from such conditions as might have led us to any motivation The emotion is apprehended and intuited in a purely universal character and in consequence thereof the ordinary pathological symptoms of emotion lose their significance and through all the different emotions bereft of their pathological characters we have one enjoyment of joy It is for this reason that in the experience of a tragedy we find as much enjoyment as in that of a comedy, for the experience of a grief would have been unpalatable if it was associated with its pathological consequences



These pathological consequences are always due to a sense of self struggle, self motivation, loss, and the like. But in the intuition of the Rasa we live through the experience of a pure sentiment bereft of all its local characters

In the subconscious and unconscious regions there are always lying dormant various types of emotio motive complexes. When through artistic creation a purely universal emotional fear, amour, etc., are projected in the mind they become affiliated to those types of emotio-motive complexes and this mutual affiliation or apperception or implicit recognition of identity immediately transforms the presented artistic universal into artistic joy or Rasa. It is for this reason that in experiencing artistic joy there is a kinship and identity among all art enjoyers.

Abhinavagupta's teacher Bhaṭṭa Tauta in his work *Kavya kautuka*, says that a dramatic play is not a physical occurrence. In witnessing a play we forget the actual perceptual experience of the individuals on the stage playing their different parts or manifesting their individuality as associated with their local names and habitations. The man who is playing the part of Rama does not appear to us in his actual individual character and it does not also appear to us that he cannot be the Rāma about whom Valmiki wrote. He stands somewhere midway between the pure actuality and the pure ideality. This together with all the scenic associations and those of music produces an experience which vibrates with exhilaration, and as a result thereof the whole presentation of actuality becomes veiled as it were, in so far as it is an actual occurrence of presentative character. (The past impressions, memories, associations, and the like, which were lying deeply buried in the mind became connected with the present experience and thereby the present experience became affiliated and perceived in a new manner resulting in a dimension of new experience, revealing new types of pleasures and pains unlike the pleasures and pains associated with our egoistic instincts and the success or failures of their strivings. This is technically called *Rasasvādāna*, *Camatkāra*, *Carvaṇā* which literally means the experiencing of a transcendent exhilaration from the enjoyment of the roused emotions inherent in our own personality. A play or a drama is the objective content of such an experience. A drama or a play is not a physical occurrence. It is a pure spiritual enlightenment, a spiritual expression throbbing and pulsating with a new type of music, joyous and pensive. As a result of this experience, a unity is effected between the individual's own experience and the expression of the art. This experience is, therefore, nothing else but the enlightenment of a universal. Or it may also

rather be said that it is a new creation involving the personality of the individual and the objective dramatic content as constituents—a new appearance a revelation different from all other experience and all external objects. If this analysis be true dramatic experience and art can no longer be regarded as imitative.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta thought that on the one hand all the equipments of the stage together with the music release from our mind the hold of the impression that such and such a person has taken a particular part and it also makes us indifferent to the suggestion of an impossibility that the player before us cannot be Rama. Being cut off from its connection on two sides namely, the positive connection of the play with the present actor as a known individual with the actuality of all his bearings and on the other hand the impossibility of connecting the actor with the realised Rama's character having lost its force the suggestive influence can very naturally surcharge the mind with new exhilarations and feelings which can without any relation to anything else modify the state of the mind. In this state the previous experiences existing in the mind of the audience as impressions work up independently in association with the suggestion of the dramatic performance. The affiliation apperception and integration of these roused impressions and expectations produce new joys and new intuitions. The aesthetic content of a drama is all that is illuminated in such a process.

Here we find that the universalization\* of poetic art is of two kinds. First of all the aesthetic composition by nature of its special suggestive force presents before our minds an aesthetic situation and an emotion that is devoid of all its local character. Secondly the expression of this artistic enlightenment has a universal character in its manifestation in different minds. In the next stage this presented whole becomes commingled with various types of subconscious and unconscious feelings or emotio-motive complexes which are lying dormant in the minds of various people. It is easy to see that so far as these latter are concerned they are naturally different in different persons in accordance with the nature and diversity of experience. It is for this reason that the same artistic whole though it be presented in the same manner in different minds their artistic apperception of it would be different in accordance with the difference of diverse emotio-motive complexes. But neither in the universal whole presented to the mind nor in the motive complexes do we find any trace of any local character or colouration that is associated with the ego or the self in its practical commerce.

\*The universalization on which Abhinavagupta elaborated is one of the original contributions of Bhaṭṭa Nyaaka.—Ed.



with the real objective world around it. It is, therefore, called transcendental, i.e., *Alaukika*, and its other name is *Camatkāra*. The word *Camatkāra* is in reality used in three different senses. It is sometimes used to denote the special aesthetic attitude of the mind produced by the commingling of the universal artistic situation and the stirred up emotive complexes. It also means the aesthetic pleasure arising out of it, and thirdly, the bodily manifestation of such an enjoyment. In addition to this, it is also used to denote that special mental function by which the whole thing is enjoyed.

The view of *Rasa* expressed by *Abhinavagupta* had been accepted in later times as the almost unchallengeable gospel truth and as the last analysis of the aesthetic phenomenon propagated through literature.

## 5 VĀMANA'S THEORY OF RITI\*

*Professor S K De*

To Vamana belongs the credit of being the first writer on Poetics who gave us a well thought out and carefully outlined scheme of Poetics no longer naive or tentative which in spite of its theoretic defects is in some respects unique and valuable

The enquiry as to what is the soul or essence of Poetry is for the first time definitely posed and systematically worked out by Vamana, his predecessors, to whom the body of poetry was more important never having troubled themselves with this question Vamana lays down in clear terms *Ritiratna kavyasya*, 'the Riti is the soul of poetry' and working out this figurative description he points out (on I 1 1) that the word (*Śabda*) and its sense (*Artha*) constitute the 'body', of which the soul is the Riti He defines the Riti as *Viśiṣṭapada racana* or particular arrangement of words This particularity (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) of arrangement again rests upon certain definite combinations of the different *Gūṇas* or fixed excellences of composition For instance of the three kinds of Riti proposed by Vamana the *Vaidarbhi* unites all the ten *Gūṇas* the *Gauḍī* abounds in *Ojas*<sup>2</sup> and *Kanti*<sup>2</sup>, the *Pāncālī* is endowed with *Madhurya*<sup>2</sup> and *Saukumarya*<sup>2</sup> Thus is how Vamana would distinguish the different Ritis from one another On these three Ritis poetry takes its stand just as painting has its substratum in the lines drawn on the canvas<sup>3</sup> The *Vaidarbhi* is of course recommended for it contains all the excellences, and as the genius of each diction is peculiar to itself Vamana rejects the view that the other two inferior dictions ought to be practised as steps leading up to the *Vaidarbhi* He argues that the proper diction cannot be attained by one who begins with the improper If the weaver practises weaving with jute, he does not attain proficiency in the weaving of silk It will be seen from this analysis of the three kinds of diction that the *Vaidarbhi* is the complete or ideal one which unifies all the poetic excellences whereas the other two encourage extremes The one lays stress on the grand the glorious or the imposing the other on softness and sweetness whereby the former loses itself often in bombast the latter in prolixity It

---

\*From *History of Sanskrit Poetics* Vol II

<sup>1</sup>*Kāvya-lamkāra* Śloka I 2 6

<sup>2</sup>Names of poetic qualities which have been explained later

<sup>3</sup>Ibid 1 13



will be noticed also that the names of the different Ritis are derived from those of particular countries, and Vāmana expressly says in this connexion that the names are due to the fact of particular excellence of diction being prevalent in the writings of particular countries. This makes it probable that the theory of diction, peculiar to this school, originally arose from the empirical analysis of the prevailing peculiarities of poetic expression in different places and furnishes another proof of the general *a posteriori* character of the discipline itself.

It should be observed that the term Riti is hardly equivalent to the English word 'style', by which it is often rendered but in which there is always a distinct subjective valuation. Although Artha (the sense or idea) is admitted as an element by Sanskrit writers, the Riti consists essentially of the objective beauty of representation (of the intended idea), arising from a proper unification of certain clearly defined excellences, or from an adjustment of sound and sense. It is, no doubt, recognised that appropriate ideas should find appropriate expression, or in other words, the outward expression should be suitable to the inward sense. Bharata goes further and formulates that in the drama the expression should also be in keeping with the temperament and character of the speaker to whom it is attributed. But at the same time, the Riti is not, like the style, the expression of poetic individuality, as it is generally understood by Western Criticism, but it is merely the outward presentation of its beauty called forth by a harmonious combination of more or less fixed literary 'excellences'. Of course, the excellences are supposed to be discernible in the sense or import, as much as in the verbal arrangement, but this subjective content is not equivalent to the indefinable element of individuality which constitutes the charm of a good style. If we accept the nomenclature of a modern analyst of style, we may say that the Sanskrit authors admit what he would call the 'mind'-in style, as a subject of technical formulation, but not the 'soul'-in style, which is elusive and which they leave to individual writers to evolve in their own way.

Vāmana, therefore, teaches that the Guṇas are essential in poetry, as they go to make up the Riti, which is the 'soul' of poetry<sup>1</sup>. The objection of the author of the *Ekavālī* is that to conceive the Guṇas, on the one hand, as the principal element and therefore as something fit to be adorned and to call them, on the other hand, properties that adorn poetry involves contradiction in terms. This raises only a scholastic quibble which does not bear serious examination. The Guṇas are,

<sup>1</sup>*Kaṣyāpāmkāra Sūtra* I 2 6-8

no doubt, spoken of as the attributes of the word and the meaning but this, as the commentator points out, is a loose or popular use of the term, for, strictly speaking, they are concerned directly with Riti. To the objection that these entities have no absolute existence, Vāmana replies that their existence is vouched by their cognition as such by men of taste and that these excellences are not found in all cases of recitation but depend upon the presence or absence of certain well defined characteristics<sup>1</sup>

Vāmana enumerates the Guṇas as ten, which appears to have been the standard number from Bharata's time, but he really doubles the number by clearly differentiating between the Śabda guṇas and the Artha guṇas, and regarding each Guṇa as belonging respectively to Śabda and Artha. In other words, each Guṇa is looked at from two different points of view, and the distinction thus proposed between verbal and ideal excellences comes in, as technically put, according as the word or the idea is the denoter (Vācaka) or the denoted (Vācya). We find in Vāmana, for the first time, the definite classification of Guṇas of Śabda and Artha respectively. This sharp distinction no doubt, clears away some of the vagueness surrounding definitions of Bharata's and Dandin's individual Guṇas, and Vāmana, though widely differing from his predecessors in the peculiar connotation he attaches to some of them, is careful in distinguishing the allied Guṇas from one another.

His scheme of the Guṇas may be tabulated thus

Śabda guṇa	Artha guṇa
i ojas or compactness of word structure (gaḍhabandhatva, where bandha means pada racanā in 14)	i ojas or maturity of conception (arthasya prauḍhāḥ)
ii prasāda or laxity of structure (Sāthulya)	ii prasāda clearness of meaning (artha samalya) by avoidance of superfluity (anupajogiparivarjanāt, as Abhinavagupta explains)
iii Śleṣa, or coalescence of words resulting in smoothness (masṭpatvam, yasmīn sati bahuvyapī padāni ekavad bhāṣante)	iii Śleṣa or coalescence or commingling of many ideas (ghaṭanā)
iv samatā or homogeneity of manner, i.e. of construction (mārgābhedaḥ yena mārgopakramas tasya atvāgaḥ)	iv samatā or non-relinquishment of proper sequence of ideas (prakramābhedaḥ)
v samāhṛi or symmetry due to orderly ascent and descent i.e. when the heightening effect is toned down by softening effect and vice versa (śroḍhavaroha krama)	v samāhṛi or grasping of the original meaning arising from concentration of the mind (artha-dṛṣṭiḥ samāhṛiḥ kīraṇatīti)



- |  |   |
|--|---|
| vi. mādhyāya, or distinctness of words (prthak padatva) due to absence of long compounds (samāsa daurghyanivṛtti)              | vi. mādhyāya or strikingness of utterance (ukti vaicitrya) i.e. in an impressive periphrastic manner for special charm. |
| vii. saukumārya or freedom from harshness (ajaraḥatva)   | vii. saukumārya or freedom from disagreeable or nauseous ideas (apāruṣya)   |
| viii. udāratā or liveliness in which the words seem as if they are dancing (yasmā sati nṛtyanti va padani) i.e. pada vicchedāt | vi. udāratā or delicacy i.e. absence of vulgarity (agrāmyatva)  |
| ix. artha vyakti or explicitness of words whereby the meaning is easily apprehended (jhaṭ tyartha prat pati hetutva)           | ix. artha vyakti or explicitness of ideas which makes the nature of things clear (vastu-svabhāva sphuṭaṭva)             |
| x. kānti or brilliance i.e. richness of words (aujjvalya)  | x. kānti or prominence of the rasas (dīpta rasatva)   |

After the Guṇas Vamana deals with the poetic figures or Alampkaras as elements of subsidiary importance. This definite differentiation of Guṇa from Alampkara we meet for the first time in Vamana, for Bhaṃmaha was indifferent to it. Daṇḍin does not accept it and Udbhaṭa appears to have denied any difference. At the outset Vamana states no doubt that poetry is acceptable from embellishment (Alampkara), but he is careful to explain embellishment not in the narrow sense of poetic figure but in the broad and primary sense of beauty or charm<sup>1</sup>. He also points out that it is only in the secondary instrumental sense that the term alampkara or embellishment is applied to simile and other poetic figures. In this view Vamana apparently develops logically Daṇḍin's teaching but Vamana does not make the presence of poetic figures a necessary condition. What makes poetry acceptable in his opinion is the presence of charm or beauty (i.e. Alampkara in its broad sense of Saundarya) which he does not define and which is in some respects undefinable. The Riti and its constituent Guṇas come in as a *sine qua non* in the production of this beauty but the poetic figures only contribute to its heightening. This distinction between the Guṇa and the Alampkara as to their respective position in a formal scheme of Poetics which is vaguely hinted at by Daṇḍin is fully developed for the first time by Vamana<sup>2</sup>. The Guṇas being essential to the Riti are defined as those characteristics which create the charm of poetry—a function which is assigned to both Guṇas and Alampkaras by Daṇḍin—but Alampkaras are such ornaments as serve to enhance the charm already so produced. The Guṇas are

<sup>1</sup>Kavyam grāhyam alampkarat Saundaryam Alampkaraḥ

<sup>2</sup>Kavyālampkara Sūtra I 12

said to be Nitya (permanent), implying that the Alamkāras are Anitya, for there can be charm of poetry without the Alamkāras but no charm without the Guṇas. In other words, the Guṇa stands to poetry in the Samavāya-relation<sup>1</sup>, while the Alamkāra in Samyoga-relation, Samyoga being explained as mere conjunction and Samavāya implying inseparable connexion or inherence (Nitya-sambandha). To put it in the usual figurative language, the Guṇa is related to the 'soul' of poetry (viz. Rīti), while the Alamkāra rests merely on the 'body' (viz. Śabda and Artha). The Alamkāra, without the Guṇa, cannot of itself produce the beauty of a poem, but the latter can do so without the former.

The Rīti-teachings mark a great advance on the Alamkāra-doctrine in many respects. There are many points which are common to both these systems; but, by clearly defining and working out the doctrine of Rīti as that distinct characteristic of poetry which sharply separates it from dry philosophical or technical writings, the Rīti school seems to have first suggested and started the enquiry (only hinted at by Bhāmaha's theory of Vakrokti) as to what constitutes the essential charm of poetry, and anticipated the theory of Vicchitti (or Ukti-vaicitrya) elaborated later by Kuntaka and other adherents of the Alamkāra-doctrine. The Dhvanikāra<sup>2</sup> pays an indirect compliment to the Rīti school for having first perceived, however dimly, the true nature of poetry, although he does not agree with its peculiar theory of Rīti. The Rīti school also goes a step further than the Alamkāra school in including Rasa among the necessary characteristics (in Kānti as an Artha-guṇa). It is possible that Vāmana's partiality for the drama, which he considers to be the best form of composition and from which he supposes other forms of poetry to proceed<sup>3</sup>, led him to realise the importance of Rasa, already worked out as fundamental in the drama by the dramaturgic Rasa school, and to incorporate it in one of the essential properties of poetry<sup>4</sup>. But, at the same time, it was perhaps his idea to make his definition of poetry comprehensive enough to cover a larger field and include those instances, e.g., which develop no Rasa. The Kāvya-śobhā (poetic beauty), a term which he probably borrows from Daṇḍin, or Saundarya which conveys the same general idea as the word 'beauty', is regarded as the ultimate test of all poetry; and

<sup>1</sup>See *Kāmadhenu* on III 1.4

<sup>2</sup>Dr De, belongs to the school of scholars who consider the author of the Dhvani text in verses (Dhvanikāra) and Ānandavardhana, the author of the prose gloss thereon, to be two different persons

<sup>3</sup>*Kāvyālamkāra Sūtra*, I. 3 30-32.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.* III 2 15 and Vṛtt.



this beauty, in his opinion, agreeing with the common sense view of the matter, is realised by carefully worked out diction, which avoids the damaging flaws by adopting primarily the so called literary excellences, as well as the poetic figures for the secondary purpose of heightening the effect thus produced.

But the Riti system, in spite of Vamana's well reasoned formulation and the advocacy of his followers, never appears to have wielded very great influence, and its existence was comparatively short lived. There is no doubt that like the Rasa and the Alankāra systems, it left its impress on later theories, but it never found a serious champion after Vamana among latter day writers, and its theories never found unqualified acceptance. Its general doctrine of Riti began to be discredited and severely criticised from Ānandavardhana's time as too crude an explanation of the nature of poetry, and Mammaṭa, the foremost authority of the latest school, ingeniously combats and sets aside the leading views of Vāmana.

It may, however, be noted that some of the broad principles enunciated by the Riti school have been tacitly recognised by later theorists. The importance of Riti or diction, as such, became established as a stock idea in Poetics but it was accepted with grave modifications. It was accepted by the Dhvani school in so far as it contributed to the development of the Rasa dhvani, and its chief characteristic was supposed to consist in an arrangement or disposition of words or letters for that purpose. This modification naturally diminished the value of all discussion and elaborate classification of the Ritis into different types, and the function of the three Ritis of Vamana was made practically equivalent to the three Guṇas admitted by the authors of the *Dhvanyaloka*, but they do not yet appear to have lost all interest with later theorists. Even those writers who do not subscribe to the doctrine either of the Riti school or of the Dhvani school pay considerable attention to this question.

Abhinavagupta, however, thinks that the three Ritis of Vamana, which in his opinion, characterise an elevated, soft and middling theme respectively through a peculiar combination of the Guṇas have no separate existence from Guṇas and Alankaras. Attention therefore, was naturally directed to the Guṇas and Alankaras more than to the Riti itself, of which they formed, in Vāmana's opinion the constituent elements, and the Riti, if recognised at all, was recognised as consisting in a particular disposition of words, letters or syllables which favours the development of Rasa and stands in the same relation to it as (in the usual figurative conceit) the conformation of the 'body' to the

'soul' <sup>1</sup> It follows from this that the respective functions assigned to Guṇa and Alamkāra are not in relation to the Rīti but to Rasa which is one of the fundamental elements of poetry with the later schools. We have already noted that, after Ānandavardhana, the Guṇas are taken as inseparable attributes and causes of excellence<sup>2</sup> of the Rasa or the principal poetic mood in the composition (and not, as Vāmana thinks, of the Rīti). The poetic figures, on the other hand, are only attributes of Śabda and Artha, which constitute the 'body' of poetry, and therefore heighten the poetic mood or Rasa in an indirect way<sup>3</sup>. Vāmana's ideas about 'poetic charm' are also taken as axiomatic, but they appear in later theories in a somewhat different form as the Vicchitti, or Vaicitrya, or Kavi prauḍhokti underlying all figurative expression.

In spite of these and other important contributions to the general theory of poetics, it is obvious that the fundamental doctrine of the Rīti school could not have been accepted in its entirety. Nor could it have competed against that of the Dhvanikāra, because Vāmana comprehended poetry only from the formal point of view, whereas the former showed a deeper insight into its inner nature. The more or less objective definition of the Rīti, given by this school, was hardly enough to satisfy the search for ultimate principles. Viśvanatha, following the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana in this respect, states this objection when he says that the Rīti is a particular kind of formal arrangement, a peculiar disposition or posture of parts, what is called the 'soul' or essence of poetry is something quite different. Again, the analysis of the several types of diction shows considerable ingenuity indeed but it was found almost impossible, as Daṇḍin himself admitted very early, to label and classify all the modes of poetic expression with definite and unalterable characteristics. As the Rīti school, therefore, tended to make invidious and essentially unprofitable (except as empirical facts) distinctions between the Vaidarbhi, Gauḍī and other kinds of diction with regard to whose exact significance there was bound to be inevitable difference of opinion, it naturally provoked criticism and opposition. In the same way, the endeavour to exhaust and classify all the literary excellences and flaws within clear-cut bounds on the basis of more or less formal analysis, was sure to prove unconvincing, and a protest against minute differentiation or endless multiplication.

<sup>1</sup> Pada-saṅghaṭanā rurangaśaṭṭhā viśeṣavatī upakāritī rasādīnām—Viśvanatha Śaṅkaraśaṅkara-ix 1

<sup>2</sup> āṅgino rasasya utkāṣa hetavaḥ acalaśūbhāyo guṇāḥ—Vāmanaśa, Kavyaprakāśa viii 1

<sup>3</sup> Ibid VIII 2



of the Gūṇas was rightly and definitely propounded by Mammaṭa, who following Ānandavardhana reduced the number to three only, viz Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasāda, in relation to the ultimate factor of the poetic sentiment. The attempt, therefore, to stereotype the entire poetical output into so many ready made dictions and fixed excellences, was bound ultimately to be discarded in favour of other and more penetrating principles.



of the imagination on the part of the poet. The Vakra kavi vyāpara or Kavi vyapāra vakratva is, in Kuntaka's opinion, the ultimate source of poetry. The Vakrokti is thus a Bhaṭṭi prakāra—a mode of expression, or in the terminology of Ruṣyaka an Ukti vaicitrya—an extraordinary expression which rests entirely on the genius of the poet.

It follows from this exposition that Kuntaka, like Bhāmaha, cannot accept any composition involving mere Svabhāvokti<sup>1</sup>, although Daṇḍin and others have given prominence to this particular figure, which consists in a description of the natural disposition of an object. When we make use of embellishment, what we embellish is the Svabhāva<sup>2</sup> of an object. If this Svabhāva itself is an embellishment, as it is in Svabhāvokti, what is there left to be embellished? To Kuntaka, a plain description of this Svabhāva (as he takes it) is obviously without the requisite strikingness, and he is naturally afraid, apart from technical objections, that the inclusion of this figure would admit even commonplace unadorned expressions into poetry. But this does not mean that Kuntaka entirely rejects the possibility of embellishing the svabhāva of an object. He includes it in the scope of a special kind of Vākya vakratā<sup>3</sup> in which the Svabhāva of an object, whether Sahaja<sup>4</sup> or Āhārya<sup>5</sup> forms the legitimate theme for heightened expression, and allows it as one of the elements of the simpler Sūkṣmāra marga<sup>6</sup>.

Kuntaka also appears to agree with Bhāmaha that the Atiśaya<sup>7</sup>, which he paraphrases in one place as Prakarṣa kaṣṭhādhiroha<sup>8</sup>, is involved in Vakrokti vaicitrya, and he takes it as a necessary element in what he calls Vicitra marga<sup>9</sup>. But as this Vaicitrya, which consists in a departure from conventional usage, may be attained by wild or eccentric writing it is laid down that it should be Tadvid ahlāda kāri or capable of pleasing the connoisseur. The Tadvid ahlāda karitva<sup>10</sup> is defined as consisting of a pleasing enjoyment beyond what is afforded by the excellence of word, sense or embellishment. Thus the ultimate test of this Vaicitrya in poetry is Tadvid ahlāda or the appreciation of the Sahādaya the man of taste. The Tadvid or Sahādaya plays an all important part in poetic theories. The Sanskrit authors clearly

<sup>1</sup>Natural description

<sup>2</sup>Nature

<sup>3</sup>Obliquity of sentence

<sup>4</sup>Natural

<sup>5</sup>Worked up

<sup>6</sup>Delicate (soft) style

<sup>7</sup>Striking quality

<sup>8</sup>Climax of excellence

<sup>9</sup>Striking style

<sup>10</sup>Capable to please the connoisseur



assert that everyone is not capable of realising the charm of poetry and demand a degree of culture and aesthetic instinct in the capable reader, the Rasika or the Sahṛdaya. He is the expert who must not only be initiated into the intricacies of theoretic requirements but must also possess the finer capacity of aesthetic enjoyment born out of wide culture and identification with the feelings and moods of the poet. Ānandavardhana discusses Sahṛdayatva at some length, and Abhinavagupta arrives at a concise definition of the Sahṛdaya thus—Yeṣāṃ kavyanuśīlanabhyasavaśād viśadibhute mano mukure varnaniya tanmayibhavana योग्यता ते ह्रदया सम्वादabhajaḥ saṛdayaḥ<sup>1</sup>, a definition which became so much standardised that Hemacandra does not scruple to copy it literally.

Taking this broad connotation of Vakrokti Kuntaka maintains that this Vakrokti constitutes the only possible embellishment or Alaṃkara of poetry. No doubt, for the sake of convenience of treatment, one speaks conventionally of Alaṃkarya (that which is to be embellished, viz. Śabda and Artha) and its Alaṃkara (embellishment viz. the poetic figures), but this distinction in his opinion is not essential. The embellished speech itself in its entirety is poetry and the addition of poetic figures is not adventitious. His position appears to be that embellished word and sense constitute poetry, and it is not proper to say that Alaṃkaras belong to Kavya, for this statement would suggest that Kavya may exist without them. Indeed, Vakrokti as a mode of expression being essential in poetry, it underlies and forms the substance of all poetic figures so called. In a sense, therefore, Kuntaka (like Daṇḍin) uses the term Vakrokti as almost co-extensive with the generic term Alaṃkara. As such, therefore, the Vakrokti is as Kuntaka holds, the only Alaṃkṛti<sup>2</sup> possible to Śabda and Artha and all so called poetic figures are but different aspects of the Vakrokti. As a matter of fact Kuntaka includes the Alaṃkaras in the province of Vakya vakrata.

The Vakrokti being the only Alaṃkara admissible, all other Alaṃkaras or poetic figures so analysed by other writers can be properly included in its comprehensive scope. Kuntaka is conscious of the fact that the Kavi vyapara, which is the source of Vakrokti, is in its nature undefinable yet one can distinguish and classify its function into six different spheres. The Vakratva, created

<sup>1</sup>Those whose sensibilities rendered transparent by a regular contemplation of poetry are capable of identification with the described object—such persons with responsive hearts are called Sahṛdayas the men of taste.

<sup>2</sup>Embellishment.

by Kavi vyapara may occur in the following cases (1) in the arrangement of letters which is termed Varna vinyasa vakrata. In this may be included among other things, all matters which other writers would include in Anuprasa<sup>1</sup> and Yamaka<sup>2</sup>. (2-3) In the substantive (Pratipadika) or the terminal (Pratyaya) part of a word it is called respectively Pada purvardha and pada parardha (or Pratyaya)-vakrata. In the former are included peculiar uses of Parjaya (synonym), Rudhi (conventional words) Upacara (fancied identification founded on resemblance) Viśeṣaṇa (attributive words) Samvṛti (covert expressions) Vṛtti (i.e. Samasa and Taddhita affixes) Bhava (roots of words), Linga (gender) and Kriya (verb). In the second group are dealt with the peculiar uses of Kala (tense), Karaka (case), Saṃkhyā (number) Puruṣa (person) Upagraha (voice) and particles and indeclinables. (4) In a sentence it is called Vakya vakrata. The Vakya vakrata may be of infinite varieties for it depends on the fertile fancy of the poet. In this section is included the treatment of all poetic figures embracing those figures. This is the subject matter of the third chapter. (5) In a particular topic (Prakarapa), it is called Prakaraṇa vakrata. (6) In the composition as a whole it is called Prabandha vakrata. The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of these two subjects. With the exception of the introductory portion of the first chapter which deals with general principles the whole of the work is devoted to the definition, classification and illustration of these varieties of Vakrata which form the different categories into which poetic speech is analysed. But Kuntaka himself admits that Vakratva may be of infinite kinds depending on the creative genius of individual poets.

Kuntaka appears to put much more stress on Riti than his master Bhamaha does and his treatment of Guṇas appertaining thereto is much more elaborate. In this he was probably influenced by the traditions of the Riti school. He acknowledges three Margas<sup>3</sup> (a term used both by Daṇḍin and Vamana as equivalent to Riti) and these correspond to the three Ritis of Vamana and his followers. But he finds fault with the classification and nomenclature of Ritis adopted by these exponents of the Riti theory. Kuntaka alludes to Daṇḍin's twofold and Vamana's threefold classification of Ritis but asserts that if Ritis are to be named and differentiated as Vaidarbhi, Gauḍī etc., after different localities in which they are supposed to flourish then

<sup>1</sup> Alliteration

<sup>2</sup> Chiming sustained assurance



as it is called) is an element in both, but in the former the Rasa becomes an Aṅga of the delineation of Svabhāva, while in the latter the ornamentation is to be done in accordance with the underlying motives of Rasa. In Kuntaka's opinion, the Vicitra-mārga, which is favoured by all good poets, is the more difficult of the two, demanding greater skill and maturity of treatment.

To the Sukumāra mārga belong the excellences of Mādhurya (sweetness due to fewness of compounds), Prasāda (perspicuity), Lāvaṇya (beauty arising out of proper arrangement of letters and words) and Ābhijātya (smoothness). The Vicitra mārga is similarly characterised by four sets of excellences, which are designated by the same names but defined somewhat differently, viz, Mādhurya (compactness of skilful structure avoiding laxity), Prasāda (lucidity due to the use of expressive words and easy syntax), Lāvaṇya (beauty due to the arrangement of short and long syllables), and Ābhijātya (elevatedness which is neither too soft nor too hard). The Madhyama mārga, which stands midway between these two styles, combines the excellences of both (Ubhaya-maka). To these special characteristics Kuntaka adds Aucitya (I 53-54) and Saubhāgya (I 55-56) as excellences common to the three Mārgas. The Aucitya, which as a characteristic emphasises the fitness of words and ideas, had been admitted by the Dhvani school chiefly in connection with Rasa, and discussed generally in a separate treatise by Kṣemendra, while the Saubhāgya is an excellence which arises out of the realisation of all the resources of a composition.

From the prominence thus given to the analysis of Alampkāra, it will be clear that Kuntaka could not put enough emphasis on Rasa and Bhāva as elements of poetry. The Rasa is dealt with topically in connexion with the poetic figures of the different Mārgas in which it is involved, as also in the treatment of Prikarapa prabandha vakratā<sup>1</sup>. Kuntaka admits the necessity of Rasa, but regards its delineation apparently as a special kind of realising Vakratva in a composition. He quotes with approval an Antara śloka<sup>2</sup> which lays down Nirantara rasodgāra garbha saundarya nirbharāḥ/ girāḥ kavīnām jīvanti na kathā mātramāśritāḥ<sup>3</sup>. He admits that it is not the mere matter or plot but the beauty imparted to it by the continuous development of Rasa which can make the words of a poet live, and in this he follows the dictum of Ānandavardhana, but as he had already accepted the

<sup>1</sup> The claim of episode and plot-structure.

<sup>2</sup> An observation put pointedly in the form of a verse in the midst of the prose gloss.

<sup>3</sup> The utterances of (eminent) poets which are full of beauty characterised by a continuous development of Rasa, do not live merely upon the theme.

essentiality of Vakrokti the Rasa could be comprehended only as an element of Vakrokti. It would appear that while the theorists of the school to which Kuntaka belonged were indeed cognisant of that aesthetic delectableness which must be present in poetry and which in Sanskrit goes by the name of Rasa but they could not yet harmonise it with their theory of Alamkara except indirectly as an embellishment of the language or of sense. Thus in the figure Rasavat which was recognised by old poetics (Bhamaha III 6 Daṇḍin II 280 ff) and which helped to smuggle in as it were the idea of Rasa into their systems the moods and feelings are roused not for their own sake but only to adorn the expressed thought. Kuntaka substantially follows this tradition but as in the meantime the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana had already worked out the importance of Rasa and indicated its position as an essential element in poetry he had to assign to Rasa a definite place in his system and could no longer regard the Rasavat etc. as convenient figures of speech in which the Rasas could be included.

While discussing the kind of Vakya vakrata in which the Svabhava of an object forms the theme Kuntaka gives directions as to how sentient objects can be described and made attractive through the proper development of sentiments like love. He appears to accept the theory of Anandavardhana that the Rasas cannot be Sva śabda vacya<sup>1</sup> and gently ridicules those writers (e.g. Udbhaṭa) who hold views to the contrary. In this connexion he points out how charming results can be produced in poetry by nourishing Rasas and Bhavas and cites verses from the *Likramorasaśya* and *Tapasa tatsaraja* as illustrations of Vipralambha śṅgara<sup>2</sup> and Karuṇa rasa<sup>3</sup> respectively. He also comments upon the Rasoddipana samarthyā<sup>4</sup> of *Kumarasambhara* and *Likramorasaśya*. Incidentally he considers in detail the claims of the so-called Rasalamkaras (Rasavat Preyas Ūrjasvin and Samahita) to be included in the list of Alamkaras as they were done by older writers who comprehended all ideas of rasa in these figures. Kuntaka could not regard them in the same light as they were viewed by older theorists like Bhamaha and Daṇḍin nor could he regard them with Anandavardhana as cases of Guṇibhūta vyaṅgya in which the suggested sense (here Rasa) is subordinated to the expressed poetic figures. He maintains that like Svabhavokti they are not Alamkaras but Alamkariya

<sup>1</sup> Described by their name

<sup>2</sup> Love in separation.

<sup>3</sup> Pathetic sentiment



i.e., in these so called poetic figures, the Rasa is developed for its own sake and not merely as an embellishment of the expressed thought. He criticises severely the older views of Bhamaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa and others, commenting in detail upon their definitions. But he is at the same time careful in laying down that even the Rasavat, in which Rasa is independently developed, is only an aspect of Vakratā depending on Kavi-kauśala. If not theoretically invulnerable, this view is interesting as indicating that the importance of Rasa, first advocated in poetic theories by the Dhvanikāra<sup>1</sup>, appears to have influenced thinkers belonging to other traditions of thought. The Dhvanikara attempted to reconcile the older idea of Rasavat as involving the Rasas secondarily by admitting it in his second division of poetry, but Kuntaka brushes aside all older views in this respect, and thinks that the case of Rasavat should be considered as one in which the poet has an opportunity of creating a kind of Vakrokti in which the Rasa supplies the principal charm.

Thus Kuntaka, recognising the importance of Rasa in poetry, had to allow it to form an element of the two kinds of style—the Sukumāra and the Vicitra. He lays down in general terms that Vicchitti is *Sarasatva sampaducita*<sup>2</sup>. He also allows the Rasas to play an important part in what he calls *Prabandha* and *Prakarapa vakratā*, i.e., in *Vakratā*, occurring in the composition as a whole or in its constituent episodes. In a *Prakarapa*<sup>3</sup>, for instance, the special kind of *Vakratā*-*vicchitti* (or the ingenious and charming turns) introduced in the incidents of a traditional plot is justified in so far as it contributes to the development of Rasas. Sometimes the *Prakarapa vakratā* may be such that the aṅgi or dominant Rasa is developed in an act of a drama (e.g. in *Vikramorviśya*, Act IV) to a climax which it has never attained either before or after. Sometimes a single Rasa like *Karuṇa* is developed and sustained throughout the play with constant repetition of the theme, but the *Vakratā* is thereby not rendered tiresome because it is woven with new surprises and made brilliant with Rasa and *Alaṃkāra*. In a *Prabandha*<sup>4</sup>, again, the Aṅgi rasa of the original story may be abandoned in favour of another Rasa to impart new charm to the plot. Thus in the *Vēṇiśaṅkha* the dominant *Santa* rasa of the *Mahābhārata* is rejected in favour of *Vīra* rasa.

Similar remarks apply to Kuntaka's treatment of the element of

<sup>1</sup> Author of the Dhvani theory.

<sup>2</sup> Endowed with Rasa.

<sup>3</sup> Context or part of the theme.

<sup>4</sup> Whole work.

**Dhvanī in poetry** It is clear that Kuntaka who admits not the essentiality of Rāsa or Dhvanī—subject, of course, to what has been said in the foregoing paragraph about the importance of Rāsa to Kuntaka,—but that of Vakrokti, can comprehend them only in some aspects of Vakratā. Ruyyaka explains that all ideas of Dhvanī are acknowledged by Kuntaka in the special form of Vakrokti, called Upacāra vakratā, the peculiarity of his view consisting in this recognition of the concept of the ‘suggested sense’ and in the attempt to incorporate it in Vakrokti. From Kuntaka’s treatment of Upacara vakrata it appears that the Upacara vakratā lies at the root of such pleasing figures as Rūpaka and therefore of metaphorical expression generally, and that, generally speaking the Upacara consists of a supposed or fancied identification of two objects, however distinct, on the basis even of the slightest resemblance. The term Upacara, no doubt, is often used loosely as identical with Lakṣaṇā (Indication or Transferred Sense), but the above interpretation agrees with the idea of Upacāra expounded by a majority of theorists, and is put concisely by Viśvanātha (p. 47) as ‘the arrest of the apprehension of difference between the two objects, absolutely distinct by means of the greatness of their resemblance’. As such, therefore, it is admittedly involved in figures like Rūpaka (metaphor) and forms the basis of metaphorical expression in general. As an instance of Upacara vakrata Kuntaka cites the case of application to immaterial objects of words which denote material objects, as in the phrase ‘particle of abuse’. The word ‘particle’ applicable to material objects in the sense of ‘little’ bears a pleasing charm to the Sahīdaya, when it is applied, through the analogy of ‘littleness’, to such immaterial objects as ‘abuse’. Kuntaka’s Upacara would come under the comprehensive domain of transferred expression known as Lakṣaṇā and would be included by the writers of the Dhvanī school in the province of Lakṣaṇā mula dhvanī or suggestion based upon Transference of Indication.

The author of the *Vakroktijivita*, therefore, may be classed (together with Bhamaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa and Vamana) among those who hold (according to the classification of the Dhvanīkāra and Anandavardhana) that Dhvanī or suggestion is Bhakta<sup>1</sup>, or, in other words, among those who maintain that the suggested sense is not the essence of poetry but is only a secondary element. Kuntaka acknowledges the concept of Dhvanī but denies its independent existence as ‘the soul of poesy’ by including it under various forms of Vakrokti.



But in spite of the opinions of Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara and Jayaratha, it appears that Kuntaka is more fully alive to the importance of Dhvani in poetry than they would make us believe, and assigns to it a larger part in his scheme of Poetics than allowing it to be comprehended in all its aspects in Upacāra vakratā merely. At the very outset of his work he defines Vācaka śabda<sup>1</sup> and Vacya artha<sup>2</sup> comprehensively as including in its scope not only Lakṣaka śabda<sup>3</sup> and Lakṣya artha<sup>4</sup> but also Vyañjaka<sup>5</sup> and Vyaṅgya<sup>6</sup> word and sense, thus expressly recognising the three Vṛttis, including Vyañjana, in poetry. He acknowledges the element of Dhvani in the Sukumāra marga but more explicitly in the Vicitra mārga. The two cases of Lakṣaṇā mūla dhvani<sup>7</sup>, recognised by the Dhvani School, are acknowledged by Kuntaka. The Paryaya-vakratā, again, where words with a double meaning lead to the suggestion of a metaphor or simile, is expressly stated by Kuntaka to fall within the province of what is called the Śabda śakti mūla dhvani<sup>8</sup>. Thus Kuntaka admits most of the broad divisions of Dhvani elaborated by the Dhvani theorists.

Again, Kuntaka recognises Pratiyamānatā generally in those cases of Vakya vakratā where the Svabhāva of an object forms the theme and guardedly uses the term, Gocaratva<sup>9</sup>, instead of Vācyatva<sup>10</sup>, so as to include the possibility of Vyaṅgyatva<sup>11</sup>. He thus clearly indicates that such descriptions are possible not only through express words but also through suggestive expressions. In other words he accepts in a general sense what is known as Vastu-dhvani<sup>12</sup>. In this way, he appears to acknowledge Alaṃkāra dhvani, as elsewhere he acknowledges Rasa-dhvani and Vastu-dhvani. In one passage, while discussing the figure Parivṛtti<sup>13</sup>, which he would consider to be Alaṃkārya (and not an Alaṃkāra), he gives his opinion that this so called figure is charming when it involves suggestion, and speaks categorically in this connexion of the three forms of suggestion of Vastu, Alaṃkāra and Rasa recognised by the Dhvani school.

---

<sup>1</sup>Denoting word

<sup>2</sup>Denoted meaning

<sup>3</sup>Indicating word

<sup>4</sup>Indicated meaning

<sup>5</sup>Suggesting word

<sup>6</sup>Suggested meaning

<sup>7</sup>Dhvani based on transference

<sup>8</sup>Dhvani based on the power of the word

<sup>9</sup>Being the object of expression

<sup>10</sup>Express denotation

<sup>11</sup>Suggestiveness

<sup>12</sup>Suggestion of the object

<sup>13</sup>A figure of speech based on the exchange of two similar or dissimilar things

Indeed, Kuntaka belongs to that group of authors who, having flourished after Ānandavardhana's time, do not deny the concept of Dhvani, but try to explain it in terms of already recognised ideas. Like Mahimabhaṭṭa who attempts to settle the process of Suggestion by the technical logical process of Inference, Kuntaka lived in the interval between Ānandavardhana who first championed the Dhvani-theory and Mammaṭa whose classical text-book raised the theory to almost exclusive authority. Like Mahimabhaṭṭa again, Kuntaka, as a follower of Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and the Alampkāra school, started a vigorous but short-lived reactionary movement which wanted to go back to the old position in a somewhat original way by an attempt to reconcile new ideas with the old. In this lies the historical importance of Kuntaka's work. But like the Anumāna-theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa, still again, Kuntaka's theory of Vakrokti never appears to have received liberal recognition in the hands of later theorists, all of whom, since Mammaṭa's time, accepted without question the Dhvani-theory of Ānandavardhana. If later writers refer to his Vakrokti, it is only to criticise and reject it; and in attempting to revive and extend Bhāmaha's old theory in the face of the more widely received theory of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka was apparently fighting on behalf of a cause already doomed.



its equivalent Śakti are sometimes used in this sense in Sanskrit works. But since genius is a vague and general term, and moreover is always seen in poetry in the excellence of the poet's imagination, we need not feel any hesitation in equating Pratibhā with Imagination.

Pratibhā literally means a flash across the mind—a revelation characterised by 'immediacy and freshness'. Many systems of Indian philosophy have developed doctrines of Pratibhā to explain the transcendental knowledge gained by immediate vision without resorting to the laborious and often inadequate exercise of the intellect. Aesthetics is but a branch of philosophy; and it has been clearly shown that important theories of Indian Poetics, especially those which explain the realization of Rasa, follow closely distinct schools of Indian philosophy<sup>1</sup>. The statements of our Ālaṃkārikas about Kavi-pratibhā too can be easily traced to the doctrines of intuitive knowledge developed by different schools of philosophy like the Āgama, the Nyāya and the Jaina. We may note here one obvious illustration. It was in Kashmir, the home of the Pratyabhijñā school, that Indian aesthetic thought reached its fullest height; writers like Abhinavagupta achieved eminence in both fields of speculation. No wonder then that statements regarding the nature of Pratibhā in poetry should in many cases be a reflection of the Śaivāgama view. Indeed, Abhinavagupta's stanza:

Yadunmīlanaśaktyaiva viśvamunmīlati kṣaṇāt

Svātmāyatanaviśrāntām tām vande pratibhām śivām

—*Dhvanyālokalocana*,  
end of ch. 1.

which describes Parā Pratibhā — the Supreme Power of Śiva ever residing in Himself and revealing the entire creation in the process of self-revelation—can equally well apply to Kavipratibhā, the poet's imaginative vision to which the whole universe becomes open. We may be certain that Abhinavagupta intended his lines to characterize both the Pratibhās.

But let us dally no further with this subject of philosophical origins and correspondences which, though fascinating, cannot be discussed with any competence by the present writer. We shall confine our attention to the views on Pratibhā as manifested in Poetry. It is customary for the majority of Ālaṃkārikas to dismiss this subject with a few remarks while discussing the requisites of the poet. But Rājaśekhara with his usual interest in topics which are somewhat out of

<sup>1</sup>See *Indian Aesthetics* by Prof. M. Hiriyanna, Proceedings of the First All India Oriental Conference, Poona, Vol. II, also included as the first essay in *Art Experience*

the beaten track devotes a whole chapter and even more of his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsa* to Pratibha. He has many interesting things to say about it, one of his most valuable contributions to the subject is the recognition of the Responsive (Bhāvayitrī) Imagination of the reader beside the usual Creative (Kārayitrī) Imagination of the poet. A writer who deserves far greater tribute, however, is Kuntaka. It may be said that his *Vakroktijivita* is nothing but a treatise on the function of Imagination in Poetry. At the outset he admits the ultimate supremacy of the poet's Imagination, he regards it as the source of every proper charm in a poem and holds it to be the very life of every poetic element, especially of *Ālaṃkaras*. Again and again, almost on every other page of the *Vakroktijivita* the word Pratibha (or some equivalent of it) is brought in to explain this or that charm of poetry. And, alone of all *Ālaṃkārikas* it is Kuntaka that has something direct to say about the shaping of the poet's conception in the course of expression. In fact, the very pivot of his system, the *Vakra kavivyāpāra* (the striking activity of the poet), seems to mean nothing but *Kavipratibhā vyāpara*, since every mode (*Prakara*) of its working is the transcending of the matter for the achievement of something imaginative.

Among the other *Ālaṃkarikas* that we can consult with great profit there are of course the two master-minds, *Ānandavardhana*<sup>1</sup> and *Abhinavagupta*, the hints and chance-remarks that they drop off and on illumine the whole regions of the subject of Pratibha. Then, there is *Abhinavagupta*'s own teacher *Bhaṭṭa Tauta*. Unfortunately, we possess only a few fragments from his still unrecovered *Kāvya-kautuka*, but they are quite precious. Lastly, we must not forget to mention *Mahima Bhaṭṭa*, the chief critic of the *Dhvani* school. In his *Vyaktiuvaka* there is a short passage on the nature of Pratibhā introduced incidentally in the discussion of the figure *Svabhāvokti*. It is so significant that we cannot help regretting the loss of his philosophical work *Tattvoktikosa* in which he had specifically expounded Pratibhā-tattva.

It is the creative aspect of Imagination—its power to conceive ever new thoughts and images and to express them in living words—that easily catches one's attention. The celebrated definition given by *Tauta* points out particularly this feature of Pratibhā. The full passage, so far as it has been preserved for us in quotations (e.g. *Kaṣṭhā-nusāsana*, 2nd Edn, p. 3), runs as follows —

<sup>1</sup>The author of the present paper belongs to the school which makes no distinction between the *Kārikā* and the *Vitti* portions of the *Dhvanyāloka*, *Ānandavardhana* is taken as the author of both.



reveals its own unique self. The poet's Imagination seizes its individual qualities—the qualities which give even the meanest object great significance and make the ugliest appear most charming—and represents in fit words such a vision of reality.

Hence, a poet need not go beyond the commonality of life to create Beauty. There is Beauty before him if he can but look at it with the right eyes, and a bare, unadorned representation of it can become true poetry—indeed it may surpass in charming descriptions cloaked in adventitious finery. This seems to be the real significance of admitting Svabhavokti in poetry. Whether it should be technically brought under the Alamkaras proper or not is a problem of minor importance. What we should specially bear in mind in our present discussion is the fact that in Svabhavokti the poet adds nothing of his own, he represents a thing as he sees it. No doubt his vision is fresh and selects only the unique features of the object he is describing but there can be no art without selection.

That fidelity to life, as it is, has a place in poetry is further recognized by the theorists in the inclusion of Vastu along with Alamkara and Rasa under Dhvani. Abhinavagupta takes care to point out that even the other two kinds of Dhvani ultimately resolve into Rasa, but that Vastu (unadorned fact)<sup>1</sup> should be given at all the status of Dhvani under appropriate conditions is surely significant. This point becomes still clearer when we observe its further division into Kavipraudhoktiniṣ panna, 'evolved by the poet's imaginative expression' and Svataḥ sambhavi 'existing in actuality'. In Western Poetics there has been a long drawn quarrel over the question whether Poetry is essentially 'Imitation' or 'Creation' (Mimesis or Poesis). In India the problem did not long remain unsolved (though in the earlier stages of poetics there was some fight over Svabhavokti). Both the modes came to be admitted because both of them could achieve Rasa prakāśa the most important aim of poetry. Neither 'Imitation' nor 'Creation'—or to use our own terminology, neither 'Svabhavokti' nor 'Vakrokti'—is an end in itself, it is only a means to the realization of Rasa, and has to be justified only in relation to this end.

So far we have been stressing the nature of Imagination as a kind of Dṛṣṭi—a way of looking at the universe. Now we have to revert to its more familiar aspect—Sṛṣṭi (Creation), and make an attempt to understand more exactly what it means. The poet is often compared

<sup>1</sup>It must be remembered however that Vastu becomes poetic only when it is suggested. Again Vastu can signify a supernatural fact as well as a natural fact. All suggested sense which is neither Rasa nor Alamkara is termed Vastu.

to the Creator, sometimes to the detriment of the latter. The poetic world is said to be free from the laws of Destiny and created by the poet without the least material cause. That is to say, the poet is supposed to weave it out of the shapes and sounds that his own Imagination bodies forth. But, in art as in life, something cannot come out of nothing. The poet's Imagination must feed on something outside it, be the food as rare and tenuous as 'the aerial kisses of shapes that haunt thought's wildernesses'. Psychologists have shown that even the most original Imagination can only work on the impressions of the world it has received, 'it may produce new modes of combination, but no new elements'<sup>1</sup>. Indian theorists too were not unaware of this even when they grew eloquent over the Poet's creative magic. For instance, when Ānandavardhana says

Apāre Kavyasamsāre kavireva prajāpatiḥ  
Yāthāsamā rocate viśvam tathedaṁ parivartate<sup>2</sup>

he admits clearly that the poet works upon the material presented by the world and does not create his poem out of the void. Note especially the word parivartate, 'transforms' it holds the key to the secret of poetic creation.

It is Kuntaka, however, that has devoted some space to the discussion of this problem. He remarks unequivocally

Yanna(?) varṇyamānasvarupāḥ padārthāḥ kavibhirabhūtāḥ santaḥ  
kriyante, kevalam sattāmatreṇa paśpūratam caṣam tathāvidhaḥ  
ko'pyatīśayaḥ punaradhiyate, yena kāmapi saḥdayaḥḥdayahārīṣim  
ramaṇīyatam adhiropyate (*Vakroktijvita*, p. 140)

By this he means that the poet does not set about creating non-existent objects, but taking them as they occur bleak in life he endows them with some special charm in the process of describing them. Then, Kuntaka goes on to say, this special charm contributed by the poet conceals effectively the original character of the object, and in the form revealed through the poet's Imagination the object shines like some new creation. It is this which entitles the poet to the appella-

<sup>1</sup>*Readings in Psychology*, p. 339. Cf. also 'all so-called inspirations occur strictly within the limit of the individual's capacity, training and previous cognitions' J. E. Downey *Creative Imagination*, p. 158.

<sup>2</sup>In this infinite world the Poet is the creator. He transforms the world as it pleases him.

Compare the implications of this with the statement of Croce. 'The philosophy of language, in a word, is identical with the philosophy of poetry and art the science of intuition-expression aesthetics which embraces language in its whole extension' (*Aesthetics, Encyclopaedia Britannica XIV, Edn.*)



tion of Creator. These remarks of Kuntaka apply to Utpādyā<sup>1</sup> as well as Prasiddha<sup>2</sup> themes. For even when a poet invents an incident he does not create it absolutely. What he does is to fuse together the various features of the things that, owing to the inherent relation between one and another, spring at the moment to his Imagination of their own accord. As a result of this integration we perceive indeed a new thing, but in reality it is only its Atiśaya<sup>3</sup> that has been the original work of the poet. Kuntaka's account of this process is a little obscure here and there, but there is no uncertainty about his general position.

By thus questioning the poet's title to the rank of creator in the absolute sense, we are not, by any means, reducing the marvel of poetic creation. The picture as it emerges from the poet's imagination does indeed look new, because he has endowed it with a transcendental charm. And the elements which have gone to make it may seem incredible when viewed separately, but somehow they have become welded into a most harmonious whole. Thus does Ānandavardhana characterize the poet's speech, comparing it with the enchanting graces of one's beloved.

In almost every definition of Pratibha, we observe that Artha and Śabda, Abhidheya and Abhidhāna, Darśana and Varṇanā, or Prakhyā and Upākhyā—i.e., the conception (or intuition) and its verbal expression—are both attributed to the imaginative activity. That is as it should be. A conception, however original it might be, leads but a shadowy existence until it is embodied in appropriate words. There are philosophers who hold that one possesses an intuition only to the extent one is able to express it, at least to oneself<sup>4</sup>. However this may be, there is no doubt that a poet truly becomes a poet only when he has woven his rich conceptions into verbal patterns. Bhaṭṭa Tāta, as quoted by Hemacandra, has something significant to say on this point.

'It is said that a Kavi is necessarily a seer (Rṣi), and a seer is one who has vision (Darśana). Vision is the intuition (Prakhyā) of the Reality underlying the manifold objects of the universe and their qualities

<sup>1</sup>Created by imagination

<sup>2</sup>Well known (historical and legendary)

<sup>3</sup>Extraordinary element

<sup>4</sup>Cf. "intuition is only intuition in so far as it is in that very act expression. An image that does not express—that is not speech, song, drawing, painting, sculpture or architecture—speech at least murmured to oneself, song at least echoing within one's own breast, line and colour seen in imagination and colouring with its own tint the whole soul and organism—is an image that does not exist." (Croce *Aesthetics*, *Essey Br.*, 11th Edn.)

chance to rise above the threshold of consciousness. Hence his vision becomes conventional and matter of fact. But in a poet most of these inhibitions are relaxed, hence his impressions freely flow into his consciousness. This accounts for the wealth of imagery that the poet has at his command. Again, much of the poet's constructive work takes place in his sub-conscious mind. This fact explains the shock of surprise the poet himself feels when a splendid thought or image flashes across his mind. His poem seems to compose itself for him. If one is averse to give credence to ante-natal Samskaras and supernatural blessings, this is the only explanation that one can accept of the creative mystery. It can also help one to understand the exceptional cases of poetic outburst mentioned by Jagannātha Paṇḍita—how at the end of a long period of silence a person suddenly finds his tongue and begins to sing. Probably a great intellectual or emotional crisis has loosened many of his inhibitions, and all the wealth of experience which had been till then locked up comes back to his consciousness in fresh associations to be moulded into poetry.

It is very interesting here to turn to what Hemacandra, following Jaina philosophy, has to say on the coming into play of Pratibhā. He divides Pratibhā into two classes: innate (Sahajā) and conditioned (Aupādḥiki), the latter being caused by incantations, divine blessing, etc. But both kinds spring into activity in much the same way. The soul is luminous by nature like the sun. But certain Karmas (called Jñānāvaraṇīya karmas) veil it like a cloud and prevent it from shining. When they are removed (Kṣaya) or suppressed (Upaśama) Pratibhā bursts forth in splendour. If this process takes place of its own accord we have 'innate' Pratibhā, but if supernatural aids are necessary to remove the veil we have the 'conditioned variety'. The correspondence between Hemacandra's view and that of modern psychology becomes striking once we equate the Āvaraṇa (veil) of Hemacandra with the 'inhibitions' of the latter school in this particular respect.

So far, we have deliberately refrained from dwelling on the most important condition of the poet's imaginative activity—the lever which sets it in motion. In the creative period of Indian aesthetics the critics of the Dhvani theory were one with its champions in acclaiming Rasa the soul of poetry. It is Rasanubhava<sup>1</sup> from which poetry springs and it is Rasaprakāśa<sup>2</sup> at which it aims. No wonder then that Rasa controls the working of the poet's Imagination too. Now we

<sup>1</sup> Experience of Rasa.

<sup>2</sup> Illumination of Rasa.



understand the significance of the expressions, 'Rasāveśavaiśadya'<sup>1</sup>—and 'Rasānugūṇaśabdārthacintā'<sup>2</sup>—in the definitions of Pratibhā given by Abhinavagupta and Mahima Bhaṭṭa respectively. For the very awakening of the poet's Imagination there must be an initial emotional thrill in his heart. The faggots must be lit before the flame can shoot up. Again, the Imagination of a poet who is genuinely under the influence of Rasa can conceive only such fancies and images and order them only in such ways as are most in harmony with his predominant emotional mood. If through carelessness his fancy breaks loose and produces conceptions which bring a break in the Rasapratiti<sup>3</sup>, he has to cancel them ruthlessly for the sake of achieving harmony. A poet has to be doubly watchful in the matter of Alampkāras for, Alampkaras more than anything else are the specific creatures of Imagination<sup>4</sup>. An Alampkāra has a place in poetry when it can be conceived by the poet as he is borne along the current of Rasa and does not put forth any extraneous effort for its development. An Alampkāra (ornament) justifies its name only when it is developed with care and in place.

Ānandavardhana again and again stresses this point. A poet's fancy may have the power to mint a hundred images, but he must use only those that are in harmony with the Rasa. Alas, then, as now, there were not wanting poets who snapped their fingers at Rasa and indulged their fancy to the utmost in heaping Alampkāra on Alampkāra.

What has been said just now must not of course be taken to mean that Ānandavardhana is averse to the full play of Imagination. All that he wants to stress is that Rasa should be its guiding star. Once this is admitted, he yields to none in appreciating the supreme importance of Imagination in poetry. Nor is he prone to judge the propriety of an Alampkāra by a cast iron rule. He knows that there tumbles into the imagination of an inspired poet conception after conception, each of which leaves the reader gaping with wonder. The poet does not go seeking after them, they crowd at his door eager to get a nod from him.<sup>5</sup> In fact, it is on the super normal excellence of a poet's Pratibhā, as revealed in his poetry, that his greatness depends.

<sup>1</sup>Clarity of vision resulting from the inspiration of Rasa.

<sup>2</sup>Contemplation of the word and the meaning conforming to Rasa.

<sup>3</sup>Perception of Rasa.

<sup>4</sup>That a specific activity of the Imagination is at the basis of every Alampkāra is fully recognized by our Ālampkarikas from Kuntaka onwards. (See S. K. De *Vakroktijīva* Introduction Sec. 7 where the matter is fully discussed.) As we have noted already the fight over Svabhāvokti too ultimately revolves round this point. *J H Q* March 1937

<sup>5</sup>अलङ्कारान्तराणि हि निरूप्यमाणदुर्धटनान्यपि रमसमाहितचेतसः प्रतिभानवन कवेरुपूर्विकया परापतन्ति ।

*Dhyanaloka* (1978 edn) pp 86-87

As Anandavardhana has pointed out in his comment here, the world has indeed seen numberless poets of the most varied types, but it is some five or six like Kālidāsa that have been accorded the epithet 'mahakavi'. It is the exceptional quality of their Imagination that has won for them this rank.

At the outset of the present enquiry we observed the bias of Indian Poetics towards the reader's point of view. Nowhere else has the reader of poetry received such an exalted position. He is the Sahādaya—one with a kindred heart—in whom the outpouring of the poet's heart finds its goal and fulfilment. The poet and he are the two aspects of a single entity—the Sarasvata tattva<sup>1</sup>. Hence the reader too needs Imagination to understand poetry and re-live it. Rajaśekhara calls it Bhavayitṛi pratibhā (Responsive Imagination) distinguishing it from the Karayitṛi pratibhā (Creative Imagination) of the poet. It is this which enables the reader to respond to and realise the poet's effort and conception.<sup>2</sup> There are critics who hold that the same person cannot be both a poet and a critic because he either lacks the power to compose poetry or cannot enjoy the poetry of another through jealousy or complete self-regard. It is also said that a poet cannot appreciate properly his own poetry either, but has to leave it to the enjoyment of the Rasika (one who has the capacity to enjoy Rasa), probably because he cannot rise above his personal concern in the poem and regard it objectively. But these views cannot stand much examination since they militate against the very conception of Sahādayatva. Poetry fails in its purpose if the same experience does not animate both the poet and the reader. It may be the misfortune of some poets not to be able to enjoy properly the work of another poet or even their own. But this is due to extra-poetic causes and does not concern us at present. What we are anxious to point out is the similarity that exists between the reader's appreciative activity and the poet's own creative activity. There is no doubt some difference between the reader and the poet, since the former's Imagination is less active and less original than the latter's. While the poet's Imagination has to seek, select and build and so create poetry, the reader's has simply to re-experience what is given to it. But the latter is none the less a creative act. Unless the reader, by imaginative response, feels the very glow that thrilled the poet's heart, he cannot hope to re-live the experience that the poet once

<sup>1</sup> *सर्वस्वत्यास्तत्त्व विविग्दयान्त्र विग्रयने* *Uparāśaśloka of Dharmasloka Locana*

<sup>2</sup> *भावयत्योत्तुर्वाणा भावयित्री । ना हि कवे श्रममभिप्राय च भावयति ।*

*तस्या रसल वलित कवेर्वापारतर । (Kāśyapaśāstram p. 13)*



lived through and expressed in words. The appreciation of Poetry is not a cold intellectual apprehension. The reader has to feel the original inspiration in every fibre of his being

Again, we must not forget the essentially suggestive nature of art. A poet can never hope to make explicit (Vācya) through words his glimpse of beauty. He can, at best, point in its direction; and the reader has to use his own eyes to visualise it. The enjoyment of poetry is no listless passivity. The reader has to meet the author at least half way. Abhinavagupta utters but the bare truth in remarking that the very life of Dhvani lies in the cooperation of the reader's Imagination with the poet's.

We can draw to a close now. There can be no apter conclusion to this enquiry than a quotation from the *Vakroktiśrīta* (p. 129) indicating almost all the aspects of the subject—Sūkṣmārthadarśana, apūrvārthanirmāṇa and kavisaḥṣṭaya-pratibhā-sahakāra [i.e., intuition of the subtle aspects of things, creation of something new and the co-operation of the reader's imagination with the poet's]

Līnam vastuni yena sūkṣmasubhagam tattvam girākṣyate  
nirmātum prabhavenmanohoramidam vācaiva yo vā bahiḥ  
vande dvāvapi tāvahaṃ kavivarau vandetarām tam punar  
yo vijñyātapariśramōyamanayorbhāravatāraḥṣamaḥ

‘ He who with his words draws out the subtle and beautiful attributes hidden within things, he who can by his mere words incarnate them externally in a beautiful form, these two great poets I salute, and indeed I salute more the (connoisseur) who knows the labour of the above two and is a fit person to receive the burden unloaded by them ’

## 8 THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA\*

*Dr R Gnoli*

The most ancient text that has come down to us is the *Nāṭya Śāstra* (4th or 5th Century A D ?), which tradition attributes to Bharata. This is a voluminous collection of rules and instructions concerned, in the main, with the production of drama and the education of the actors. Drama is considered as a form of synthesis between the visual and aural arts. In it both collaborate at arousing in the spectator, more easily and forcibly than by any other form of art, a state of consciousness *sui generis*, conceived intuitively and concretely as a juice or flavour, called *Rasa*.

This *Rasa*, when tasted by the spectator, pervades and enchants him. Aesthetic experience is, therefore, the act of tasting this *Rasa*, of immersing oneself in it to the exclusion of all else. Bharata, in a famous aphorism, which, interpreted and elaborated in various ways, forms the point of departure of all later Indian aesthetic thought, says, in substance, that *Rasa* is born from the union of the play with the performance of the actors. The essence of this *Rasa*, of which Bharata speaks, became the subject of study and analysis to a whole series of thinkers, each of whom was anxious to contribute to a clearer understanding of the words of the master. The earliest of these about whom we have any knowledge were Daṇḍin and Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, who lived respectively about the 7th and 9th Centuries, they thought, curiously, that *Rasa* was none other than an ordinary movement of the mind (anger, pain, etc.) developed to the highest degree by the combined effect of the play, the production and the actors, etc. *Rasa*, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa declared, is to be found in the represented character and, by extension and then metaphorically only, in the imitating actor. Śaṅkukī, who lived a short time after Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, disagrees decidedly with the theory of his predecessors. According to him, *Rasa* is not an intensified but an imitated state of mind. The actor imitates the state of mind of the characters he is portraying and this imitated state of mind is perceived by the spectators in the form of *Rasa*. This perception is free of any relation to the concepts of reality and non-reality. A horse imitated by a painter, Śaṅkukī observes, does not

---

\* I have followed the manuscript of that name.



while accepting, on the one hand, the solution put forward by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, did not fail, on the other, to show up clearly the boundary lines which separate the state of mystical consciousness from that of aesthetic consciousness. Religious experience, he argued, marks the complete disappearance of all polarity, the lysis of all dialectics in the dissolving fire of God. Sun and Moon, day and night, good and evil are consumed in the ardent flame of consciousness. The Yogin remains, as it were, isolated in the compact solitude of his consciousness, far beyond any form of discursive thought. In aesthetic experience, however, the feelings and the facts of everyday life, even if they are transfigured, are always present. In respect of its proper and irreducible character, therefore, which distinguishes it from any form of ordinary consciousness, aesthetic experience is not of a discursive order. On the other hand—as regards its content—which is nothing but ordinary life purified and freed from every individual relationship—aesthetic consciousness is no different from any other form of discursive consciousness. Art is not absence of life—every element of life appears in aesthetic experience—but it is life itself, pacified and detached from all passions. Further devotion (which is a preliminary and unavoidable moment of religious experience) postulates the complete abandon of the subject to the object of worship, God. Parameśvara, who, although being immanent and consubstantial, according to Abhinavagupta, with the thought which thinks Him, becomes in the religious moment as if transcendent to it and separate from it. The purpose of the Yogin is to identify himself with this transcendental object. Religious devotion implies therefore a constant drive towards an end which is outside it and, as such, is the very antithesis of aesthetic experience, which is perfect self-sufficiency.

What is the nature of poetic language? This problem attracted the attention, in the 9th century, of a rhetorician and philosopher by the name of Ānandavardhana. His is a justly famous book, called the *Dhvanyaloka*, on which Abhinavagupta was to comment a century and half later. Ānandavardhana reached certain conclusions which were accepted, with some rare exceptions, by all later Indian aesthetic thinkers. Poetic language, he says, is different from the language of prose: it arouses in the reader echoes and feelings—in a word, aesthetic experience—foreign to prose, whose value is purely informative and didactic. The words in a prose text have, according to Indian linguistics, two or, in the view of some writers, three powers, of which the chief one is the power of denotation (*abhidha*), the faculty, that is, of denoting a given object. Clearly, the power to arouse aesthetic

experience cannot be reduced to this Ānandavardhana conceives aesthetic experience in terms of a power (of a function, *Vyāpāra Vṛtti*) which makes manifest unexpectedly and without any noticeable bridge, a new sense, independent of the conventional sense. To this new sense, which is none other than *Rasa*, this school gave the name, which is difficult to translate, of *Dhvani*, sound, or more specifically, *Rasa-dhvani*, the sound of *Rasa*.

In his commentary, Abhinavagupta goes on to specify the relationship which exists between the words and *Rasa*. This is neither a naturalistic relationship between cause and effect nor a gnoseological relationship between the communicating sign and the thing communicated, but a relationship between what he calls—so as to distinguish the aesthetic fact from any other—manifestor and manifested. *Rasa* is neither caused nor made known by the poetic word, but is manifested by it. Aesthetic experience, manifested (and not produced nor expressed) by the poetic word, is not in a relationship of cause and effect with that which precedes and follows it, but marks, as it were, a magical break in the web of relationships of which everyday life, *Samsāra*, is woven. The prosaic word, Abhinavagupta says, is simply an instrument of information and, once it has fulfilled its task, that is to say, once it has been perceived, has no further usefulness. The poetic word, on the contrary, is an end in itself and, once read and tasted, loses nothing of its intrinsic value, but remains, as it were, virgin and intact. Art, Abhinavagupta says, in contradiction to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and to tradition in general, is not instructive, except indirectly, in so far as it sharpens the aesthetic sensibility and, therefore, the consciousness.

While the aesthetic experience, which concerns the spectator above all, was receiving so much attention Indian thought did not neglect to examine the creative moment, in which the poet gives life and breath to his work. The chief thinkers to study the nature of the birth of a work of poetry were Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭa Tauta and later Abhinavagupta, his immediate disciple. 'In the infinite sea of poetry'—writes Ānandavardhana—'the poet is the true and sole creator and as it pleases him to create, so the whole grows and is transformed.' The poet is at once he who sees (the seer, *Rṣi*) and he who is able to express that which he sees (*Varṇananūpuṇa*). *Rasa*, the aesthetic state of consciousness, belongs, in reality, to the poet alone, it is nothing but his 'generalized' consciousness. It fills him entirely with itself and is translated spontaneously into poetic expression, like a liquid which overflows from a vase or like the natural or pre-discursive



sive consciousness. In these stanzas, consciousness is described as being of two sorts, discursive consciousness which is consciousness of the universal, and direct consciousness, which precedes the activity of the mind, transcends the domain of language and is thus consciousness of the particular. In this context Mahima Bhaṭṭa also says—'The object of direct perception is the particular. This and no other is the object of the language of good poets, gifted with intuition.' Intuition is therefore a form of direct perception (Prajña), says another stanza, which while the poet is completely absorbed in the labour and the search that precede poetical creation, is born unexpectedly from contact with the thing *in se* (Svarupa=Svalakṣaṇa), that is to say, before any mental construction. In an image borrowed from mystical thought, poetic intuition is described as the third eye of Śiva, in virtue of which one perceives by direct intuition, independently, that is, of discursive knowledge, every form of existence, past, present and future. The logical and practical categories of language are a diaphragm, an obstacle which comes between the reality and our consciousness. The difference between the poetical and the ordinary language consists in this, that the former is devoid of these categories and therefore attains the reality before its solidification into the modes of discursive thought. In this sense, the poetical language is related to other unconventional forms of expression, namely interjections, intonation of voice, and, on the religious plane, the Mantras.

After Abhinavagupta, the study of aesthetics continued in India up to the present day, but without receiving any further creative stimulus. Ānandavardhana, Bhaṭṭa Nayaka, Bhaṭṭa Tauta and Abhinavagupta are still the most characteristic exponents of this subject and their thought, although at times uncertain and ingenuous, reaches, with Abhinavagupta, conclusions which are still valid today and even relatively novel to Western thought. The conception of art as an activity and an independent spiritual experience, freed of practical interests, which the intuition of Kant perceived for the West, was already, in 10th century India, an object of study and controversy. Poetry said Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, is inextinguishable—it exists and will exist for ever. Like love, it has kindled and will continue to kindle the hearts of man with new and pulsating life, it is an essential and independent part of human nature and the poets who will never cease to tap its source, far from exhausting it, only purify and enrich it with new and ever-changing experiences.

## ✓9. SĀHITYA\*

*Professor V. Raghavan*

The concept of Sāhitya had a grammatical origin. It became a poetic concept even as early as Rājaśekhara; as far as we can see at present, the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* is the earliest work to mention the name Sāhitya and Sāhitya-vidyā as meaning Poetry and Poetics. Even after Rājaśekhara, grammatical associations were clinging to the term up to Bhoja's time. Kuntaka, about the time of Bhoja himself, was responsible for divesting Sāhitya of dry grammatical associations and for defining it as a great quality of the relation between Śabda and Artha in Poetry. Sometime afterwards, Ruṣṣaka or Mañkhuka wrote a work called *Sāhitya-mīmāṃsā*, which was the first work on Poetics to have the name Sāhitya. Afterwards, Sāhitya became more common and we have the notable example of the *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* of Viśvanātha.

Sāhitya is derived from the word 'Sahita', 'united together'. All literature is made of the material of word and sense united together and so also is Poetry. The earliest definitions of Poetry are material, giving us the substance of which Poetry is made, namely, Śabda and Artha. This is the starting point and no one can ignore this essential element so long as Poetry is a kind of expression, expressed through the medium of language. So Rudraṣa follows with his indication of the nature of Kāvya—that Śabda and Artha constitute it and many later writers like Mammaṣa and Vidyānātha define Poetry through Śabda and Artha. Even after the establishment of the Ātman (soul) of Poetry, Śabda and Artha were taken as the body of Poetry. The two, Śabda and Artha, are inseparable and always go together, the one meaning the other. No literature, no talking even, is possible without the two. But there seems to have been in the early period of Poetics a view on this grammatico-poetic question that of the two elements of Śabda and Artha, the former is more essential and important. It is perhaps to answer this view that Māgha says in his poem, the *Śiśupāla-radha*, that a discerning man will pay equal regard to Fate and Self-exertion, even as a poet will, to both Śabda and Artha. Māgha here emphasises that Śabda and Artha are of equal importance. It is to this same controversy that Bhāmaha refers and replies like Māgha.

Bhāmaha says] that both Śabda and Artha, united together, form

---

\*Adapted from *Some Concepts of Alamkāra Śāstra* and *Bhoja's Śrīgītā Prakāśa*.



**Kāvya** It is meaningless to emphasise either Śabda only or Artha only, to call the one as Ābhyantara<sup>1</sup> and the other as Bāhya<sup>2</sup>. In another way, the very late writer Jagannātha emphasises Śabda to start with, though he includes Artha also in his definition of Poetry. He defines Poetry as Śabda that gives such an idea, Artha, as is productive of non-worldly aesthetic bliss when contemplated upon. Jagannātha further justifies himself that it is Śabda that is called Kāvya and not Artha also, because we say in the world 'The Kāvya has been read but its Artha has not been understood'. But in the ordinary speech in the world one adopts a fictitious analysis of a single whole into its parts. The proper attitude would therefore be what Kuntaka has stated, namely, that both Śabda and Artha together constitute poetry.

The emphasis on Śabda by a school which considered Artha as Bāhya was perhaps strongly influenced by the grammatical Śabda Brahman philosophy of the *Vakyaṇādiya* which holds Artha as a Vivarta<sup>3</sup> of Śabda. Bhoja is a great follower of Bhartṛhari and his work is quoted numberless times in the opening chapters of the *S'rngāra Prakāśa*. Bhoja takes trouble to explain that the acceptance of Dhvani does not bring any difficulty regarding the basic tenet that all Artha is the Vivarta of Śabda. He explains Dhvani also as a Śabda Vivarta. As against this view of Śabda prādhānya<sup>4</sup>, it can be said that the Etymologists or Nairuktas considered the idea or Artha as chief and Śabda secondary in importance. It is as a reply to this controversy that Bhāmaha says that both Śabda and Artha together constitute Poetry. This is the first significance of Sāhitya.

The old writers did not go farther than defining Poetry as made up of Śabda and Artha, words and ideas. Anything said or written is of this nature and this does not define Poetry or, on the face of it, give us an idea of the nature of the charm in Poetry. The old writers described Poetry as linguistic composition (Śabda and Artha), divided it into Prose and Verse, Sanskrit and Prākṛt, Read and Acted, and so on. But at the same time they realised that Śabda and Artha in Poetry had a special beauty not found elsewhere, that, to put it briefly, the Śabda and Artha in Poetry had some speciality, Viśeṣa. It is a question of deciding this Viśeṣa<sup>5</sup> that is the problem of Poetics. Some approached the problem from the outer expression, the garb called Śabda and Artha, some plumbed the content within; while others emphasised that, whether it be a Viśeṣa of the Śabdārtha or of the content within,

<sup>1</sup>Internal<sup>2</sup>External<sup>3</sup>Transformation of the word<sup>4</sup>Speciality

everywhere in Poetry, in the Śabdārtha-śarīra<sup>1</sup> as well as in the Ātman of Rasa and Dhvani, it is the poet's peculiar way, the work of his genius, Kavi-Vyāpāra, that is the Viśeṣa. It is the analysis of this Viśeṣa that engages our attention and it is the main theme in the history of Sanskrit Poetics. That it is some beauty is accepted by all. Replying to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta says that it is acceptable to him to say that the 'Soul' of Poetry is the realisation of beauty. Śabda and Artha that are 'beautiful', Ramanīya, are Kāvya. Within this Rāmanīyaka<sup>2</sup> come Alaṃkāra, Guṇa (Rīti included in it), Rasa, Dhvani and Aucitya. These form the speciality of poetic speech, of the relation between Śabda and Artha in Poetry. In ordinary speech, Śabda and Artha are united—Sahitau. Without this Sāhitya, no linguistic expression is possible. Then what is the meaning of Sāhitya with reference to Poetry? The Sāhitya meant is one of a special kind, an unusually beautiful relation between Śabda and Artha in Poetry. Poetry is speech *par excellence*; and Sāhitya, relation *par excellence*. Thus to begin with, the word Sāhitya meant only the mere union of Śabda, the expresser, and Artha, the expressed. This means correctness and purity of grammar on the one hand and logical sensibility on the other. Taking Śabda and Artha united as Kāvya, the early writers examined the varieties of Śabda, different languages, different kinds of words as Noun, Verb, Preposition, etc., and sentences made up of words and of types of compositions made up of Vākya<sup>3</sup>, like the Sargabandha<sup>4</sup>, Nāṭaka<sup>5</sup>, etc. This analysis pertains to Śabda and is to be had in the first chapters of the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. But there is no trace of any analysis of the Artha in Poetry in the texts of these two writers. The first writer who began to talk of more varieties of Artha than one in Poetry is Udbhaṭa according to the evidence of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana*. Analysis of Artha in Poetry begins here. In his *Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa* while commenting upon Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa tries to interpret the two words Śabda and Abhidhāna as distinct and points out that in Poetry, besides the primary sense of the words, there is a second sense which is the secondary meaning.

Udbhaṭa thus mentioned the Amukhya or Gauṇa<sup>6</sup> Artha and Vāmana definitely speaks of Lakṣaṇā which gives the secondary

---

<sup>1</sup>The body consisting of the word and the meaning.

<sup>2</sup>Beauty.

<sup>3</sup>Sentences.

<sup>4</sup>A long poetic narrative composed of a number of cantos.

<sup>5</sup>Drama.

<sup>6</sup>Not the main, the secondary.



meaning as underlying the beauty in certain expressions. Soon critical circles discovered the third and greatest variety of Artha, the suggested idea. Taking Śabda and Artha together, i.e., the two in Sāhitya, and leaving aside the grammatical aspects of their mutual relation, it was found out that in Poetry the relation between the two consisted of some beauty analysable into Alamkāra, Guṇa, etc. In such a manner, in course of time, Sahitya, which at first meant only the inevitable grammatical and logical relations between Śabda and Artha in any kind of linguistic expression, came to mean those things which form the distinguishing characteristics of Poetry as different from the other utterances. Soon Sāhitya came to be used as a synonym of Poetry.

We do not know when and how exactly the word Sahitya came into existence and came to be used in the sense of Poetry. We have an old verse which uses the name Sahitya for Poetry, but its date is not decided. In Bhāmaha we have only the qualifying adjective 'Sahitau' from which Sāhitya is derived. In Rājaśekhara's *Harjamāmāsā* we find Sāhitya vidyā meaning Poetics as one of the Vidyās<sup>1</sup>. He explains Sahitya derivatively as the Vidyā of Śabda and Artha placed together in the proper manner. In section 3, describing the legend of Kāvya Puruṣa and his descent into the world, Rājaśekhara mentions Sāhitya vidyā as the spouse of Kāvya Puruṣa. It is only when we come to the eleventh century that we see the concept of Sāhitya entering, as it were, into its 'bhāgya-daśa'. It begins to loom larger and gets two exponents for itself, one in Māhwa and another in Kashmir, Bhoja and Kuntaka, two of the names among first rank Ālamkārikas who must be specially noticed in a history of Sahitya. It is striking that both Bhoja and Kuntaka start with Bhāmaha's definition. Before we compare and contrast the two expositions of Sahitya by Bhoja and Kuntaka, we shall see what Bhoja means by that term.

We have already said that Poetry being speech supreme, Sahitya is, between the two parts of language—Śabda and Artha—relation supreme. Thus, Sahitya first means all linguistic expression and the general and inevitable grammatical and logical relations between word and sense, and then it means Poetry and the poetic relations between the two. Bhoja means by Sahitya both kinds of relation and he not only deals with Poetry but with language also. At the lower levels, lies language with its general Sāhitya. Higher up the

language has risen above itself and has bloomed into Poetry, and here, the Sahitya is poetic relation between word and sense

Bhoja defines Kavya as the Sāhitya or unity of word and sense. It is to a treatment of this Sahitya of Śabda and Artha that the *S'ṅgara Prakāśa* is devoted. Bhoja calls his work itself *Sahitya Prakāśa* in chapter XI. The scheme of the whole work is contained in the definition, *Śabdarthau Sahitau kavyam* and under the edifice of the *S'ṅgara Prakāśa* lies the foundation and system called Sahitya. Sahitya is defined by Bhoja as the relation between Śabda and Artha and is of twelve kinds. Eight of these twelve Sāhityas can be called general, and the last four are special and can be classed as the poetic Sahityas. There is the well known eternal, external grammatical relation between Śabda and Artha, but these are subjects pertaining to grammar. As far as Poetry is concerned, the relation is of a superior kind. Sahitya is thus really the poetic relation, rather it is necessary to investigate the poetic Sahitya only, leaving aside the well known external Sahitya. But with a suggestion of the historical origin of the concept of Sahitya in grammar, and, as in most places, writing here also under the great influence of the science of grammar, Bhoja takes at first Sāhitya as the relation between Śabda and Artha and includes under it two sets of relations, grammatical and poetical.

We remarked above how it is worthwhile in a work of Poetics to investigate into this Poetic Sahitya only, leaving out the *Vacya-Vacaka sambandha*<sup>1</sup> as being very well known. Ratneśvara<sup>2</sup> also opines so. Bhoja has taken the grammatical relations also as Sahitya, separates the last four, and introduces them as factors which secure goodness of expression, i.e. the poetic character. This would lead to the view that Sahitya is neither the sum total of all the twelve relations, grammatical and poetical, nor the sum total of the first eight only, but that it is only the four fold poetic relation of *Doṣa hana*<sup>3</sup>, *Gūṇadana*<sup>4</sup>, *Ālamkāra yoga*<sup>5</sup>, and *Rasa aviyoga*<sup>6</sup>.

This, in brief, is the system called Sāhitya in which is envisaged Bhoja's conception of Poetry as speech made more attractive by four factors, namely, absence of grammatical, logical and literary flaws, securing of stylistic qualities of Śleṣa, etc., which are of prime importance and which must necessarily be present adornment with Ālamkāra.

<sup>1</sup>The general relation between the expressed and the expression

<sup>2</sup>Commentator on Bhoja's first work on Poetics *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*

<sup>3</sup>Avoidance of (poetic) flaws

<sup>4</sup>Securing of (poetic) qualities

<sup>5</sup>Addition of the figures of speech

<sup>6</sup>Presence of Rasa.



Bhāmaha and Dandin and is of opinion that, even as the Rasa, the way of saying things in Kavya through suggestion (Dhvani) beautifies only expression. Therefore, to sum up, Bhoja considers the speciality about Poetry as a *Śobha*, which is due to Sāhitya, this Sahitya is Alamkāra, understood in a larger and higher sense as Beauty (Śobha or Saundarya as Vāmana would say) and analysable into Rasa, Guṇa and Alamkāra (figures). This is a synthetic or eclectic theory.

Kuntaka recognises that Sāhitya surely means, primarily, only the ordinary relation of Śabda and Artha as Vācaka<sup>1</sup> and Vācya<sup>2</sup> but he says that in Poetics the word is restricted to the poetic relation, *Viśiṣṭa*<sup>3</sup> *Sahitya*, which is the same Vacya-Vācaka sambandha<sup>4</sup> made finer. Sāhitya is considered at this stage as being above Pada vakya-pramanas<sup>5</sup> and only as a poetic concept.

When Bhoja was defining the concept of Sāhitya, Kuntaka was doing the same thing in Kashmir. Kuntaka is a great name in Sanskrit Poetics. Besides his new doctrine of Vakrokti, there are many other topics on which his genius made special and valuable contribution. One such is Sāhitya.

Like Bhoja, Kuntaka is a follower of the ancients whom he re-interprets. Like Bhoja, Kuntaka starts with Bhāmaha's definition of Poetry—Śabdarthau sahitaṁ kavyam—and accepts it by adding it to his own Vakrokti. He says that both word and sense together, having Sāhitya, are Kāvya, when set in Vakrokti. Thus, language or word and sense becomes Poetry by virtue of what we might call a Guṇa called Sahitya and an Alamkāra called Vakrokti, both the words Guṇa and Alamkāra being used here in a large sense. This Sahitya is the prime requisite. It is only Kuntaka who has given us a full and significant exposition of the concept of Sahitya. He himself says that though people have been using the word Sāhitya for a long time, no writer ever systematically thought out its full significance and expounded it in any treatise. Kuntaka rightly takes credit for having done this work.

Sāhitya literally means the relation between word and sense. This relation is eternal and there is no language without it, i.e., without the word and sense being united together as the expressing and the expressed (Vācaka and Vācya). This Vācya vācaka sambandha comprehends the consideration of the structure and varieties of the Vācaka,

<sup>1</sup>Denoter

<sup>2</sup>Denoted

<sup>3</sup>Special

<sup>4</sup>The (grammatical) relation of word and sense

<sup>5</sup>Grammar, syntax and logic.

the Pada, of the syntactic import of a succession of words in a Vākya (sentence) and of the logicality of the idea, i.e., Pada, Vākya and Pramāṇa. These are present in all kinds of expression and form the original meaning of Sāhitya.

This original Sahitya which is the 'Nisarga siddha śabdārtha sambandha',<sup>1</sup> becomes Sahitya of a superior kind by the operation of the poet's genius or Kāvī vyāpara. It is this superior Sahitya that is discussed in Poetics. It is the magical quality pertaining to the words and ideas coming from a poet which makes ordinary utterance with Pada, Vākya and Pramāṇa into Poetry. It is not present in either Sāstra, scientific or philosophical treatise, or the ordinary utterances of the world, but is seen in Poetry only. It is not the Samānya<sup>2</sup> but is the Viśiṣṭa<sup>3</sup> Sahitya.

Kuntaka defines this Sāhitya as the quality of Śabda and Artha vying with each other in the suggestion of Rasa, or, to put it generally, in enhancing the beauty of Poetry. He gives this Sāhitya as applying to all the elements in Poetry, it is something like Aucitya. First of all kinds of Sahitya comes the Sahitya of Śabda and Artha, their mutual commensurateness. There must be beautiful expression as well as beautiful idea. The question of whether form or content is important in poetry does not arise. Mere idea or emotion is the subject of psychology. As long as Poetry is expression, the form is unquestionably important. It has to contain also an Artha that is equally charming. This is the first kind of Sahitya of Kuntaka. He takes Śabda as a whole, meaning expression and Artha as a whole, meaning the sense. He examines some verses and points out the presence or absence of this commensurateness between the expression and the expressed. Inadequate expression and expression devoid of idea are both bad. Beautiful expression without a beautiful idea and a beautiful idea not couched in an equally beautiful expression are both bad. The fault on the one side affects the other also. Idea insufficiently expressed is 'dead' and expression without idea or expressing something other than the intended idea is 'disease'—*Alptakalpa* and *Iṣḍhībhūta*. Thus, the first Sāhitya is the complete harmony and commensurateness between expression and expressed, form and content.

The second Sāhitya is that between one word and another in the expression and between one idea and another in the expressed. The first Sāhitya takes Śabda and Artha as a whole meaning expression

<sup>1</sup>Natural relationship of word and meaning

<sup>2</sup>General

<sup>3</sup>Special



and expressed while the second Sahitya emphasises that in the expression itself the several units namely the *Padas* must have mutual Sahitya. Word and sense must be so set that neither of them is dull, they are to be of the same power they are to be so set that they mutually vie in enhancing the beauty of the poem. The expression and the expressed are to be neither more nor less than the other but must be most precise and equally powerful. In the matter of promoting the Rasa and the *Camatkara*<sup>1</sup> of the *Sahridaya*<sup>2</sup> each should emulate the other. This is the first Sahitya. Similarly one word should vie with another and one idea with another. This is what Kuntaka means by defining Sahitya as *Paraspara Spardha*<sup>3</sup> of *Śabda* and *Artha*. He compares the sympathetic cooperation between the two to the understanding between two friends. This is the second Sahitya.

Thirdly, Kuntaka speaks of this Sahitya with reference to other elements in expression like *Marga* or *Riti*, *Vṛtti*, *Guṇa*, *Alamkara* and *Vakrata* in general. Every part or aspect of expression has to vie with the other towards enhancing the beauty of the poem.

Thus Kuntaka's conception of Sahitya in general is that the expression (*Vacaka śabda*) and the expressed (*Vacya artha*) as also the several units in either part of Poetry must be set in a glorious race competing with each other in making the poem beautiful. This notion of Sahitya has to base itself on the beauty of the poem or the relish of the *Sahridaya* as the test according to Kuntaka. In this respect the concept means the appropriateness and power of the *Vacya vacaka* in suggesting the Rasa. For Kuntaka accepts Rasa as supreme. Therefore this conception of Sahitya generally likens it to the other concept of *Aucitya* which also figures very much in Kuntaka. Criticising the introduction of *Śabdalamkaras* with special effort, Kuntaka says that this would result in the loss of *Aucitya* and through that would mean an overemphasis on *Śabda saundarya*<sup>4</sup> and a loss of Sahitya.

Kuntaka has thus brilliantly expounded the concept of Sahitya as a great principle in Poetry as the highest perfection in expression a poet should attain namely the harmony between the expression and the expressed. When *Rajasekhara* slightly explained Sahitya as the proper equilibrium between *Śabda* and *Artha* we must understand him as having had in his mind ideas similar to what Kuntaka later stated

---

<sup>1</sup>Delectation

<sup>2</sup>The sensitive reader

<sup>3</sup>Mutual emulation

<sup>4</sup>Embellishment of the word or expression.

clearly. Another explanation can be given bringing out this same significance namely, the equipoise between Śabda and Artha, the harmony of Kuntaka. The word Sahitya contains the affix 'Sa' standing for 'Samam', 'equally'—and the main word is the past passive participle of 'Dha', to put, place or set. Thus 'Sahitya' means equipoised word and idea.

A comparison of Kuntaka's exposition of Sahitya with that of Bhoja reveals interesting points. Bhoja and Kuntaka start with the same definition of Bhamaha. The difference is, Kuntaka emphasises by Sāhitya a quality of Śabda and Artha resembling Aucitya. Besides that, Kuntaka mentions Rasa, Dhvani, Mārga, and above all Vakrokti. That is, Kuntaka adds to Bhāmaha's definition of Poetry (that Śabda and Artha united, are Kāvya), the Vakrokti in which the Śabda and Artha having Sahitya must be set.

Thus although all the varieties of Vakrokti too as forming aspects of expression have to observe Sahitya, they are not included in Sāhitya. Therefore there are two ideas Sahitya and Vakrokti, in Kuntaka's definition of Poetry. Bhoja's conception of Sahitya differs in being very wide. It means Poetry as a whole in Bhoja, whereas, according to Kuntaka, it is a supreme quality of Poetry that has to be present along with Vakrokti. Bhoja's Sahitya means all the manifold activities of the poet's genius, namely elimination of flaws, the securing of style and its qualities, figures and diction, and finally making every point of expression the embodiment of Rasa. That is, Bhoja's Sahitya comprehends not only the whole of Kuntaka's Vakrokti but also every other thing in Poetry. Beyond Śabda and Artha, the only other fact in Poetry is Sahitya and under it comes everything else. In another way also Bhoja's Sahitya is very much wider than that of Kuntaka. For, to Bhoja Sahitya means all literature and all kinds of Śabdartha-sambandhas<sup>1</sup> while to Kuntaka it means Poetry and a poetic relation only, although he also recognises that ordinarily Sahitya refers to the relation between Śabda and Artha in general as Vacaka and Vācya. Only, Kuntaka leaves out the consideration of language itself and its inevitable Śabdartha sambandhas related to Pada, Vākya and Pramāṇa and treats only of the poetic relation above all these. Just as Poetry is finer speech, Sahitya is the finer relation between Śabda and Artha. Rājasekhara calls Sahitya or Poetry the finest essence of all the four Vidyas even as Wordsworth says that Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge. We can say with refer-

<sup>1</sup>Relations between sound and sense



ence to Sāhitya here, making a slight change, that Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of language

It is not the concept of Sahitya in Bhoja that has an exact correspondence to Kuntaka's Sahitya. It is interesting to note that almost the same idea contained in Kuntaka's Sahitya is found in Bhoja's Guṇa called *Sammitatva*. It is the avoidance of verbiage or over-expression, it is the use of words enough for the idea on hand. Bhoja further explains this Śabda sammitatva as the quality of Śabda and Artha being as if held in a balance.

This is what Kuntaka means by his Sahitya which he describes as Anyuna anātīkṛtatva, of word and idea being neither more nor less than each other. Sammita means well adjusted or harmonised utterance. The above given definition is of the Śabda guṇa, the quality of word called Sammitatva and Bhoja has the same Guṇa for Artha also. The difference between the two is that in the former the poet weighs the adequacy of expression from the point of view of Artha and in the latter, *vice versa*. All qualities of precision, powerfulness, clarity, and such others are comprehended in this weighing of word with idea. Its breach brings in a train of flaws. This is perhaps the greatest quality of poetic expression, the peak of perfection of poetic art. This quality is variously called, descriptively and metaphorically. The Śabda and Artha having this quality are compared by Kuntaka to two friends united in some glorious task. Paraśara Bhaṭṭa calls them 'brothers' with the best Saubhratra<sup>1</sup> feeling. Bhoja calls the same Śabda artha-sammitatva<sup>2</sup> and gives the imagery of the poet weighing Śabda and Artha in the scales of a balance. A greater comparison comes from Kalidasa himself, who gives the simile of the ideal prime divine couple Pārvatī and Parameśvara, the prototype of Man and Woman in *Raghuvamśa*, I 1. The Sāhitya or Samparka between Śabda (Vak) and Artha is compared by Kalidasa to that between Parvatī and Parameśvara or to the ideal Sahitya laid down by the *Smṛtis* between wife and husband. There is no question of inferiority or superiority between the two. Their marriage is sacred and they enter the holy union for the service performed together to Dharma to which they are both and equally subordinate. Rasa or 'beauty' of Kāvya can be likened to that Dharma and Śabda and Artha to the married couple. It is not likely that the great poet wrote the above verse merely to mean by Vag artha samparka,<sup>3</sup> the well known and eternal Śabdārtha sam-

<sup>1</sup>Fraternal

<sup>2</sup>Commensurateness

<sup>3</sup>Word meaning contact.

bandha<sup>1</sup> He might have meant that also, but he powerfully suggests here the Viśiṣṭa<sup>2</sup> Sahitya or the Viśiṣṭa Sambandha Similarly there is no 'Sārasya' or credit to the great poet to say that by 'Vagartha-pratipatti', Kalidasa prayed for the attainment of proficiency in lexicography, in words and meanings The compound is often explained by my Professor Kuppuswami Sastri as meaning the same as Kuntaka's Sāhitya or Spardhā<sup>3</sup> between Vak and Artha or the understanding between the two It is for this great quality of Poetry that Kālidāsa prays for He describes it with the simile of the prime divine couple, Ardhanārīśvara, as Śabda and Artha fused together or wedded in perfect sympathy and harmony It is this same Sāhitya that Wilfred Meynell speaks of in the same conjugal metaphor, in his biographical note attached to a selection of the poems of Francis Thompson He says of the particular poem, 'Sister Songs' 'Sister Songs is a poem to be read aloud, for sound and sense herein celebrate their divine nuptials' The same is conveyed by Kālidāsa's comparison of Poetry to Ardhanārīśvara<sup>4</sup> The goddess Parvatī is Vak or Śabda; god Parameśvara is Artha, their union as Ardhanārīśvara signifies the greatest ideal of Poetry variously emphasised as Sahitya, Sammitatva, etc

---

<sup>1</sup>Word meaning relationship

<sup>2</sup>Special

<sup>3</sup>Rivalry

<sup>4</sup>A symbolic image of Śiva representing one half of His body as Pārvatī



Alamkara, the word Alamkāra being taken here in the widest sense of that term in which Bhamaha, Dandin and Vamana and Bhoja following them understood it. Alamkara is the beautiful in poetry, the beautiful form<sup>1</sup>. Examining the field of poetic expression, Bhāmaha found Alamkara omnipresent in it. When we reach the stage of Appayya Dikṣita, who has given as many as one hundred and twenty-five Alamkaras, we see that the whole range of poetry is almost 'Vyapta'<sup>2</sup> with Alamkara in general, is 'Avinabhuta'<sup>3</sup> with Alamkāra. If Alamkāra is understood in this large sense as emphasising the need for a beautiful form in poetry, it is not very improper for the subject of poetics to be called Alamkara śāstra.

Thus, Alamkara, properly understood and properly employed can hardly be a subject for wholesale condemnation. This is said not only in view of the large sense in which we have tried to explain it above. Taking the figures as such, the best definition we can give of them is that, in a great poet, they form the inevitable incarnations in which ideas embody themselves.

They should properly be compared to the Alamkaras of damsels which Bharata speaks of under Samanyabhinaya<sup>4</sup>, Bhava<sup>4</sup>, Hava<sup>4</sup> etc and not to the Kaṭaka<sup>5</sup> and Keyura<sup>6</sup>.

Ānandavardhana says in Chapter II<sup>7</sup> that though Alamkaras are only the Śarīra the outer body, they can be made the Śarīrī the soul, sometimes, i.e. when Alamkāras are not expressed but suggested, when simile contrast etc. are richly imbedded in an utterance and in the coming together of words in an expression Alamkaras flash forth.

Abhinavagupta says here. As a matter of fact, Alamkaras are external ornaments on the body but can sometimes be like the Kumkuma<sup>8</sup> smeared for beauty on the body, when they are organic and structural. Far, far away is the hope to make this Alamkara the very soul. But even this is possible in a way, says Ānandavardhana. Just as in the mere play of children there is some temporary greatness for the child which plays the role of the king, so also, when this Alamkāra is suggested it attains great beauty and partakes of the nature of the soul.

It must be noted here that Abhinavagupta compares the Suśliṣṭa

<sup>1</sup>मोदयमलङ्कार Vāmana I : 2

<sup>2</sup>Pervaded by

<sup>3</sup>Inseparably connected

<sup>4</sup>Spontaneous expression and its modes in an emotional condition such as love

<sup>5</sup>Bracelet.

<sup>6</sup>Armlet

<sup>7</sup>Of his *Dharmyaloka*. The writer along with his Professor Ś. Kupp swami Sastrī, belongs to the school which takes Ānandavardhana as author of both parts of the text.

<sup>8</sup>Saffron.

Alaṃkāra<sup>1</sup> to Kumkumālaṃkaraṇa<sup>2</sup>, and raises it above the level of the altogether external jewel worn, the Kaṭaka Bhoja realised the insufficiency of the comparison with Kaṭaka, etc., the external and detachable jewels. Alaṃkāra as ornament of a woman also, was understood by Bhoja in a large sense. Bhoja classified Alaṃkāras into those of Śabda<sup>3</sup>, Bāhya<sup>4</sup>, those of Artha<sup>5</sup>, Ābhyantara<sup>6</sup> and those of both Śabda and Artha—Bahyābhyantara<sup>7</sup>. The first, the most external, the verbal figure of Śabdālaṃkāra, Bhoja compared to dressing, garlanding and wearing Kaṭaka, etc. The third, he compared to bath, treating the hair with fragrant smoke, smearing the body with Kumkuma, Candana<sup>8</sup>, etc. Beginning from outside, these are more intimate with the body. The second, the purely Ābhyantara Alaṃkaras, the Arthalaṃkāras, Bhoja compared to cleaning the teeth, manicuring, dressing the hair, etc. These last are most intimate, nothing not forming part at all of the body is here superimposed.

Albeit the importance of form, one should not misunderstand rhetoric as poetry. It is possible to sacrifice poetry at the altar of figure. There is such a thing as Aucitya, appropriateness, harmony and proportion, which is the ultimate beauty in poetry. The final ground of reference for this Aucitya, the thing with reference to which we shall speak of other things as being appropriate, is the soul of poetry, Rasa. The body becomes a carcass when there is no soul there, when life is absent from it. Of what use are ornaments on a carcass?

Kṣemendra<sup>9</sup>, the systematiser of Aucitya says 'Enough with Alaṃkaras, of what use are the Guṇas<sup>10</sup> if there is no life there? Ornaments are ornaments, excellences are excellences, but Aucitya is the life of the Rasa ensouled Kāvya.'

What is this Aucitya? It is the clear statement of the proper place and function of Alaṃkāra, as of other elements.

Thus Alaṃkaras have their meaning only if they keep to their places. Just as a pearl garland can beautify only a full bosom and otherwise cannot be a beautifying factor, only an Alaṃkāra appropriate to Artha and through it, to Rasa, can be of any beauty.

<sup>1</sup>Organic

<sup>2</sup>Adornment of smearing with saffron

<sup>3</sup>Word

<sup>4</sup>External

<sup>5</sup>Meaning

<sup>6</sup>Internal

<sup>7</sup>External internal (combined)

<sup>8</sup>Sandal paste

<sup>9</sup>A writer on Poetics of the latter half of the 11th century

<sup>10</sup>Poetic qualities



Kṣemendra proceeds to show how some poets have observed this rule of Aucitya of Alamkāra and how some have not. He points out the conceptual flaws in the latter, going against the main subject and sentiment. The Pratyudaharaṇas<sup>1</sup> are cases of abuses in so far as the authors of those verses have written those figures with an effort, merely because they desired to add figures. When the great poet is concentrating on Rasa, the sense of harmony and appropriateness attends on him, innate in him like instinct, there is hardly any room for impropriety. But when concentration is on figure, error creeps in. We shall consider two examples: the broken minister of the Nandas, stealing into the enemy's city over which he had once ruled like a king, looking like a serpent stilled by incantation, and consumed by his own inner fire, sees a dilapidated garden and describes it<sup>2</sup>. The plight of the garden resembles his own pitiable state and with great appropriateness in the conceiving of the similes. Viśakhadatta has drawn a mere description nearer to the context, harnessed it for Rasa and heightened the effect of the situation. On the contrary, we shall now cite a verse from the *Bhoja Campū*<sup>3</sup> where the poet has created a figure not only not in harmony with the main idea and the context but also so inappropriate as to make, as Kṣemendra says, the hearts of the Sahṛdayas shrink.

There is Hetu Utprekṣa<sup>4</sup> here: the poet imagines that Brahma presented himself before the Ādikavi<sup>5</sup>, as if jealous of the appearance of (his spouse) Vagī (speech or poesy) in another person. As a matter of fact it is to bless and give Valmiki his favour to sing the whole *Ramayana* that the god descended.

One can make Alamkāra render the help its name means if one introduces it in such a manner that it will be conducive to the realisation of the chief object: namely Bhava and Rasa, that is Alamkāra must be Rasabhava para<sup>6</sup>. That which is adorned by an Alamkāra is the Rasa. Even as the ordinary ornament: the jewels, putting them on or laying them down, suggest to us the mental state of the person, so also

<sup>1</sup>Counter illustrations

<sup>2</sup>विषयस्त सौध कुलमिव महारम्भरचन

सर शुष्क साधो हृदयमिव नाशेन सुहृदाम ।

फलहीना वृक्षा विगुणनृपयोगादिव नया

तृणच्छना भूमिमतिरिव कुनीतैरविदुष ॥ Mudrarakṣasa VI 11

<sup>3</sup>वाणीविलासमपरत्र कृतोपलभम् अभोजभूरसहमान इवाविरासीत् ।

<sup>4</sup>A figure of speech: Poetic conceit in which a cause is fancied

<sup>5</sup>The first poet: Valmiki

<sup>6</sup>Devoted to or subserving Rasa and Bhāva

does figure suggest the Bhāva. Thus, whatever, remaining in a functionary place, aids to embellish and add to the main theme's beauty is Alampkara. Rasa also can thus be employed as a decorative, as an Alampkara, to adorn a Vastu (idea) or Rasa.

Raymond<sup>1</sup> expresses a similar opinion on Alampkāra, 'The one truth underlying all the rules laid down for the employment of figures is that nothing is gained by any use of those which do not add to the effect of the thought to which they give expression. Language is to express our thoughts to others and in ordinary conversation we use both plain and figurative language but when a man wants to give another the description of a scene he has seen, he does not catalogue one and all of the details of that sight, but brings only his own idea of the landscape by adding to such of the details as have struck him many more ideas and emotions that have been aroused in him.' Thus he transports his mental image to the hearer and if the representation is comparatively plain, we have Svabhāvokti.<sup>2</sup> 'On the other hand, if he realises that it is hard for the hearer to understand him fully, he gains his end by repeating the statement, or by adding illustrative images to the mere enumeration of facts.'

Compare Rudraṭa

Samyak pratipadayitum Svarupato vastu tatsamanamiti  
vastvantaramabhidadhyat vakta yasminstadaupamyam<sup>3</sup>

'Thus the poet puts extra force into his language and in order to do so, inasmuch as the force of language consists in its representative character, he will augment the representation by multiplying his comparisons his language becomes figurative.

From the verse of Rudraṭa quoted above, we see that a complex situation or an anxiety for clearer or more effective expression necessitates figures. Similarly a thought that is too simple, too ordinary or too small to impress or get admiration by itself, needs figurative embellishment. We shall consider this view of Anandavardhana with his rules for the employment of these figures in such secondary and ordinary moods and thoughts. Even as he grants high flights in supreme moments he grants even the bare Śabdacitra<sup>4</sup> ample provision in Rasabhasa<sup>5</sup>. Heroic deeds, unselfish love sacrifice—things great

<sup>1</sup>Poetry as a Representative Art

<sup>2</sup>Natural description—a figure of speech.

<sup>3</sup>To communicate the nature of an idea most effectively, if the poet should mention another as being similar to it that is simile.

<sup>4</sup>Figures of sound—alliteration etc.

<sup>5</sup>A semblance or improper manifestation of Rasa.



- (iii) It shall be naturally and easily introducible.
- (iv) The poet shall not stop to take a fresh and extra effort to effect it.

Such a figure is allowed as proper in Dhvani<sup>1</sup>. This is the 'permissible' 'structural' figure that Pater speaks of. Such Alamkāra is born almost of itself. Such is the poet's genius that when the figure is actually found there, it is a wonder, *Āścaryabhūta*, as Ānandavardhana says. This Alamkāra properly functions to heighten Rasa.

Though a perusal of an Alamkāra text-book gives the impression that Alamkaras are artificial, elaborate and intellectual exercises requiring great effort in turning them out precisely,—things that must rather be avoided than handled with all their 'chhidras'<sup>2</sup>, they are not really so difficult of effecting for a master poet. With him, as emotion increases, expression swells and figures foam forth.

We have many instances in the *Rāmāyaṇa* where we clearly see this connection between emotion and figure, though not as a rule. There is at least a strong tendency to wax figurative in forceful situations. The description of lamenting Ayodhyā on Bharata's return from the forest and Sītā's condemnation of Rāvaṇa on seeing him out of his guise are two of the striking examples. There is, further, a tendency in the *Rāmāyaṇa* to employ figures profusely in descriptions. The opening canto of the *Sundarakāṇḍa* contains a figure in almost every verse, surcharged as the canto is with Adbhuta-rasa<sup>3</sup>.

But there are also places in the epic of high strung emotion where figures are not employed at all and the sublimity or pathos of the situation (e.g. Rāma weeping on the loss of Sītā in the closing cantos of the *Āraṇyakāṇḍa*) is left to itself to appeal to us with its own grandeur and beauty.

In Kālidāsa, we have many instances of figures rushing to the poet's pen in moments of overflowing Rasa. Every line is a figure in Purūravas's description of Urvaśī who has captivated his heart. And in the *Mudrārākṣasa*, we have a similar situation with abundant figures, when, in the glee of his success, Cāpakya exclaims as he hears that Rākṣasa has come. But to write such figures, the poet must be lost in Rasa and must have infinite Pratibhā<sup>4</sup>. Those who do not naturally get these figures in such an appropriate manner can employ figures effectively, if they do so with discrimination,—Samīkṣā.

What is this Samīkṣā<sup>5</sup>? Ānandavardhana formulates it into the following principles:

<sup>1</sup>The superior form of poetry based on suggestion

<sup>2</sup>Loopholes.

<sup>3</sup>Poetic genius

<sup>4</sup>The marvellous sentiment.

<sup>5</sup>Discrimination.

- (i) Alamkāras must be ancillary,—Aṅgabhūta
- (ii) They must never become main,—Pradhāna or Aṅgin
- (iii) The main theme shall always be kept in view and figures, in consequence, must be taken and thrown away in accordance with the requirements of the main idea
- (iv) They must not be too much elaborated or overworked
- (v) Even if they are worked out, a good poet must take care to give them, on the whole, the position of Aṅga<sup>1</sup> only

To conclude, poetry is neither pure emotion and thought nor mere manner. A beautiful idea must appropriately incarnate itself in a beautiful expression. This defines Alamkāra and its place and function. The function of Alamkāra is to heighten the effect, it is to aid the poet to say something more pointedly. Whether the poet exalts or does the opposite, Alamkāra is to help him. As such, these Alamkāras should flow out of Rasa. Even as emotion is depicted, these must come off, without the poet consciously striving after them. *They must be irremovable, structural, organic, Rasakṣipta<sup>2</sup> and Apṛthag yatna nirvarttaya<sup>3</sup>*

Figures are thus legitimate, though a proper use of them is a gift which only the greater among the poets are endowed with. Be it a Śabdālamkāra or an Arthalamkāra, be it a sound effect or a striking turn of the idea, it is not 'Bahiraṅga'<sup>4</sup> for Rasa, so long as it is useful for Rasa. Effective expression, the embodiment of the poet's idea, is Alamkāra. It is not as if it were in some separate place, like jewels in a box, to be taken and added.

The purposiveness of Alamkāra is inevitable like the purposiveness of poetry. But this does not mean that one should judge Alamkāra and poetry from a purely utilitarian point of view. There is simply beautiful poetry, which is nothing but the poet's desire to express taken shape. 'These very decorations carry the emotional motive of the poet which says "I find joy in my creations, it is good"'. 'When in some pure moments of ecstasy we realise this in the world around us, we see the world not as merely existing but as decorated in its forms, sounds, colours and lines, we feel in our hearts that there is one who through all things proclaims "I have joy in my creation"'.<sup>5</sup> Nature is the creation of God's Līla<sup>6</sup>, Poetry, of the poet's Līla.

<sup>1</sup>An ancillary

<sup>2</sup>Brought forth by Rasa

<sup>3</sup>Not to be executed by a separate effort

<sup>4</sup>External

<sup>5</sup>Tagore, *The Creative Ideal*.

<sup>6</sup>Play



## 11. AUCITYA IN SANSKRIT POETICS\*

*Professor V. Raghavan*

One of the noteworthy points in the Sanskrit systems of literary criticism is that, in an inquiry into a comprehensive philosophy of the literary art, they do not separate poetry and drama, nor prose and verse. Bharata, in his *Nāṭya Śāstra*, defines drama as imitation of the three worlds or representation of the actions of men of various nature. *Nāṭya Śāstra* I. 107, 113, 120, etc. Consequently Bharata sets forth a system of ideas of *Loka Dharmī*, 'the way of the world', which stands for the realistic elements in Bharata's Stage<sup>1</sup>. In the concept of *Prakṛti*, Bharata studies the various kinds of human nature. In the concept of *Pravṛtti* he studies the provincial, racial and national characteristics in dressing and other activities. He elaborately deals with dress and make-up, which, he says, must be appropriate to the mood and sentiment. He devotes separate sections to correct speaking in the drama according to the emotions (XIX), to the musical notes and tunes appropriate to the varying sentiments and moods (XXIX, 1-4). Bharata analyses the text of the drama and points out how the verbal qualities of sweetness, harshness, etc., and the flights of fancies expressed in the form of figures of speech have to be appropriate to the mood or sentiment portrayed (XVII, 108-123). At the end of each topic, Bharata thus points out what suits what. In judging drama, therefore, the ground of reference for success of the art is the world. Bharata emphasises that one has to know the infinite variety of human nature—*Prakṛti* and *Śīla*, in which is *Nāṭya* or drama based.

Drama is the representation of moods, *Bhāva-anukīrtana*. Out of these moods flow everything—actions, character, dress, nature of one's speech, etc. It is to this factor of *Rasa* which is at the root of all the other things that these latter have again to be referred for finding out whether in representing them, there is appropriateness. Things cannot be estimated by themselves, in isolation, and labelled good or bad, appealing or otherwise. Excellence (*Guṇa*) or Defect (*Doṣa*) does not inherently pertain to anything, eternally, but anything, according to the situation where it occurs, is either suitable or not; and in this suitability or otherwise lies Excellence or Defect. Improper placing,

\*Adapted from *Some Concepts of Alankāra Śāstra* and *Bhōja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*

<sup>1</sup>See author's *Loka Dharmī*, *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras VIII 1, 1934.

says Bharata, like placing a necklace at the foot and an anklet round the neck, can only produce laughter. It is a serious breach of propriety for a writer to describe a forlorn lady suffering from separation from her lord as having her body fully decked with jewels. In the realm of artistic expression the same rule holds good. A poet commits the greatest crime against *Rasa* if he introduces heavy verbal ornamentation in places where *Rasa* has to be effectively portrayed and where the absence of any figure is itself the perfection of art. The proper placing of things in such a manner as to suit *Rasa* and the avoiding of things not suitable to it form the essence of artistic expression. This is propriety, *Aucitya*. Thus the first work in the history of Sanskrit Poetics contains implicitly as much of this theory of poetry, *Aucitya*, as of the other theory of poetry, *Rasa*, explicitly, even though emphasis on both these—*Aucitya* and *Rasa*—was again systematically laid only in the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries.

*Aucitya* is harmony and in one aspect it is proportion between the whole and the parts, between the chief and the subsidiary. This perfection is all the morals and beauty in art. At the final stage of its formulation as a theory explaining the secret of poetic appeal, *Aucitya* is stated to be the *Jivita*, life breath of poetry. This *Aucitya*, proportion and harmony on one side and appropriateness and adaptation on the other, cannot be understood by itself but presupposes that to which all other things are harmonious and appropriate, viz, *Rasa*, the 'soul' of poetry.

Poet Magha, in his epic poem *Sisupalavadha* clarifies this law of *Aucitya* with an illustration from the science of polity. The King has to achieve his purpose with an eye on expediency, time and circumstance being the deciding factors of his policy. There is no inherent good in either Power or Forbearance by themselves but all the goodness of a policy consists in its effectiveness, in using that which is suited to the time. Thus adaptation is the only policy good for the king. The case is similar to that of a poet with whom the main concern is *Rasa* and *Bhāva* and an understanding of their subtle nature. In portraying his characters and their actions, it will not do if the poet sticks to one quality throughout, say *Prasāda* or *Ojas*. When the forceful sentiments of Heroism (*Vīra*), Wonder (*Adbhuta*) and The Terrible (*Raudra*) *Rasas* appear, he has to adopt the quality *Ojas* to suit the vigour, energy and blaze (*Dīpti*) of those *Rasas* and when the key of emotion is lowered and quiet emotional effects have to be produced, the requisite quality for the poet is *Prasāda*. This is the *Aucitya* of *Gūṇa*.

It is again in respect of *Gūṇas*, the qualities of style, that we have the



next glimpse of the idea of *Aucitya* in certain parts of the treatises of Bhamaha and Daṇḍin. In one way, the greatest *Guṇa* or Excellence of poetry is *Aucitya* and it comprehends all other *Guṇas*, and the greatest *Doṣa* or Flaw comprehending other flaws, is its absence, *Anaucitya*. Thus when the *Riti*, Style, is not suited to the *Rasa*, there is *Riti anaucitya*, the flaw called *Aritimat*. The *Gauḍī* style which may not suit *Śṛṅgāra*, love, cannot be condemned altogether as eternally unsuited to all poetry. It can effectively suggest the forceful sentiments of *Vīra*, *Adbhuta*, and *Raudra* and in their case, the *Vaidarbhi* style suited to *Śṛṅgāra* may be inappropriate, *Anucita*. There may be harsh sounds and heavy, long and swollen utterances in a highly worked-up emotion like *Raudra*, the Terrible, the harsh sounds which suggest this *Rasa* must be avoided in *Śṛṅgāra Rasa* which is suggested by sweet assonances and delicate sound effects. Therefore it is that the flaws, *Doṣas*, given as such in separate sections by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, are, to use a word which came into currency only after Ānandavardhana, *Anitya*, contingent. That is, in certain circumstances *Doṣas* cease to be so, there are no fixed *Guṇas* or *Doṣas*, what is *Guṇa* in one case is *Dosa* in another and vice versa.

The principle behind these observations is *Aucitya*, adaptation. Again, in chapter IV, the same writer, Bhamaha speaks of such flaws in poetry as *loka virodha*, going against facts of the world and nature which is a result of the non-observance of the *Aucitya* of *Prakṛti*, etc. In this context, he also points out that redundance, *Punarukti*, which is generally a flaw in expression, turns out to be an effective way of expression in fear, sorrow, jealousy, joy and wonder.

It is in the same section on *Doṣas* that the principle of *Aucitya* is implied in Daṇḍin's work also (Ch IV). Each and every *Dosa* is given by Daṇḍin with a qualification that in certain circumstances, it ceases to be *Doṣa* and turns out to be a *Guṇa*. Thus *Apartha*, the meaningless, generally a flaw, is the most proper means of successfully portraying a madman's raving, a child's sweet prattle or the speech of a sick man. Similar is the flaw *Viruddhārtha* or *Vyārtha*, the contradictory *Punarukti*, redundance, is no flaw but is an effective way of expressing compassion or any stress of emotion which needs repetition. *Samśaya* or the use of doubtful or ambiguous words, may generally be a flaw but when such words are wilfully used, as is often needed in the world, they are perfect *Guṇas*.

Bhoja developed the same idea by constituting under the head *Guṇa* a special class called the *Vaiśeṣika Guṇas*, comprising those flaws, such as the above noticed ones, which become excellences sometimes. As

figures it foreshadows the later developments and prepares the way for Ānandavardhana. On the present subject Rudraṭa speaks of many of the ideas of *Aucitya* which receive more pointed treatment in the *Dharmaloka*. In respect of figures (*Alamkāras*) Rudraṭa realises the importance of *Rasa* to suit which *Alamkaras* exist. If otherwise these latter have little meaning. The idea that *Rasa* and *Rasa aucitya* control *Alamkāra* is stated by Rudraṭa who apart from the dramatist Yāsovarman noticed above is the first writer on Poetics to mention the word *Aucitya*. After dealing with some figures of sound Rudraṭa says that these figures must be introduced after bestowing due thought on propriety *Aucitya* with reference to the main theme. They have to be now cast away and now taken up and must be sparsely used with much advantage. They must not be thickly overlaid upon the theme through the whole length of it (II 32). This is *Aucitya* of *Alamkāra* which Ānandavardhana elaborates in Ch. II of his work.

The word *Aucitya* again occurs at the end of the next chapter in Rudraṭa's work where too Rudraṭa points out the danger of sustained rhymes and other sound effects adding that they must be approached only by him who knows *Aucitya*. Rudraṭa speaks of the adaptation aspect of *Aucitya* also implicitly like Daṇḍin while dealing with *Doṣas* which in certain cases become *Guṇas* (VI 8 29 30). Rudraṭa sums up that almost all kinds of Flaws become Excellences when occasion needs the imitation (*Anukarṇa*) of those flaws. That is the poet and the dramatist have to depict an infinite variety of men and nature in diverse circumstances. When a mad man has to be represented his nonsense has to be imitated and it is itself sense for the artist here.

We may draw attention here to what the American critic J E Spingarn says as if explaining the principle of *Aucitya* by which *Doṣas* become *Guṇas* as a result of circumstances like imitation.

Spingarn says in his essay on the Seven Arts and the Seven Confusions that in poetry and drama Flaw and Excellence are not absolute but always relative. He remarks. It is inconceivable that a modern thinker should still adhere to the abstract tests of good expression when it is obvious that we can only tell whether it is good or bad when we see it in its natural context. Is any word artistically bad in itself? Is not 'ain't' an excellent expression when placed in the mouth of an illiterate character in a play or story? In Rudraṭa's words Spingarn says that a *Gramya* (colloquial) word becomes most appropriate in a case of *Anukarṇa*—imitation. Therefore in expression in the world of thought in the realm of action and feeling and in the region of ideas that which is proper in the context that which is



useful to the Rasa, and that which has mutual harmony with the other parts, is the best and most beautiful

In chapter XI, Rudraṭa again speaks of flaws of thought and emotion, where under the flaw ' *Grāmya* ' he mentions *Anaucitya* or inappropriateness in doings, in port, in dress and in speech with reference to country, family, caste, culture, wealth, age and position. All these *Doṣas* again are shown to become *Guṇas* (verses 18-23). We can illustrate this principle of *Aucitya* everywhere. Taking, for example, use of a Simile, *Nyūnopamā* or comparing with an inferior object and *Adhikopamā* or comparing with a superior object are ordinarily flaws of Simile, but these two are the very secret of success when a poet wants to satirise a person.

and the atmosphere of the *Gūṇa* and its *Rasa* or such as to suggest the *Gūṇa* and the *Rasa*. Thus sweet sound effects, the soft letters with nasal conjunct consonants, suggest the more tender and sweet emotional moods whereas harsh combinations which jar in the above instances instil vigour and become very appropriate to or highly suggestive of the forceful *Rasa* of *Raudra*. The proper use of letters according to *Rasas* is the *Aucitya* of *Varṇa*; Ānandavardhana will say that there is *Varṇa-dhvani* or the suggestiveness of letters and sounds in these instances. Collocation suggestive of *Rasa* or appropriate to *Rasa* is a case of *Aucitya* of *Saṅghaṣṇā*. Wherever there is suggestiveness of *Rasa* in the expression, be it the element of sound and letter, separate words, collocation, portions of the theme (*Prakaraṇa*) or even the work as a whole (*Prabandha*), there we have the *Aucitya* of those elements to the main thing, the *Rasa*. This is the relation between *Dhvani* and *Aucitya*.

Ānandavardhana's treatment of *Prabandha-dhvani*, dealing with the very substance of a poem or drama, and its suggestion of an overall meaning and significance is important. In respect of this the principles of *Aucitya* are: The story has to be built up, as the expression of a *Rasa*. If a story already available is handled, changes suitable to the *Rasa* must be made wherever the old story is not helpful to bring out the *Rasa*. If there are too many incidents, only those that are most expressive of the emotion must be chosen; there is no point in having too many illustrative incidents. Says Ānandavardhana: The *Aṅgas* or subsidiary themes and accessory emotional interests have to be developed only up to the extent proper to them and to their *Aṅgin*, i.e. the chief theme and its *Rasa*. Thus the major and minor episodes, the *Patākās* and *Prakaras*, in drama, or the 'descriptions' in a *Mahākāvya* have to observe the rule of *Aucitya* or proportional harmony. They must not make the reader forget the main thread and side-track him into grounds foreign in purpose to the main theme.

Lastly Ānandavardhana deals with the most intimate forms of *Aucitya*, viz., those relating to *Rasa* and those elements and conditions that evoke it, *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Sañcāri-bhāva*. The *Aucitya* of character, the human substratum of the emotions, is part of these considerations of *Rasa-aucitya*. *Aucitya* is very often met with in this section in the third chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka*. It is in this section that Ānandavardhana formulates that memorable verse which forms the greatest pronouncement on the concept of *Aucitya* and its place in poetry. He says here. Nothing hinders *Rasa* as *Anaucitya* or impropriety. *Aucitya* or propriety is the greatest secret of *Rasa*.



'Tis not enough no *harshness* gives offence,  
 The sound must seem an echo of the sense  
 Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,  
 And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows,  
 But when loud surges lash the sounding shore  
 the hoarse rough verse should like a torrent roar  
 Hear how Timotheus varied lays surprise,  
 And bid alternate Passions fall and rise

Kuntaka adds that under all circumstances cacophony should be avoided, concatenation of very unpleasant sounds are not to be written at all. These sounds by nature, says Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhāratī*, torture our ears, while there are other sounds that seem to pour nectar into our ears. The beauty of parts of speech like a suffix, participle, tense and mood, number, gender, etc., used aptly and suggestively, is then dealt with by Kuntaka.

Thus the idea of *Aucitya* looms large in Kuntaka. As a matter of fact, in almost all cases of Kuntaka's *Vakratā*, (Strikingness or Charm), the test or proof of the Strikingness or Charm is this *Aucitya* of the various elements with reference to the *Vastu* (theme) or *Rasa* (Sentiment), the depiction of which is the task of the poet. When we see Kuntaka equating *Pada aucitya* with *Pada vakrata* (p. 76), we may well exclaim that his *Vakrokti* is only another name for *Aucitya*. As more than once pointed out already, many of the instances of Ānandavardhana's *Dhvani*, Abhinavagupta's *Vaicitya* mentioned in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Kuntaka's *Vakratā* and Kṣemendra's *Aucitya* are identical. There is bound to be this close relation between *Aucitya*, *Dhvani* and *Vakratā*. Criticising Kuntaka's definition of poetry as *Śabda* and *Artha* set in *Vakrokti*, Mahima Bhaṭṭa says in his *Vyaktiviveka* (Ch. I) 'The out of the way ness' of poetic word and idea as distinguished from those of *Śāstras* (learned treatise) and *Loka* (ordinary speech) must either be the *Aucitya* so very essential to *Rasa* which is 'Soul' of poetry or be the *Dhvani* of Ānandavardhana. If therefore, the new *Vakrokti* is only *Aucitya*, nothing new is said. If this is denied, the only other possibility is that *Vakrokti* is nothing but a new name for *Dhvani* which really seems to be the fact. For the same varieties and the same instances as given by Ānandavardhana are given by Kuntaka.

Mahima Bhaṭṭa wrote in the same age, just after Abhinavagupta and Kuntaka. Mahima Bhaṭṭa accepts *Rasa* as supreme and also the *Aucitya* pertaining to *Rasa*, *Bhāva* and *Prakṛti*. Critics of the time were aware of only two things as especially distinguishing the poetic utterance from the ordinary or learned one, viz., *Aucitya* and *Dhvani*. Of these two, there is no need specially to speak of the former because Mahima

Bhaṭṭa considers it as the supreme necessity in so far as Kavya is accepted as utterance ensouled by *Rasa*. That is, according to Mahima Bhaṭṭa, there can be no opposition to *Aucitya*. It is only with *Dhṛvan* that he fights.

On the point of *Rasa* and the *Aucitya* of every element of expression to this *Rasa*, Mahima Bhaṭṭa is completely in agreement with Ānandavardhana. Ānandavardhana says that if there is one word which is *Nirasa* devoid of *Rasa*, it is the greatest literary flaw, the *Apasabda*. Similarly all flaws are comprised in one common flaw, viz. hindrance to the realisation of *Rasa*. All *Dosas* are hindrances to *Rasa* and Mahima Bhaṭṭa calls them by the common name *Anaucitya*, the absence of appropriateness. Certain ideas get certain writers as their brilliant exponents. Thus *Sahitya* gets Kuntaka as its first great exponent. To Mahima Bhaṭṭa falls the share of expounding two ideas, *Stabhavokti* and *Dosas*. The most important part of Mahima Bhaṭṭa's work is chapter II devoted to a study of five important flaws of expression, on which the classic *Ālasyaprakāśa*, the model for later compilations, draws for its own chapter on *Dosas* to a great extent. These five flaws, and all others also, are only the many varieties of *Anaucitya* which means hindrance to the realisation of *Rasa*. For *Aucitya* of *Rasa* and *Prakṛti* is the greatest *Guna*, most essential for *Kavya*. The absence of this *Aucitya* is the greatest *Doṣa* within which every other flaw is included. *Aucitya* and *Anaucitya* pertain to the content, i.e., *Rasa* and *Artha* or *Vastu* as well as to their outer garment, viz., the expression—*Śabda*. The former is *Abhyantara* or *Antaranga* internal, while the latter is *Bahiranga*, external. Even the unsuggestive and inappropriate metre is a case of *Anaucitya* of the latter category. Under varieties of *Śabdanaucitya*, Mahima Bhaṭṭa says that five are to be specially noted, they are five flaws named *Vidhejavimarsa* (subordination of an idea to be prominently predicated), *Prakramabheda*, *kramabheda* (two kinds of improper sequence of ideas), *Paunaruktya* (redundance) and *Vagjaratana* (irrelevance and saying what is not required).

Kṣemendra was the pupil of Abhinavagupta. Among his works, it is his *Aucityavivacaracarcā* with which we are concerned here. Although small in size, it yet belongs to the class of 'Prasthāna works', works which expound a new path, like those of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa. As is clear from the foregoing survey, Kṣemendra is not the author of *Aucitya*, but, as in the case of *Vakrokti* and Kuntaka, Kṣemendra worked out *Aucitya* into a system, elaborating that concept and applying it to all parts of the *Ālasya*. Kṣemendra only schematised the ideas of Ānandavardhana.



and Abhinavagupta in whose system he had his being Abhinavagupta criticised those critics who glibly talked of *Aucitya* without reference to *Rasa* and *Dhvani* which alone render *Aucitya* intelligible. Just as Kuntaka's *Vakrokti* proceeds only after accepting *Rasa* as supreme and accepts also *Dhvani*, so also Kṣemendra's *Aucitya*. Kṣemendra first posits *Rasa* as the soul, the thing whose presence makes *Kāvya*, *Aucitya* is its life '*Jivita*'. The term '*Jivita*' was used by Abhinavagupta himself to denote *Rasa dhvani* with *Aucitya*. Thus Abhinavagupta used both the words '*Ātman*' and '*Jivita*' as interchangeable and as meaning generally the essence, *sāra*. But Kṣemendra made a subtle distinction between Soul and Life, *Rasa* the soul and *Aucitya* the life.

These two metaphorical names and the relation between them in metaphysical speculations point to the intimate relation between *Rasa* and *Aucitya* and of how both come into existence together. It is to explain *Rasa*, by which *Kāvya* is already explained, that Kṣemendra offers *Aucitya*. In a verse or in a *kāvya*, *Aucitya* gives *Camatkāra* (delectation), *Aucitya* which is the life of *Rasa*.

We had observed before that *Aucitya* is as unintelligible without *Dhvani* as without *Rasa*. *Dhvani* is all throughout implied in Kṣemendra's treatment. Showing the propriety of *Pada aucitya*, a case of *Pada-dhvani* with Ānandavardhana, Kṣemendra says that the *Aucitya* in that word pleases us because that word in particular suggests the state of separation and the consequent suffering (*Vipralambha Rasa*).

Kṣemendra has elaborated and pointed out some more principles of *Aucitya* in the wider sphere of thought (*Artha* and *Artha sandarbha*), like *Deśa* (place), *Kala* (time) *Svabhāva*, (nature of a person), etc. These are comprehended in *Prakṛtyaucitya* of Bharata and the absence of the flaw of *Loka agama virodha* of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. The *Pratibhaucitya* given by Kṣemendra concerns with the minor 'fancies' and not with poetic imagination or genius as a whole. Similarly innumerable items of *Aucitya* can be elaborated and illustrated from poetry. As for instance, the propriety of metre, *Vṛttaucitya*, is an interesting study. Bharata has spoken of it in his chapters (XVI, XXXII) on *Vṛttas* (metres) and *Dhruvas* (stage songs)<sup>1</sup>. Abhinavagupta quotes in his commentary on the *Nāṭya Śāstra*, Kātyāyana, an old writer on metres, on the appropriateness of certain metres to certain subjects, moods and situations. Kṣemendra reserves this subject for special treatment in another work of his, the *Suṣṭatīlaka* (III 7-16). Kṣemendra explains

<sup>1</sup>See author's *Music in Ancient Indian Drama in Art and Letters* London XXVIII, 1954, pp 10-18. *Journal of the Music Academy* Madras XXV, iv 1954, pp 79-92. *Sangeet Vaidik Akademi Bulletin* New Delhi No 4 March 1956, pp 5-12.

## 12 THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE\*

*Professor Nagendra*

Some classics, no doubt, exist on other fine arts as well, e.g., on Music and Painting, on Sculpture and Architecture, yet the fundamentals of Indian Aesthetics have been discussed invariably in the works on Poetics. Consequently, the broader concepts of aesthetic experience have been defined mainly in the context of 'Rasa' which, by and large, constitutes the essence of poetic experience according to the Indian theory of Poetry and Art. Originally, Rasa constituted the basic quality of a dramatic work—then it infiltrated into Poetry and from Poetry to other forms of art like Music and Painting. Thus, we have primarily to concentrate on the analysis of the constituents of Rasa in order to arrive at a proper definition of the nature of aesthetic experience in Indian Poetics.

For the earlier writers from Bharata to Bhāmaha, etc., Rasa was an objective concept signifying an aesthetic situation in a drama or an aesthetic expression in a poetic composition. But under the impact of the Advaita philosophy of the Śaivite school headed by Abhinavagupta, it assumed a purely subjective character. An aesthetic situation, according to Abhinavagupta, was a part of drama, an aesthetic expression was a piece of poetry—and the experience thereof was Rasa. The views of these scholars from Abhinavagupta to Viśvanātha who have unequivocally defined Rasa as an aesthetic experience can be summed up as follows:

(i) The aesthetic experience is based primarily on human<sup>1</sup> emotions. It is essentially pleasurable—it is a state of bliss, a state of self-realization or self-fulfilment.

(ii) The state of bliss is pervaded by a feeling of spiritual illumination and is mostly free from sensual elements. The physical emotions shake off their sordid attributes when they are converted into artistic emotions—they are freed from the limitations of time and space and are universalized. Consequently, they cease to be a part of the direct physical experience of the spectator, raise him above the petty mundane experiences of the self, refine his sensibility and sublimate his consciousness.

---

\*Adapted in English from *Rasa-Siddhānta*.

<sup>1</sup>I am deliberately using this broad and rather unusual expression because neither of the other two synonyms—the 'material' and the 'physical' can serve our purpose in the present context.



Nevertheless, it is not a state of pure spiritual bliss, because it is neither a permanent state of joy nor is it completely purged of the material concomitants

Thus, according to Indian Poetics, the aesthetic experience is a state of transcendental joy, or a state of self fulfilment if we choose to use a more secular expression, achieved by means of art through the medium of sublimated emotions

These concepts are, however, all exposed to criticism in the modern age and three fundamental questions arise in the mind of a modern thinker in this context almost spontaneously

(i) What is the relationship between an emotional experience and an aesthetic experience?

(ii) Is the aesthetic experience pleasurable essentially and invariably?

(iii) If it is so, then what is the nature of this (aesthetic) pleasure?

A student of art today cannot feel satisfied unless these questions are suitably answered. It is, therefore, necessary to resolve them in terms of the modern theories of art and criticism.

## 1 WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE AND AN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE?

The aesthetic experience is primarily based on emotion. It is not possible to conceive of a form of beauty without some finer threads of emotional associations, direct or indirect—patent or latent. The majority of Indian art critics are agreed upon the inter relationship of the artistic emotion and the human emotion. 'na bhāvalunostraso na bhāvo rasavarjitah', i.e.,—the Rasa is never without an emotional basis nor can an artistic emotion exist without Rasa. Yet the artistic emotion is distinct from the human emotion and the two cannot be identical under any circumstances. The basic emotions underlying the aesthetic experience, according to Indian Poetics, can be divided into two categories. Emotions like love, wonder, courage and humour are pleasurable whereas the others like pathos, anger, terror and horror are painful in life. But when they form the material basis of art they all lose their sting and the element of pain is extracted invariably. The experience of a pathetic situation in art is not at any rate painful as it is in life. The pathetic sentiment has been purged of its venom during the process of artistic creation. Thus, it does not require any great effort to prove that the artistic emotion is not identical with human emotion as such.

of experiences characterized by a subtle synthesis of several and quite often conflicting impulses

We shall have to examine these closely before we can arrive at a tangible conclusion. For certain obvious reasons, I shall start with the thesis No (ii), viz., that the aesthetic experience can be both pleasant and unpleasant according to the nature of the basic emotion underlying a work of art. Our first reaction is that the experience of a tragic art should be painful as a matter of course. But there are strong reasons to refute it. The aversion of the human mind to pain is so natural and strong that nobody in his senses will spend his time and money just to gain a painful experience. It is true that quite often we face unhappy situations—nay sometimes even court them in our life. The craving of the mystic poets for pain is well known and the Buddhist philosophers have extolled pain as one of the Supreme Truths, yet on a closer analysis it is not difficult to ascertain that here also pain is a means and not the end by itself. The mystic craves for pain because it provides him the opportunity for enjoying a communion with the eternal object of Love. So also, in the Buddhist philosophy, pain has been considered a Supreme Truth because ultimately it is through the negation of pain that we attain Nirvana: thus there too, it is the negation of pain and not pain itself, which is the ultimate target. And then the reader or the spectator is neither a mystic nor a philosopher: it can never be established that he goes to witness a tragedy for the sake of a tragic experience, mystic or philosophical.

The argument that the experience of a tragic theme is by itself painful and yet the reader or the spectator is attracted towards it for the love of its artistic merits is also untenable in the final analysis. (a) The grief or terror, if there is really a feeling like that, emanating from violent tragic situations should be so powerful that all literary graces—the figures of speech, the rhythm, the musical qualities of the verse, or the embellishments of the stage—will not be adequate to relieve it. (b) Then a divided concept of the underlying tragic emotions and the artistic qualities as separate entities is unwarranted. Poetics and Psychology both would reject such a concept as out of date. The common man is not really sensible to these subtler graces of art and the art connoisseur cannot be satisfied just with the external embellishments of the poetic or the histrionic craft. (c) If we admit of a variety in the nature of the aesthetic experience on the basis of the difference in the underlying emotions, the indivisibility of this experience is negated.

Let us now examine the third and the fifth alternatives which define the artistic emotion as a complex experience. Whereas the exponents



of the former talk only of a mixture of pleasure and pain the modern psychologists think in terms of 'a pattern of experiences' These concepts were not unknown to the Indian thinker, but in his view this admixture or complex pattern is a part of the process of contemplation only and does not extend to the point of culmination where the diversity of psychic actions is resolved into a unified experience In the creative process, the artist does pass through varied experiences pleasant as well as unpleasant, but ultimately he succeeds in effecting a harmonious fusion of all these experiences—and that is called art Without this fusion the artistic creation is abortive, i.e., art is born invariably out of harmony or harmonious fusion Similarly, in the process of artistic appreciation we have a flux of varied experiences of different nature which ultimately formulate into a pattern and our ultimate experience is the experience of this pattern which though complex is a harmonious whole (otherwise it will be an abortive production and not a work of art) To sum up the theories which define the aesthetic experience as a mixed experience or a pattern of experiences are tenable only so far as they apply to the process, at the point of culmination the experience is not mixed or divided but unified and harmonized—which has been described by I. A. Richards as 'a systematization of impulses' Quite obviously, this systematization of impulses is a state of happiness or at least a pre condition of happiness Richards and several other significant critics do not wish to call it a 'pleasure' but they admit at least indirectly that it is a state of gratification a state of mind when we feel gratified and fulfilled

Thus, the arguments against the essentially gratifying character of the aesthetic experience do not hold ground in the ultimate analysis

### 3 WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS PLEASURE?

(I confess that 'pleasure' is a weak term and mostly conveys a sordid meaning yet there is no other word in the English language and as such this word is being used broadly to denote the whole range of gratifying experiences of the human psyche from the sensual to the spiritual pleasures)

Quite obviously the pleasant experience or pleasure also is of different kinds and has different levels of quality and our definition of the aesthetic experience will remain incomplete until we have analysed the nature of the pleasure implied therein Here again we have to traverse through the vast realms of Indian and Western Poetics to arrive at some positive conclusions But I shall present in brief the results of these age long researches of the Indian and Western masters

(i) The aesthetic pleasure is a kind of psycho physical pleasure. Plato among the ancients and Marx and Freud among the modern thinkers have propounded this view—of course, in their own and entirely different ways.

(ii) The aesthetic pleasure is a kind of spiritual pleasure. The leaders of Sanskrit Poetics like Abhinavagupta and Jagannātha on the one hand and the Idealist Philosophers in the West—Plotinus among the ancients and Kant and Hegel among the moderns—subscribe to this view.

(iii) The aesthetic pleasure is really a pleasure of imagination. This concept has its seeds in Aristotle's Poetics, was presented in a clear form by Addison in the 18th century and was ultimately given a philosophical orientation by Croce who interpreted it as a pleasure of 'intuition' in the 20th century.

(iv) The aesthetic pleasure is a specific and unique pleasure, distinct from all other kinds of pleasures—material as well as spiritual. It is an absolute experience incapable of being explained in terms of the material experience. Although this concept is very old, it was presented from a new angle by A. C. Bradley, Clive Bell and other aesthetes in the beginning of the 20th century. There is an element of mysticism or at least mystery in this concept and Richards has discovered positive traces of the mystical theories of Kant and Hegel. Yet, it will not be correct to identify this concept of the 'specific' or the 'unique' experience with spiritual joy, because according to the aesthetes this 'specific' experience of Art is different not only from the material pleasure, but from the common conception of spiritual joy as well.

Let us now start from the end because this last concept in spite of the support of an age long tradition seems to be more vulnerable than others. All the arguments given in favour of the specific character of an aesthetic experience make it clear that it is different from (i) a direct or indirect psycho physical experience, (ii) a purely intellectual experience such as the experience of solving a problem or proving a hypothesis as also from (iii) a spiritual experience the yogic experience, for example. But this does not prove that it cannot be explained in terms of the usual experiences of the human mind—that it is not an experience of this world. It contains sensuous as well as intellectual elements and for those who believe in the existence of Soul it also contains an element of the spiritual experience. The pattern of this experience is different from the other categories of usual experiences but its ingredients are not essentially different. Consequently, although different in form, it does not differ from them in



nature. After all, a detached experience or an impersonal or universalized experience is also a sublimated form of the psycho-physical experience. Richards has rightly argued that in the entire process of an aesthetic experience or appreciation, our sense-organs, mind and intellect, serve as the inevitable media and, therefore, so long as we do not discover a separate 'specific' sense-organ for the perception of an aesthetic phenomenon, it will be illogical to conceive of the aesthetic emotion as a 'unique' experience. And that puts an end to the aesthetic theory with all its ingenuities.

The aesthetic pleasure is a pleasure of imagination—this is only a partial truth. Here the most significant fact in the context of art, namely that the human emotions form the substratum of the aesthetic experience, has been ignored. The basis of all art is our psychic life: imagination is its medium and an essential medium without doubt. Yet imagination alone cannot create art unless it has got the required material-basis in the form of human emotions. Therefore the pleasure derived from art is not just the pleasure of imagination. Imagination plays a very important part outside the range of art as well, for example, in scientific inventions. But the pleasure of imagination enjoyed by a scientist has nothing to do with an aesthetic experience. The exclamation of 'Eureka' cannot be poetry by any stretch of imagination. Besides, imagination itself is a faculty of the mind and as such an imaginative pleasure is also a mental-cum-intellectual experience and cannot be regarded as a separate category by itself.

The pleasure derived from art is a kind of spiritual joy—transcendental and super-sensuous. This is, I am afraid, a concept difficult to be proved or disproved by reason because the existence and conception of Soul are matters of permanent controversy. If I do not have necessary scientific data to prove the existence of Soul, I do not, at the same time, have any unimpeachable evidences to disprove it. I would, therefore, accept the traditional view. According to the Sāivite school of Indian Philosophy, joy is in the nature of the Spirit and accordingly every form of pleasure, from the lowest to the highest, in one way or the other, is a manifestation of the Spirit. The difference between the psycho-physical and the spiritual joy is a difference of quality and not of essence and thereby the aesthetic pleasure is different from the spiritual pleasure only in quality, or only in so far as it is not an absolute state of bliss. The Vedānta also arrives at a similar conclusion from a different angle, of course, and defines sensual pleasure as a semblance of the Spiritual Bliss: as such aesthetic pleasure which is more or less purged of the taints of nature comes very near the Reality

or the Real Bliss The Western Idealists define it as a transcendental experience—a joy which transcends the sense-organs and is felt by the Spirit directly

In this context, if we accept the definition of the Śaivite philosophers, then there can be no controversy because the difference between one kind of pleasure and another finally disappears in that case But it is not so in practice, and we do make a distinction Actually the Idealists also do not identify aesthetic pleasure with spiritual joy. According to the Indian thinkers, it is very akin to and not identical with spiritual joy, and the Western philosophers also believe that this experience passes through the psycho physical media in the earlier stages although ultimately it transcends them all and enters into the purer regions of the Spirit Thus the difference between the two is evident, even though it may be a difference of quality and not of the essence Whereas the spiritual joy is an absolute experience of the Supreme Self the aesthetic pleasure has a material basis invariably This material basis is extremely refined it is an impersonal or universalized emotion no doubt yet it is there because the impersonal or universalized experience also is, in the ultimate analysis, a material experience and not a spiritual experience like a yogic experience or the experience of religious meditation It is a state of sublimation, a liberated state of the psyche but it does not transcend the psyche

Now remains the first thesis viz , the aesthetic experience is a material pleasure Although it has been presented rather crudely by its exponents, by Plato on the one hand and by Marx and Freud on the other, yet it becomes difficult to reject it The pleasure derived from art is a material pleasure art is a material phenomenon and its enjoyment is obviously an experience of this world Except in the case of mysticism, the subject matter of all art consists of the normal human experiences, its tools and instruments also are the faculties of the mind viz , imagination and intellect, the media of appeal are the sense organs on the physical plane and the imaginative sensibility on the higher psychic plane and lastly the recipient is the normal human being with all his impulses fully developed—and not a mystic or a devotee Therefore, it is difficult to disbelieve that it is an experience of this world a human experience As such we shall have to determine its character within the range and in the terms of Psychology

It will be more fruitful to base our observations on a concrete work of art Here is a beautiful verse of Bhavabhūti



Viniścetum śakyo na sukhamiti va duḥkhamiti va  
 Pramoho nidra va kimu viśavisarpaḥ kimu madaḥ  
 Tava sparśe sparśe mama hi parimudhendriyagaṇo  
 Vikaraścaitanyam bhramayati ca sammilayati ca

(*Uttararamacarita* I 35)

I cannot determine whether it is pleasure or pain whether stupor or sleep, whether the working of poison or intoxication, at every touch of thine a certain sensation comes upon me which stupefying all my senses now bewilders my consciousness now paralyses it

My experience on reading this poem is obviously pleasant, the theme is based on love and my mind passes through feelings of eros to attain this pleasant experience. Yet the fact remains that there is an obvious difference between this experience and the actual experience of love and I am definitely conscious of this difference—every enlightened reader is. What is the nature of this difference? The experience of love in life is direct, my ego is deeply involved and as such it is more intense. The experience of the love poem is not a direct psycho-physical experience my ego is not involved therein and therefore it is not as intense. It would be necessary to analyse the whole process of this artistic experience in order to explain its character. When I read this poem the music of its words and rhythm immediately catch my ear then almost imperceptibly its meaning reveals itself thereafter by the magic of the poetic diction i.e. by force of the imaginative use of the language my imagination is activated a number of free images are conjured up and under the stimulus of a variety of subsidiary emotions the instinct of love is roused in my consciousness which is liberated from the involvements of the ego—because this love is not directed towards any particular object and is as such impersonal and detached and finally the whole psycho physical process culminates in a pleasant experience.

Human experience can be divided into three broad categories sensual mental and intellectual. This classification is obviously very broad and no category can be exclusive because of the extremely intricate and complex nature of our experiences wherein all the faculties of the human personality are simultaneously involved yet it is on the whole a workable classification based on the primary use of one faculty or the other. The experience of a dear person's embrace is for example a sensual pleasure its reminiscence is a mental pleasure and the solution of a powerful problem of an emotional problem

say, of a precise definition of this particular emotional experience in the present context, is an intellectual pleasure. Where does the aesthetic pleasure derived from the love poem quoted above fit in? Surely, this is not the pleasure of a physical union with the beloved nor is it by any chance the pleasure of a successful analysis of an amorous experience. Is it then the experience of a pleasant reminiscence conjured up by our memory? Here we have to pause for a while, because there is obviously some similarity—this experience of a pleasant reminiscence is like the aesthetic pleasure, a reflex experience in which imagination plays the major part. Yet, the two are not identical, because a reminiscence is basically personal wherein our ego is invariably involved, it is not detached and is only partially liberated. It is an action of the memory which is a passive form of imagination and as such it is only a revival of a past experience—unlike the aesthetic experience, which is an action of the active or the creative imagination and is, therefore, not just a revival but a recreation of a past experience. The aesthetic experience is different from the experience of a reminiscence because of its impersonal and creative character, which purges it of all the base elements and imparts a pleasurable quality. Thus the aesthetic experience is the pleasant experience of an imaginative recreation of an emotion. The process of imaginative recreation involves in some measure an action of the intellect as well, because after all it is to a certain degree a conscious and a deliberate activity at least in the later stages of composition or ‘externalization’, to use Croce’s expression. And, this brings in the intellectual element as well within the pattern of the aesthetic experience.

So, in the final analysis, the aesthetic experience can be defined as a complex experience, pleasant in essence, in which the emotional and intellectual elements are blended in a subtle harmony. It has a separate identity because it is more refined than the emotional pleasure and more colourful than the intellectual pleasure.



### 13. TRAGIC PLEASURE OR THE ENJOYMENT OF THE PATHETIC SENTIMENT\*

*Professor Nagendra*

In Indian Poetics, Tragic Pleasure or the enjoyment of the Pathetic Sentiment never assumed the form of a problem—as if the accompaniment of the word 'Rasa' or 'aesthetic bliss' ruled out the very possibility of controversy on the subject. Therefore we do not come across any sustained discussions or well-argued positive answers to the question. Yet the Indian mind was vitally conscious of the enigma and has in its usual philosophical way made an acute analysis and suggested impressive answers: the solutions are, however, only implicit and not explicit because the problem did not assume such proportions as in the West.

The general answer is that it is basically unwarranted to apply the natural cause-and-effect theory of normal human life to Poetry. Poetry is a peculiar unworldly phenomenon which cannot be defined in terms of ordinary human logic—it is an extraordinary creation of a supernatural, supernormal genius and as such the ordinary rules of life cannot govern it. Sorrow emanates from sorrow, fear proceeds from fear in usual life: but the poetic genius performs the miracle of affording pleasure from painful situations, of converting horror or terror into pleasure:

Hetutvam śokaharṣādergatebhyo loksaṃśrayāt  
Śokaharṣādayo loke jāyantām nāma laukikāḥ. (6)  
Alaukikavibhāvatvam prāptebhyaḥ kāvyasaṃśrayāt  
Sukham sañjāyate tebhyaḥ sarvebhyo'piti kā kṣatiḥ. (7)  
(*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, III, 6-7)

'In the worldly life, well-known causes of pleasure or pain might lead to painful experience, but in poetry they assume a supernatural character. And hence, what is the harm in believing that in Poetry they cause pleasure invariably?'

This is one simple stock answer to the much-vexed question of Modern Poetics. I need hardly remind the students of Western criticism that this explanation anticipates in its own way all those theories of the Aesthetes like Bradley and Clive Bell of the 20th century

who emphasize the specific character of poetic experience and claim complete autonomy for poetry and art. In the words of Bradley

'First this experience is an end in itself, is worth having on its own account, has an intrinsic value. Next, its poetic value is this intrinsic worth alone. For its nature is to be not a part, nor yet a copy of the real world as we commonly understand that phrase, but to be a world by itself, independent, complete, autonomous.'

—A. C. Bradley *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, page 5

These critics have, of course, used the word 'experience' and not 'joy', but as I have explained in my introduction to Aristotle's *Poetics*<sup>1</sup>, the aesthetes, directly or indirectly, believed in the principle of aesthetic joy.

This answer underlines the supernatural character of aesthetic joy and naturally it stands or falls by that. This is really true that in almost every country the literary thinkers of the past have claimed that the poet's genius is a supernatural phenomenon and his activity also is consequently supernatural. Plato himself believed in the theory of divine madness of the poet. But today, after all the advances in the sciences of the Mind and the Matter, it is too late to revive or even accept the theory except in a metaphorical sense. It does not require a serious effort to prove that between poetic genius and other genius or between poetic activity and the intellectual activities and consequently between poetic and other emotional cum intellectual experience, there is a difference only of quality and not of nature. Therefore, whereas it is not to be denied that the experience of poetised sorrow is certainly different from that of actual sorrow, it is certainly not supernatural or peculiar in the sense that it cannot be defined in terms of the science of emotions. Without being a direct experience of sorrow, it still remains a psychic experience all right. And hence this answer does not go very far in solving the problem.

Another solution is suggested by the 'Theory of Universalization' propounded by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in the 8th-9th century A. D. According to him, the poetic experience is never personal or individual; it is always universal. The emotional experiences are so portrayed in literature that they are freed from their personal limitations, they cease to be the experiences of the particular hero or the heroine and become the common experiences of all the receptive and responsive readers or playgoers. Freed from the limitations of time and space

<sup>1</sup>*Arastu Ka Kavyasūtra* Introduction pp. 91-100-101



in this way, they are elevated and refined—their edges are rounded and stings lost. Thus, in their universalized form, pity and fear are both enjoyed.

Tasmat kavye doṣābhavaguṇalakāramayatvalakṣaṇena nāṭye  
caturvidhābhīnayarūpeṇa nibīdanujamohasankaṭatanivāraṇa  
karīṇa vibhavadisādharaṇīkaraṇātmana abhidhato dvitīyena  
śīlā bhāvkatvavyapāreṇa bhavyamāno raso bhogena  
param bhuṅyate<sup>1</sup>

The gist of this quotation is that, according to Bhaṭṭa Nayaka, the poet with the help of a certain functional quality called 'Bhavakata-va' which is very much akin to 'imagination', lends poetic enchantment to the word and the meaning and presents the painful emotions like sorrow and anger also along with their subjects in a universalized form.

Thus the poet has at his command two positive inter-related faculties, namely the imaginative faculty and the faculty for universalization—they are inter related because universalization also is ultimately effected by the faculty of imagination. Under the spell of imagination 'sorrow' loses its peculiarity, divorced from personal associations it is freed from the sordid attributes of common physical experiences and a sublimation of the emotion takes place. In terms of Indian philosophy we can explain this process all the more effectively. All personal experience is limited and the feeling of limitation is by itself a painful experience. But when it transcends personal limits and is universalized, it is converted into a veritable pleasure because the feeling of universality is essentially pleasant. We find some vague indications of this answer in Aristotle's theory of Catharsis, only vague indications, and not the full fledged explanation which has been offered by Professor Butcher on behalf of Aristotle on the basis of the later advances in Western Criticism. 'The sting of the pain,' says Butcher, 'the disquiet and unrest, arise from the selfish element which in the world of reality clings to these emotions. The pain is expelled when the taint of egotism is removed' (*Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* p. 268). Butcher is himself conscious that he has overdone the job and adds by way of explanation: 'If it is objected that the notion of universalizing the emotions and ridding them of an intrusive element that belongs to the sphere of the accidental and individual, is a modern conception, which we have no warrant for attributing to

<sup>1</sup>Abhinavagupta *Abhinavabhāratī* (Backward & Oriental Series Vol. I (1961), p. 277

Aristotle, we may reply that if this is not what Aristotle meant, it is at least the natural outcome of his doctrine ' Bhaṭṭa Nayaka's theory, however, is as complete in itself as it is convincing One of the most effective processes of sublimation according to modern Psychology is 'the socialization of the Ego', which is in essence the same thing as the 'universalization of the personal experience'

Allardyce Nicoll has spoken of the 'feeling of universality' almost in the same context while discussing the various causes of 'tragic pleasure' 'Part (of the tragic relief) too comes from that very sense of universality—which has been stated to be the fundamental characteristic of all high tragedy—some form of contact with forces divine, if we are atheistic we shall say it is a contact with the vast, illimitable forces of the Universe'

—*The Theory of Drama*, p 131

The third answer is implied in the theory of Revelation Abhivya-kativada of Abhinavagupta who was possibly a junior contemporary of Bhaṭṭa Nayaka Drawing on the philosophical treasures of Śaivite Philosophy, Abhinavagupta has propounded that Rasa or aesthetic bliss is not created but is only revealed There is no cause-and-effect relationship between Poetry and aesthetic bliss therefore the question of tragic scenes giving rise to sorrow or fear does not arise According to Abhinavagupta the soul is the abode of eternal bliss, it is by nature blissful But on account of its associations with the mundane life, its purity is tarnished and a sort of moss gathers over the crystal stream of perennial joy There are various ways and means of removing this moss and restoring the original purity and blissful state of the Soul such as the Yoga or devotion or other spiritual practices As soon as the moss is removed, the stream of joy flows clear and crystal again Poetry is also one of these ways and means, although its effect is less permanent, yet it does succeed in removing the moss Thus poetry does not cause or create bliss it only opens the veil and lays bare the eternal bliss which resides in the soul

Asmanmate tu samvedanamevanandaghanamasvadyate Tatra  
ka duḥkhaśanka Kevalam tasyaiva citratakaraṇe ratisokadi  
vasanāvyaparaḥ<sup>1</sup>

i.e. 'In our opinion the ever blissful consciousness itself is enjoyed in the form of aesthetic pleasure, there is no question of pain The emotions like love and pathos are only to lend it variety'



All good poetry which succeeds in doing this leads to bliss—irrespective of its theme. The theme may be tragic or comic or romantic—so long as it is successfully poeticized it must restore our soul to its essential blissful state. That is how a successful tragedy also leads to pleasure in the same way as a successful romance does. This is obviously a metaphysical theory and we find its echoes in critics like Coleridge and Croce in the West.

Sardatanaya, a critic of the 13th century, comes out with another explanation which is also based on Saivite philosophy. According to him, this world is a mixture of good and evil, of pleasure and pain. Evil and pain are unavoidable in life, yet the soul by means of its certain permanent attributes (Raga, Vidya and Kala) enjoys it. The impulse for bliss is so powerful in the soul that it breaks down all barriers and forces and painful elements also to yield bliss because bliss alone is the reality. By the same process the soul of the reader discovers joy even in tragic scenes.

All these critics have, on the whole, a positive outlook; they all believe in the pleasure of pain. But there is another remarkable work on Sanskrit dramaturgy—the *Natyadarpaṇa* of Ramacandra and Guna-candra who flourished in the 12th century A.D. The two authors have boldly challenged the tradition and laid down in unmistakable terms that Rasa or aesthetic experience is not pleasant only; it is both pleasant and unpleasant: *sukha-duḥkhatmakō Rasaḥ*. They believe that the reader or the playgoer takes delight in a poetic work or a drama not because the painful emotions portrayed in the theme are transmuted into pleasurable experiences, but because he is charmed by the art of the poet and the actor and is deceived into finding a kind of enjoyment in the performance. The painful emotion remains painful without doubt, but the marvel of the poetic and the histrionic art fills him with a sort of rapturous astonishment in which the consciousness of the painful element is merged for the time being. This is a fore-runner of the Formal Theory of the West which propounds that the embellishments of poetry and stage lend enchantment to a tragic work and round off its painful edges.

To quote Nicoll once again:

There is the presence of the creative artistic power of the dramatist himself and particularly in the Greek and Elizabethan plays, the rhythm of the verse to reave away our minds for a moment from the gloomy depths of the tragedy. A more detailed consideration of the use and of the value of verse in tragedy we may leave till later, but

here it may be observed that verse in many cases acts as a kind of anaesthetic on our senses. The sharp edge of the pain is removed in the plays of Aeschylus and Shakespeare and though it becomes more poignant in some ways, yet it is rest of its crudeness and sordidness by the beauty of the language.

The note in the *Valyadarpana* contains one more answer which is again implicit. It is said that the taste of a work of poetry or drama is very much like that of a saucy drink. Just as in this drink a number of spices of all tastes—sweet, bitter, sour—are mixed up and they all contribute to the 'ultimate taste', in the same way in human life all experiences—pleasant and unpleasant—are mixed up and contribute to the ultimate enjoyment of life. In ordinary parlance, the bitter, the sour and the sweet are all called *Rasas* or tastes—so also in poetry the pathetic, the horrible, the terrible, the humorous and the beautiful are called *Rasas*. Just as the mixture of the bitter improves the taste of the drink, in the same way the mixing up of the tragic or the pathetic enriches the ultimate aesthetic experience. This explanation is more pragmatic than philosophical. But it contains the germ of the famous 'Interest Theory' of Western Criticism. Human life is a mixed pattern of pleasure and pain—both of them are equally inevitable and the human mind is naturally interested in both. The funeral engages our attention as much as the marriage, may be a little more. By the same logic, man is attracted towards a tragic play, his interest in the inevitable gloom of life invariably draws him to a tragedy. It is not for the lighter entertainment or the pleasure, but for the inherent interest in life in all its vicissitudes, that he loves to read or witness a tragedy. We find echoes of this theory in Lucas: 'Life is fascinating to watch whatever it may be to experience. And so we go to tragedies not in the least to get rid of emotions but to have them more abundantly to banquet not to purge' —*Tragedy*, p. 52

These are in brief the various answers suggested by Indian Poetics to the problem of tragic pleasure. One more could be found in the realm of philosophy. According to the Buddhist philosophy, pain is one of the Supreme Truths of life. The realization of truth is always a positive gain, it is a joyful experience in essence. Tragedy, which emphasizes the Supreme Truth in life is a veritable means of this realization and ultimately results in a happy experience. In Western philosophy, quite obviously under the influence of Buddhism, Schopenhauer has given the same explanation—according to him tragedy



understand better the ultimate reality—namely ‘the utter vanity of living’ Schlegel also offers a similar explanation although his argument is a little different. His belief is that in tragedy we have the consciousness of ‘a destiny soaring above this earthly life and we find something consoling and elevating’. Such consciousness is not unknown in Indian literature, for ages the Indian mind has been deriving solace from the consciousness of a destiny soaring above earthly life.

Karamagatī t̥āre nāhi t̥āre

Muni Basiṣṭha se paṇḍit gyāni sodhi ke lagan dhare

Sita haraṇa, maraṇa Daśarath ko, bana men bipatī pare

‘Inevitable are the ways of Destiny

A seer like Vasiṣṭha made all calculations and everything was done most auspiciously,

Yet Rāma was robbed of his wife, lost his father and was miserably stranded in the jungle’

This problem has been tackled in a more optimistic way—possibly by Burke, who explained that tragedy was enjoyable because of the atmosphere of nobility and magnanimity which pervaded it. There is a veritable fall in a tragedy but it is the fall of the mighty and the virtuous, which rouses not pity but admiration in the spectator. The hero suffers, but his suffering sublimates his character and the spectator also shares this process of sublimation of personality. No poetic work illustrates this argument better than the *Rāmayaṇa* depicting the sufferings of Rāma who personifies nobility.

Such solutions, I may repeat, are found only in the realm of philosophy or philosophical poetry or ethics and ethical poetry, they are not accepted in Indian Poetics, directly or even indirectly for the simple reason that they are in contravention of the fundamental theory of *Rasa* which is based on the theory of ‘*Ānanda*’.

These explanations cover almost all the answers offered by Western Poetics. There are a few more given by Russo, Hume and others, namely (a) that we find a sort of gratification in the distress of others or (b) that pleasure and pain are sisters and in meeting with one we discern the form of the other, or (c) that we watch a tragedy to get out of boredom because it is better to be afflicted than to be bored. But they are not to be taken very seriously. The Indian critics have arrived at their conclusions, independently of course, in most of the cases they have forestalled the theories of their Western colleagues.

Their way of thinking is, without doubt, more profound and their arguments have sounder philosophical basis. They have at times mystified their explanations by using certain metaphysical terms or by starting on premises which the modern mind may find difficult to accept as such. But that is not enough to reject them as unscientific. A scientific, rational and psychological reorientation is easily possible in almost every case and it has never caused me much difficulty in rationalizing them in the modern way.

In this context, one is naturally reminded of the great Aristotle and the solution offered by him in his famous theory of Catharsis. For Aristotle, the experience of reading or watching a tragedy is a process of psychic purgation. According to him 'by arousing pity and fear tragedy affects a purgation of these and kindred emotions with the result that the painful element is extracted and the mental equilibrium is restored.' The explanation is fairly convincing but it goes only half way. To the Indian thinker, such an experience is negative. It is only the extraction of the painful element and not a positive enjoyment. It only prepares the ground for the aesthetic bliss to blossom forth. As it is, it is only a sort of relief and not an enjoyment. Contrary to this, the experience envisaged in Indian Poetics has a positive character. It is not just a relief from pain, but a veritable enjoyment, it is a self fulfilment and since it is achieved after breaking through the hurdles of pain and sorrow, it is all the more profound and powerful. And that accounts for the poetic outburst of Bhavabhūti who asserted that there is only one sentiment, the Pathetic—*Eko rasah karuṇa eva*.

### CONCLUSION

Thus, for more than two thousands years, the Western and Eastern, the ancient and the modern, thinkers have been struggling to solve this problem. Yet it seems to be where it was—at least we have not found any unimpeachable answer which may be universally accepted. In the light of the above discussions, we can safely draw the following conclusions —

(i) There is a grain of truth almost in every answer, even in the principle of malicious pleasure, the difference is only of the degree, i.e., some answers are comparatively more acceptable than others—that is all.

(ii) No single answer is complete in itself so as to meet all doubts and objections. If you believe in the existence of a Soul which is essentially blissful, then Abhinavagupta's argument should suffice.



But this 'if'—this proviso—is not so simple because how many can have this belief today and how can they have it? By the laws of general logic and general psychology the solution given by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka without its metaphysical concepts seems to be quite profound many a Western thinker has accepted or echoed it in his own way This solution combines in itself the principles of artistic synthesis and universality which are fairly convincing by themselves

(iii) Therefore we shall have to combine several arguments together in one to evolve an adequate formula—because in actuality also several conditions combine together to convert pain into pleasure in a piece of art for example (a) the sentiment of sorrow depicted in a work of art is not a direct but imaginative experience and there can be no doubt that its sting is considerably minimized as a consequence, (b) In Tragic Poetry pathos is mostly associated with the great and the noble—this association with greatness and virtue relieves sorrow of all its sordid elements and lends it a peculiar grandeur The tragic scenes generally represent the dignity of the human soul at its climax and they invariably refine and sublimate our emotional responses The personal sufferings of Rama for example in the *Ramayana* are adorned with a divine halo by his unshaken fidelity to social duty Such scenes emphasize the grave and the serious side of life and help in the realization of the deeper truths of human existence Realization of truth is indeed an achievement which elevates the soul Thus the pathetic contents in a piece of art help us in the enjoyment of life in its fullness

(c) And lastly the artistic process removes the remnant of pain Artistic creation is a process of synthesis by effecting harmony in diffused elements the artist creates a unity in diversity and imparts form to the formless and the deformed This is called artistic unity in Aesthetics it brings about secretly a harmony of emotional experiences which in its turn gives comfort to the psyche I cannot in this context resist the temptation of reproducing a passage from one of my own earlier works 'Experience is composed of sensations and it is never one solitary sensation but a system or pattern of sensations When the sensations are coordinated and harmonized our experience is pleasant and when they are discordant and dishevelled the experience is unpleasant The sensations derived from art are not direct but reflex This by itself relieves them of their sting to a considerable extent and besides they pass through a process of coordination and systematization during the artistic contemplations by the poet Thus they are invariably reduced to a pleasant harmony, because the

poetic contemplation is essentially a process of effecting unity in diversity which at the level of the psyche is, without doubt, a gratifying experience. In this way, the painful experiences of life, when their basic sensations are coordinated and systematized, are converted into a *unified happy experience in art* '.

This is how the paradox of Tragic Pleasure can be resolved at least that is how I have been able to satisfy myself



## THE CONTRIBUTORS

### 1 P V Kane (1880 )

Mahamahopadhyaya Dr Pandurang Vaman Kane, National Professor, Ex Vice Chancellor, University of Bombay, and Ex Member of Parliament, is a veteran scholar of Hindu Law and Sanskrit Literature. His *History of Sanskrit Poetics* is a pioneer work in the field although his monumental contribution is the *History of Dharma Śāstra* (5 volumes) for which he received the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1956. He has been honoured by the highest national distinction of 'Bharataratna'. The portion selected from his writings appears in the second part of his *History of Sanskrit Poetics*.

### 2 M Hiriyanna (1871-1950)

M Hiriyanna, Professor of Sanskrit at the Maharajah's College, University of Mysore was a recognised authority on Indian Philosophy. His work *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* is one of the most popular and authoritative works on the subject. Several collections of his writings and lectures on subjects like the little known Pre-Sankara Vedantins, the *Philosophy of Values*, *Quest for Perfection* and *Indian Aesthetics*, have been published posthumously. His articles on Indian Aesthetics have been compiled in *Art Experience* from which the material presented here has been extracted.

### 3 S Kuppuswamy Sastri (1880-1943)

Mahamahopadhyaya Vidyavacaspati S Kuppuswamy Sastri, M A I E S, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the Presidency College Madras and Curator of the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, combined in himself the old Pandit's erudition in Śāstras with the intellectual equipment of a modern scholar. Equally at home in Kavya and Śāstra, he edited and wrote several works of distinction such as *The Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana*, *The Vibhrama vivēka of Maṇḍana*, *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, *Compromises in the History of Vedānta*, *Dhvanyaloka with Locana and Kaumudī*-Vol I, and also brought out a large number of volumes of Descriptive Catalogues of the Sanskrit Manuscripts. The two articles given in this volume are adapted from his second and third lectures delivered at the Annamalai University in 1931 and published in book form under the title *Highways and*

*Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, issued by the Research Institute founded in his name in Madras

4 *S K De* (1890-1968)

Dr Sushul Kumar De, M A , LL B D Litt , formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Bengali at the Dacca University and later Professor of Sanskrit at the Jadavpur University, was a pioneer in the field of Indian Poetics in modern times and a prominent figure in Bengali literature as well. His major publications are *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (two volumes), *Early History of the Vaishnava Faith and Movement in Bengal*, *History of Sanskrit Kavya Literature* and two Parvans of the critical edition of the *Mahabharata*, Poona. The first article included in this volume is taken from a collection of his critical essays entitled *History of Sanskrit Poetics* and the second is adapted from his Introduction to his edition of Kuntaka's *Vakroktijivita*.

5 *S N Dasgupta* (1885-1952)

Dr Surendra Nath Dasgupta, D Litt (Honoris Causa, Rome) formerly Professor of Mental and Moral Sciences, University of Calcutta and then Professor of Sanskrit, Edinburgh University in 1945 was one of the foremost philosophers of modern India known for his scholarship and versatility. His magnum opus is *The History of Indian Philosophy* in several volumes some of which were posthumously published. Among his other works are *A History of Sanskrit Literature* and *Fundamentals of Indian Art*. The present essay is taken from *A History of Sanskrit Literature* Vol I.

6 *T N Sreekanthaya* (1906-1966)

T Nanjundaya Sreekanthaya, formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Kannada, University of Mysore, was a sensitive scholar of Sanskrit Poetics and a leading literary critic in Kannada. His important original works on literary criticism are *Bharatiya Kavya Mimamsa*, *Kavya Sameeksha* and *Samalokana*. This essay on Imagination originally appeared in the Indian Historical Quarterly Volume XIII No 1, in March, 1937.

7 *R Gnoli* (born January 20, 1930, in Rome)

Dr Raneiro Gnoli is Professor of Indology in the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy at Università degli Studi, Rome. Some of his major



*Inscriptions in Gupta Characters* Part I in 2 volumes, *The Pramāṇavarttika of Dharmakīrti*, *Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the Kāvyaalankāra of Bhaṃha*. The contribution included here appears as an Introduction to the 1st edition of his book *The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*

#### 8 V Raghavan (1908– )

Dr Venkatarama Raghavan, M A , Ph D is the Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit at the University of Madras. He has received several distinctions including the Kane Gold Medal of the Bombay Asiatic Society and the Indian Republic Day Award of Padma Bhushan. His chief official undertaking at the University of Madras is the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* an inventory of Sanskrit works and authors in manuscripts and print. His contributions to the various aspects of Indian aesthetics, poetry, drama and music have been voluminous. Apart from numerous papers in this field his major works are *Some Concepts of Alamkāra Śāstra*, *The Number of Rasas* and *Bhoja's Śṅgāra Prakāśa* for which he received the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1966. Author of a number of short and long poems and plays in Sanskrit he edits also the *Samskr̥ta Pratibha*, the Sahitya Akademi Journal for contemporary original writings in Sanskrit. A student of Professor S. Kuppuswamy Sastri, he was responsible for the posthumous publication of his Professor's Lectures and was also closely associated with Professor M. Hiriyanna and also connected with the revised editions of the *Histories of Indian Poetics* by Drs P. V. Kane and S. K. De. The selections included in this book are from his *Concepts of Alamkāra Śāstra* and *Bhoja's Śṅgāra Prakāśa*.

#### 9 Nagendra (1915– )

Dr Nagendra M A., D Litt , Hindi Critic Professor and Head of the Department of Hindi University of Delhi has specialised in the comparative study of Indian and Western Poetics. Some of his major works are *Riti Kāvya Kī Bhoomika*, *Aastha ke Charaṇ* (a complete volume of 101 critical essays), *Arastoo ka Kāvya Śāstra*, *Bharatiya Kāvya Śāstra kī Bhoomika* and *Rasa Siddhanta* for which he received the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1966. Most of the classical works on Sanskrit Poetics and some volumes on the critical theories and attitudes in the West have been translated and published in Hindi under his editorship. The two articles included in this book are English adaptations from his *magnum opus*—the *Rasa Siddhanta*.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### A. Sanskrit Texts

- Agnipurāṇa, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 41, Poona, 1900.  
Abhijñānaśākuntala of Kālidāsa  
Abhidhāvṛttimāṭṛkā of Mukulabhaṭṭa, Nirnaya sagar Press, Bombay, 1916.  
Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta, Commentary (C) on the Nāṭya Śāstra, Gaekwad's Oriental Series Vol. I 1st edn. 1926, 2nd edn 1956 Vol II 1934, Vol III 1954.  
Alaṃkāraustubha of Kavikarṇapūrāgosvāmin, Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi, 1926  
Alaṃkārasarvasva of Ruṣyaka (i) with Jayaratha's C. Kāvyaṃālā 35, 1939; (ii) with Samudrabandha's C, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 40, 1926, (iii) with Vidyācakravartin's C. Meharchand Lachhmandas, Delhi, 1963.  
Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.  
Uttararāmacarita of Bhavabhūti.  
Ēkāvalī of Vidyādhara, with C of Mallinātha, Bombay Sanskrit Series 63, 1903.  
Rgveda  
Aucityavicāracarcā of Kṣemendra, Kāvyaṃālā Gucchaka I.  
Kavikaṇṭhābharāṇa of Kṣemendra, Kāvyaṃālā Gucchaka 4.  
Kādambarī of Bāṇabhaṭṭa  
Kāvyaakautuka of Bhaṭṭa Tauta (fragments in citations)  
Kāvyaṃprakāśa of Mammaṭa (i) with Māṇikyacandra's C. Saṅketa, Govt. Oriental Library Series 60, Mysore 1922; (ii) with C's of Vidyācakravartin and Bhaṭṭa Gopala, 2 parts, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 88, 100, 1926, 1930 (iii) with the C of Śrīdhara (Sandhivigraha), Calcutta Sanskrit College, 2 parts, 1959, 1961  
Kāvyaṃmāmsā of Rājasekhara, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1916, 1924, 1934.  
Kāvyaadarśa of Daṇḍin, (i) with C's by Taruṇavācaspati and the Hṛdayaṃgamā by M. Rangacharya, Madras, 1910, (ii) with C. of Vādyaṅghra ed. by V. Krishnamachariar, Madras 1936  
Kāvyaṃnuśāsana of Vagbhata, with his own C, Kāvyaṃālā 43, 1915  
Kāvyaṃnuśāsana of Hemacandra, with his own C's Alaṃkāra Cūdāmanī and Viveka, Kāvyaṃālā 70, 1901  
Kāvyaālaṃkāra of Bhāmaha, Kasi Sanskrit Series, Varanasi 61, 1928, with English translation by P. V. Naganatha Sastry, Tanjore, 1927.  
Kāvyaālaṃkāra of Rudraṭa with the C of Namisādhu, Kāvyaṃālā 2, 1928  
Kāvyaālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha of Udbhaṭa, (i) with the C of Pratihārendurāja, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1925, (ii) with the C. of Tilaka (Vivṛti), Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1931.  
Kāvyaālaṃkāra Sūtras and Vṛtti of Vāmana (i) Kāvyaṃālā 15, 1895 (ii) with C of Tippabhūpāla, Vanī Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1909  
Kumārasambhava of Kālidāsa  
Kūvalayānanda of Appayadīkṣita, (i) with C Rasikarañjanī of Gangādhara Vājapeyī, Kumbhakonam, 1892, (ii) with C. Alaṃkāracandrikā by Vaidyanātha Tatsat, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1917  
Candrāloka of Jayadeva, with Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa's C, Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1923  
Campū Rāmāyana of Bhoja, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1914.  
Citramīmāmsā of Appayadīkṣita, Kāvyaṃālā 38, 1926  
Tāpasavatsarāja of Anangaharṣa Māyu (tra) rāja, ed by H. H. Yadugiri Sampat-kumara Ramanuja Jeer, Bangalore, 1929  
Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya with Avaloka of Dhanika, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1897.



Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, (i) with Locana of Abhinavagupta, Kāvya-mālā 25, 1928, (ii) with Locana, Kaumudī of Uttuṅgodaya and Upalocana of Kuppaswami Sastri, Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras, 1944, (iii) also Kasi Sanskrit Series 135, Banares 1940 (See this for Locana on Ch IV of the Dhva-Ā)

Naṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa of Sāgaranandin, Text, Myles Dillon, Oxford University Press, London, 1937.

„ „ Translation Notes etc, M. Dillon, M. Fowler and V. Raghavan, Transactions of the Philosophical Society New Series Vol 50 pt 9, Philadelphia, 1960

Naṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, Gacwad s Oriental Series 48, 1929

Naṭya Śāstra of Bharata (i) Kavyamala 42, 1894 Revised edn 1943 (ii) Kasi Sanskrit Series, Chowkhamba, Varanasi 1929 (iii) with Abhinavabhāratī See Abhinavabhāratī

Nighaṇṭu and Nirukta of Yaska

Prataparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa of Vidyānātha

(1) Bombay Sanskrit Series 65, 1909, with Kumarasvamin's Ratnāpaṇa and Ratna-ṣaṇa

(2) With Ratnapaṇa, Balamanorama Press, Madras-4, 1914

(3) „ „ Revised edn, Sanskrit Education Society, Madras 1970

Buddhacarita of Aśvaghōṣa

Bhava-prakāśana of Śaradatanaya, Gacwad s Oriental Series, 45, 1929 30

Mahābhārata of Vyasa

Mahabhaṣya of Patañjali

Malavikāgnimitra of Kālidāsa

Mudrarakṣasa of Viśakhadatta

Raghuvamśa of Kālidāsa

Rasagangadhara of Jagannatha, Kāvya-mālā 12, 1888

Rasatarangīṇī of Bhanudatta, Venkateswara Press, Bombay, 1914

Rasapradīpika of Prabhakara, Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavan Texts 12, Banaras, 1925

Rasamanjari of Bhanudatta with C s of Ananta and Nāgeśa, Benares Sanskrit Series 1904, Gopal Narayan & Co, Bombay 1926

Rasarāvasudhakara of Singabhapala, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 50, 1916

Rasarāvalamkāra of Prakāśavarāṇa, V. V. Sarma *Indian Historical Quarterly* Calcutta, VI, p 173 also *Ibid* S. K. De, and Dr. V. Raghavan, *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, VIII pp 267 276

Ramayaṇa of Vālmīki

Vakroktiṣivita of Kuntaka, S. K. De, Calcutta 1923, 1928, 1961

Vākya-pāṇīya of Bhartṛhari

Vagbhataśālikāra of Vāgbhaṭa (I) Nirmayasagar Press Bombay, 1895, 1915

Vikramorvaśīya of Kālidāsa

Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, Venkateswara Press, Bombay, 1912

Vṛttivarttika of Appayadīkṣita, Kavyamala 36, 1910

Veṇīsamhara of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa

Vedāntasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa

Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa, with an incomplete commentary, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 5 1909

Śiśupālavadha of Magha

Śṛṅgaratūlaka of Rudrabhaṭṭa, Kāvya-mālā Guccaka 3

Saṅgitaratnākara of Śaṅgadeva, with Kallinātha's C (i) Ānandāśrama Series 35 Poona, 1896 1897 (ii) with C s of Śiṅgabhapāla and Kallinātha, 4 vols, Adyar Library, Adyar, 1943, 1953, 1954, 1959

Sarasvatīkaṇṭhabhaṭṭa of Bhoja, Alankāra, Kāvya-mālā, 95, 1925



- Sāhityadarpaṇa (S D ) of Viśvanatha, (i) with Sanskrit Introduction by MM Durga prasada Dviveda, Nirnayasagar Press, 1922, (ii) with introduction by P V Kane, 2nd edn , 1923, 3rd edn , 1951
- Sāhityamīmāṃsā, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 114, 1934
- Suṃtītilaka of Kaśemendra, Kāvyaṃala Guccaka II
- Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa
- Harṣacarita of Bāṇa

### B Works in English

- Aesthetic As Science of Expression and General Linguistic Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie Macmillan & Co Ltd , London 1909
- Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta The Gnoli, Reniero Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente Rome 1956 Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies Varanasi 1963
- Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art Butcher S H London 1895
- Art Bell, Clive G P Putman New York 1958
- Art Experience Hiriyanna M Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore 1954
- Bhoja's Sringara Prakasa Raghavan V Punarvasu' Madras 14 1963
- Biographical Note to 'Sister Songs' in a selection of poems of Francis Thompson Meynell, Wilfred 1895
- Complete Psychological Works of S Freud The Edited by James Starchey in collaboration with Anna Freud The International Psycho-Analytical Library
- Creative Imagination Downey, J T Kaegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co , London and New York 1929
- Critique of Judgment Kant, Immanuel English translation by J H Bernard Macmillan & Co 1892
- Discourse on the influence of Learning & Art (Social contract & Discourses) Rousseau, Jean Jacques Everyman's Library Series No 660
- Encyclopaedia Britannica XIVth Edn pp 263 b-272a Croce, B Article on Aesthetics
- English Composition and Rhetoric Ba n Alexander 2 parts Longmans Green & Co London 1890
- Innecads The Plotinus English translation by Stephen Mackenna 3rd Revised edition by B S Page London 1962
- Epigraphia Indica Vol 24 1937 The Archaeological Survey of India, The Manager of Publication Delhi (Govt of India Press, Calcutta 1942)
- Essay on Criticism Pope Alexander Macmillan & Co In a Collection, 1966
- Essays—'Of Tragedy' Hume, David 1874 5
- Fundamentals of Indian Art Dasgupta, S N Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1954
- Gupta Inscriptions Edited by Fleet, John F Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum. Vol III Inscriptions of the Early Gupta Kings and their successors Superintendent of Govt Printing, Calcutta, 1888
- Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit Kuppaswami Sastri, S Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras-4 1945
- History of Sanskrit Literature, A Classical Period Vol I Dasgupta, S N and De, S K University of Calcutta, Calcutta 1947
- History of Sanskrit Poetics  
—(Introduction to Sāhityadarpaṇa) Kane P V 3rd revised edn Bombay 1951  
Separately by Moulal Banaras das Delhi 1961  
—De S K 1st edn. 2 parts Calcutta 1923, 1925 2nd revised edn., under one cover, Calcutta 1960
- Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
- Is there a Poetic View of the World? Herford, C. H Proceedings of the British Academy for 1915 16, Vol VII pp 423-454
- Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland London



- Lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient & Modern Schlegel, Friedrich von  
Translation by J G Lockhart Edinburgh 1835-38
- 'Music in Ancient Indian Drama' V Raghavan, *Art and Letters* London, XXVIII,  
154, *Journal of the Music Academy*, Madras, XXVI iv, 1954, *Sangeet Natak*  
*Akademi Bulletin* March 1956
- Oxford Lectures on English Poetry Bradley, A C Macmillan & Co 1955
- Philosophy of Fine Art The Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich Translation by  
F P B. Osmonston London 1920 (4 Vols)
- Philosophy of Grammar, The Jespersen Otto George Allen & Unwin London  
1924-1925
- Poetic Diction Bridges Robert *The Forum* vol LXIX New York May 1923,  
(pp 1536-43) Also in his *Collected Essays*, Oxford University Press
- Poetics Aristotle Translation by Butcher, S H 2nd Revised Edition, London,  
1898
- Poetry as a Representative Art Raymond, G L London 5th edn 1909
- Prelude to Poetry, The The English Poets in defence and praise of their own Art  
Edited by Ernest Rhys Everyman's Library Series No 789
- Principia Ethica Moore, G E Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903
- Principles of Literary Criticism Abercrombie Lacelles In the Anthology 'Outline  
of Modern Knowledge', Victor Gollancz Ltd London 1931, 1931, 1932 (pp 859  
907)
- Principles of Literary Criticism Richards, I A Kaegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.  
Ltd London 1925
- Proceedings of the 1st All India Oriental Conference Poona 4 Vol II 1919
- Readings in Psychology
- Republic Plato Translation by Jowett B The Dialogues of Plato, *Encyclopaedia*  
*Britannica* 1952 (University of Chicago)
- Sadhana, The Realisation of Life Tagore, Rabindranath Macmillan & Co 1906
- Selected correspondence (Selections dealing with Philosophical subjects) Marx Karl
- Seven Arts and Seven Confusions Spingarn, J E In the collection 'Creative  
Criticism & Other Essays' by Author New York 1917 Oxford 1926
- Some Concepts of Alamkara Sastra Studies on Raghavan V The Adyar Library,  
Adyar Madras 20 1942
- Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics De S K., Firma, K L Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta.  
1959
- Spectator Addison Joseph 4 Vols Everyman's Library 167 London 1958
- Style Pater, Walter Works of W Pater Vol V Appreciations with an Essay on  
Style 1889 Macmillan Library edn, London 1910
- Style Raleigh Walter 1897
- Theory of Drama, The Nicoll, Allardyce George G Harrap & Co London New  
Edn 1931
- Theory of Poetry, The Abercrombie, Lacelles Martin Secker 1924
- Towards a Theory of Art, An Essay Abercrombie, Lacelles Second impression  
Martin Secker London 1926
- Tragedy in Relation to Aristotle's Poetics Lucas, F L London 1927
- World as Will and Idea, The Schopenhauer, Arthur Routledge & Kaegan Paul  
Ltd, London 10th impression, 1957 Translation by R. B Haldane and T Kemp  
in 3 Vols

#### C. Works in Hindi

- Nagendra Aastha ke Charan (1968), Arastoo kā kāvyā s āstra, (1967), Bhāratiya  
kāvyā-s āstra ki Bhumikā (1963), Rasa siddhānta (1969) The Second  
was published by Bharati Bhandar Allahabad and the rest by National  
Publishing House, Delhi